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A number of researchers have examined likely financial outcomes in retirement for female 
primary carers in Australia. This literature has been motivated by both the significant proportion 
of working age women providing care, and the social and economic value of their unpaid labour. 
Although offering valuable insights into the significant relation between the life-course timing of 
care provision and superannuation balances, the existing literature does not consider the financial 
consequences in retirement for women who care for their parents, and in particular, those who 
simultaneously or sequentially “sandwich” this care with raising children. This thesis addresses 
this omission by developing a series of superannuation accumulation scenarios for carers of 
elders, and “sandwich generation” carers from a range of estimated life-course employment and 
earnings profiles. Within the framework of feminist political economy, the thesis interprets 
estimated financial outcomes for various cohorts of carers in the context of their likely financial 
needs in retirement. These outcomes are compared with likely outcomes for various cohorts of 
non-carers, including male and female full-time workers and mothers working part-time. The 
results indicate that average full-time continuous workers are unlikely to amass superannuation 
balances sufficient for their financial needs in retirement, and that “sandwich generation” carers 
along with mothers raising children with disabilities are likely to be particularly adversely 
affected. The research thus supports the body of literature challenging claims that Australia’s 
current retirement income policy is efficient and equitable. Additionally, claims that the current 
system will relieve the fiscal burden of the ageing population on future generations become 
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contestable in light of the likely unsustainable outcomes for those currently providing substantial 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, policy advisory bodies, governments and global institutions 
including the World Bank (1994) expressed concern regarding future capacity to meet the 
financial needs of ageing populations in OECD nations. Suggestions for reform were focused 
on replacing, as far as possible, public Age Pensions with private systems based on life-
course superannuation contributions as means of financing retirement. This strategy was 
ostensibly aimed at relieving the fiscal burden on future generations of taxpayers. However, 
the timing of its implementation and the surrounding political dialogue are indicative of a 
belief that public bodies were, by comparison to markets, inefficient in allocating social 
resources.    
The Australian Retirement Income System was introduced in 1992 to alleviate what was 
perceived to be an impending fiscal crisis. Based on World Bank guidelines, Australia’s 
three-pillared system consists of a means tested public Age Pension, income from the 
investment of employment-based mandatory contributions and additional voluntary 
contributions for those willing and able to afford these. The architects of this scheme claimed 
that it is was equitable, considering the retention of the Age Pension as a “safety net” for 
those unable to fund themselves in retirement.  
Since its implementation, Australia’s Superannuation Guarantee Charge (SGC) has generated 
a body of research and opinion challenging claims that it is efficient or equitable or both. 
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Critics of the system variously focus on its administrative efficiency, its stability and 
sustainability in the context of fluctuating global and macroeconomic conditions and its 
fundamental equity. With regards to equity, a significant portion of critics emphasize that the 
SGC particularly disadvantages women. They predict that many women in Australia are 
likely to rely to some degree on the Age Pension in retirement, which is concerning because 
women are more likely to have greater financial needs in retirement than men.  
Feminist political economists have observed that employment and income-based retirement 
income systems are inherently gender biased, given women’s relative underrepresentation in 
the paid labour force and the persistent gender wage gap in Australia. Feminists therefore 
interpret the likely less favourable retirement outcomes for women in Australia as 
manifesting a patriarchal system that “rewards” women’s unpaid social labour with various 
degrees of poverty. In this regard, projected estimates of accumulated superannuation in the 
existing literature have highlighted the significance of the life-course timing of paid 
employment, especially as they relate to particular groups of women who are at risk of living 
in poverty in retirement. These include mothers raising children and returning to full or part-
time work, migrant women from non-English speaking backgrounds, and women who 
divorce or are separated from their partners. This focus on cohorts is consistent with a 
Standpoint Theory framework that encourages analysis of situations from the perspective of 
the distinctive experiences that disadvantaged groups have in contrast to that of the powerful 
and privileged.  
Taking this approach, several studies have focused on the likely dire financial outcomes in 
retirement for those working aged individuals, mostly women, who provide informal primary 
care to family members, friends and others. The examination of likely retirement incomes for 
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these informal carers has been motivated by both their significant representation in the 
Australian population (nearly 12 per cent) and the sizeable social and economic value of their 
unpaid labour. These studies have afforded valuable insights in the relation between the life-
course timing of care provision and financial outcomes for carers in retirement.  
These studies have focused on outcomes relating to just two of a range of care situations in 
Australia, namely, informal care of children with disabilities, and care for a partner – the 
latter assumed to be undertaken mostly by mid-aged females. However, in focusing on these 
cohorts, researchers have abstracted from the approximately 30 per cent of working age 
carers who provide elder care. Many of these informal carers of elders are likely be 
simultaneously or sequentially “sandwiched” between raising children and caring for their 
parents. Without further investigation it cannot be assumed that financial outcomes in 
retirement for this group can be straightforwardly extrapolated from outcomes for the carer 
cohorts previously considered. 
As such, this thesis examines financial outcomes in retirement for a range of female informal 
primary carers with a particular focus on those providing unpaid elder (including spousal) 
care and those who do so while or after raising children, as well as those caring for a disabled 
child. In this regard, the thesis not only endeavours to fill a gap in the existing literature. 
Considering the currently substantial social and economic value of unpaid elder care, it also 
assesses claims regarding the fiscal viability of Australia’s current SGC from the perspective 
of the future sustainability of informal elder care. The thesis indirectly assesses such claims 
in light of the future capacity of elder carers themselves to retire with a modicum of good 
health and a decent standard of living. So in the process of assessing financial outcomes in 
retirement for informal elder carers, the thesis indirectly offers some critical insight into 
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claims that Australia’s three-pillared retirement system is a viable way of addressing 
anticipated fiscal burdens associated with an ageing population. 
On these terms, this research is also inspired by the ethical question of social provision for 
those who expend substantial emotional, physical and financial energy in caring for the aged 
and infirm in what one would hope to call a civilised society.  
Within the framework of Feminist Standpoint Theory, the thesis interprets the estimated 
outcomes for carers in light of those similarly estimated for various cohorts of working-age 
non-carers and also in the context of variously estimated financial needs in retirement. The 
results indicate that, while average earning full-time continuous workers are unlikely to 
amass superannuation balances sufficient for their financial needs in retirement, “sandwich 
generation” carers and mothers raising children with disabilities are likely to be particularly 
adversely affected.  
Focusing on superannuation outcomes for female informal primary carers, the results of this 
thesis strengthen the body of literature challenging claims that Australia’s current retirement 
income policy is efficient and equitable. Additionally, claims that the current system will 
relieve the fiscal responsibilities of funding an ageing population become contestable in light 





Structure of the thesis 
Chapter One sets the historical and policy context. It outlines the history of Age Pension 
policy in Australia and considers the social and economic context of dialogues on the 
necessity of reforming public funding of retirement. In doing so, it interprets perceptions of 
the fiscal crisis of the ageing population as informed by broader neo-liberal conceptions of 
the unsustainability of the modern welfare state. The chapter concludes by outlining the key 
elements of Australia’s current three-pillared retirement income system. 
Chapter Two broadly outlines key criticisms of Australia’s current retirement income 
system, focusing on the academic and institutional literature. This literature raises questions 
regarding the capacity of Australia’s current SGC to meet financial needs in retirement for 
the majority of the current workforce. It also raises concerns about the system’s stability, 
efficiency and equity. The chapter concludes by focusing on the body of literature 
highlighting present and likely inadequate and inequitable outcomes for women. 
Chapter Three sets the theoretical context of the research findings. It draws on feminist 
political economy to explain the likely inadequate and inequitable retirement outcomes for 
women.  Focusing on income and labour market trends in Australia, the chapter shows that 
employment retirement income systems are inherently gender biased given the stereotyping 
and discrimination underlying gender wage gaps and women’s lower rates of labour force 
participation. Within the framework of Feminist Standpoint Theory, this chapter also 
considers the range of research highlighting groups of women who are likely to be 
particularly disadvantaged under Australia’s current superannuation system, finishing with a 
focus on female primary carers.  
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Chapter Four outlines the nature, extent, functional significance and impacts of informal 
primary care in Australia. In doing so, it puts the case for a study of financial outcomes in 
retirement for female carers. The chapter concludes by explaining the need for studies that 
expand on the carer cohorts considered in the existing literature.   
Chapter Five outlines the methods and assumptions that have been used to estimate 
retirement incomes based on a range of female carer profiles. It discusses the significance of 
the absence of Australian longitudinal panel data on carers and the consequent necessity of 
drawing on cross-sectional data in developing the range of retirement accumulation scenarios. 
Drawing on the concept of “open systems”, the chapter concludes by emphasizing the 
necessity of supplementing inferences drawn from cross-sectional data with descriptive 
causal explanations drawn from carers’ own accounts and histories.  
Chapter 6 considers different conceptions of “need” and “poverty” before estimating the 
likely financial “requirements” of various groups in retirement in Australia. The chapter 
estimates the superannuation balances most likely required to fund “modest” and 
“comfortable” lifestyles and then compares these with the current amount of the Age Pension. 
These calculations are the basis for assessing the adequacy of the superannuation balances 
estimated for each of the cohorts in subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 7 estimates likely retirement incomes for a range of workers, ranging from males 
and females in full-time continuous work to mothers whose paid employment is combined 
with raising children. These profiles, constructed from cross-sectional data, serve as points of 
reference when assessing financial outcomes in retirement for female carers.  
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Chapter 8 estimates likely financial outcomes in retirement for five female carer profiles. 
These include a mother raising a child who has a disability from birth, a woman caring for 
her elderly parent, a woman raising children while caring for her elderly parent, a mother 
caring for a young adult son diagnosed with schizophrenia at 17 years of age, and a mother 
raising children and then caring for her older partner. The selection of these profiles and the 
construction of the employment and earnings scenarios are explained with reference to a 
range of cross-sectional data. The chapter concludes by noting the limitations of inferences 
drawn from the correlation of cross-sectional variables at a given point in time, given the 
highly episodic nature of informal care and the pronounced temporal asymmetry of its 
effects.  
Chapter 9 draws on first-hand descriptive accounts and carer case histories to causally 
explain the likely temporally asymmetric impacts of caring on carers. For studies of carers in 
Australia this is necessary, given the absence of longitudinal data. Drawing on the concept of 
complex causation in “open systems”, this chapter shows that the complex interaction of 
various physical, emotional, social, cultural and economic variables makes it likely that the 
impacts of caring on carers extend well beyond the period in which the care is being 
provided. The chapter concludes by illustrating the ways in which being a primary carer can 
affect employment and financial outcomes for years after the provision of care has ceased. 
This leads us to conclude that outcomes for female carers estimated in the previous chapter 
are likely to understate the true extent of their disadvantage, given Australia’s current 
retirement income system.  
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Chapter 10 considers various conservative and reformist retirement income policy proposals 
in light of the conclusions of previous chapters. The chapter concludes by identifying 
















AUSTRALIA’S SYSTEM OF RETIREMENT INCOME IN HISTORICAL AND 
POLITICAL CONTEXT 
  
1.1 Australia’s Age Pension: A brief history 
In the early days of the colony and throughout the nineteenth century, family and charitable 
organisations carried out social welfare functions such as the care of neglected children, the 
sick, the destitute and the aged (Kewley 1980a; Carmichael & Plowman 1985). However, 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, the capacity of these institutions in this regard 
came under strain. In particular, it became increasingly difficult for family and voluntary 
charities to financially support the aged, given the growing proportion of the population over 
the age of 65 and the sheer numbers of older people left homeless and destitute by the 1890s 
recession (Carney 2010).  
Beal and McKeown (2006) note that it was increasingly accepted from the late 1900s 
onwards that responsibility for the aged should not lie solely with individuals and their 
families. Such care should also be the collective responsibility of the community. As an 
example of this acceptance, the 1896 NSW Legislative Assembly Inquiry Into the Aged 
concluded that an old-age pension was the right of every person aged 60 and over. 
Recognizing both the need and community backing for some sort of support for the aged, the 
NSW Government made a provision in the form of a pension scheme for the aged in need. In 
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the early 1900s most states followed the NSW Government’s initiative and introduced some 
sort of aged pension scheme (Murphy 2011). 
In 1905-6, the Commonwealth Government initiated a Royal Commission into the provision 
for the aged. The Commission concluded, similarly to the previous NSW Legislative 
Assembly Inquiry, that an age pension should be the right of all, after reaching the retirement 
age of 65 years. The Commonwealth Government subsequently introduced the Old Age 
Pensions Act 1908 with the aim of ensuring that basic needs could be met for people unable 
to support themselves in retirement (Kewley 1980b). 
Initially both eligibility for the pension and the concomitant value accorded to claimants was 
based on character, race, age, residency and means. For example, the character and race 
provision of the 1908 Act (Cwlth) denied the Age Pension to individuals who were not of 
‘good character’. This included alien-non-residents and non-Australians, usually comprising 
New Zealand Maoris and Australian Aborigines and individuals born in Asia, Africa and the 
Pacific Islands (Kewley 1980b). These limitations restricted access to many new immigrants 
and discriminated against the traditional inhabitants of Australia. These discriminatory 
limitations were progressively removed over the next 60 years. For example, when 
introduced, the residency provision meant that claimants needed to have been continuously 
resident in Australia for twenty five years to be eligible to claim the Age Pension. By 1909, 
the provision for residency requirement was reduced to twenty years. Further changes to the 
residency test occurred only much later in 1962, when the residency period was reduced to 10 
years (Kewley 1980b).  
Today, claimants are required to satisfy the age and residency requirements to claim the Age 
Pension and the amount of Age Pension received depends on claimants’ other income and 
47 
 
assets.   Appendix A1:1 details the eligibility criteria for the Age Pension. Since it was 
funded from general revenue, limiting the Age Pension to those individuals most in need was 
designed to maintain an affordable and sustainable system (Herscovitch & Stanton 2008). 
Under the means test, retiring people with significant resources must draw on these before 
calling on the community for assistance through the Age Pension.  
Initially the Age Pension was available to men and women from 65 years of age. In 1910, the 
entitlement age for women was lowered to 60 years of age (Kewley 1980b). Rice Warner 
Actuaries (2012) suggest this was because men usually married a woman 3 to 5 years 
younger than themselves. With retirement ages at 65 years and 60 years, a couple could retire 
at the same time. However, during the later decades of the twentieth century, the increasing 
number of women and their increasing longevity of life provided the catalyst for rethinking 
this position and eventually the pension age for women was increased to 65 years, the same 
as men (Rice Warner Actuaries 2012).  
Under the 1908 Act of the Commonwealth of Australia, the rate of the Age Pension was set at 
£26 per year, or 10 shillings per week. In 1909, the Age Pension represented 21.6 per cent of 
the average wage (Financial Demographics 2004), although it is unclear how the average 
wage was determined in 1908. The demand for the Age Pension was expected to be relatively 
low since, at that time life expectancy at birth was 58.8 years for women and 55.2 years for 
men (Beal and McKeown 2006). In 1908 only 4 percent of Australia’s 3.8 million residents 
were aged 65 years or older. In contrast, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012a) suggests 
that a baby boy born in 2008-2010 could expect to live, on average, 79.5 years, while a baby 
girl born in 2008-2010 could expect to live 84 years. Life expectancy in Australia is ranked 
third overall, equal to Hong Kong, Switzerland, Sweden and Israel. Similar to other Western 
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countries, the female life expectancy is higher than that of males (Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare 2005). For details of comparison life expectancy table see Appendix 
A1:6; A1:7. 
Since the introduction of the Age Pension, the most significant legislative changes have been 
the differentiation of pension rates for singles and couples (in the 1960s) and the indexation 
of the Age Pension rate to the male average weekly wage (Rothman & Bingham 2004). The 
most recent indexation in March 2010 made the Age Pension benchmark 27.7 per cent of the 
male average weekly earnings for singles and 41.76 per cent for couples (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia 2008-2009).  
Currently there are approximately 2.4 million Australians on the Age Pension, costing 
approximately $39.5 (National Commission of Audit 2014). Approximately 69 per cent of 
older people receive the Australian Government Age Pension and a further 8 per cent receive 
service pensions from the Australian Government Department of Veterans' Affairs 
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004a). Around 73 per cent of pensioners receive over 90 per 
cent of the maximum pension rate and only 3 per cent receive less than 25 per cent of the 
maximum rate (ABS 2009).  
Here it should be noted that Australia currently spends considerably less on pensions than the 
average of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.  
The OECD report on retirement incomes indicates that Australia’s public pension costs 
approximately 3.5 per cent of GDP, whereas the OECD average is 7.8 per cent (OECD 2013, 




1.2 Concerns regarding the aged pension 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, expected pressure from an ageing population raised concerns 
about the ability of future governments to fund the public Age Pension. Australia, like most 
developed countries, faced a demographic challenge with an ageing ‘Baby Boomer’ 
generation, born between 1946 and 1964. This problem appeared to be exacerbated by a 
declining birthrate in more recent decades (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2011a). As Kelly 
and Harding (2004) point out, given the existing trends in the ageing population, almost one 
in every four Australians will be aged sixty-five years and over by 2042. Meanwhile, on their 
projections, the working population will experience almost zero growth. As such, the ratio of 
retirees to the working age population can be expected to rise from 18 per cent in 2000 to 37 
per cent in 2050. This represents significant pressure on the Age Pension as a means of 
funding Australians in retirement. As it stood, this fiscal problem of funding an ageing 
population in retirement appeared to be exacerbated by the limited extent of occupational 
superannuation as an alternate means of retirement funding.  
1.3 The rise of neo-liberalism and attacks on the welfare state 
The politico-economic vision of neo-liberalism is rooted in selected tenets of classical 
liberalism adapted for the twentieth century. Core normative concepts included individual 
freedom of thought, speech and exchange of privately owned property. In economic matters, 
the voluntary market exchange of private property by agents (be they individuals or 
corporations) is deemed to be the most ethically acceptable kind of arrangement. The 
economists Friedrich Hayek (1944) and Milton Friedman (1951; 1962) argued that voluntary 
market exchange would most likely result in more efficient allocations of resources and 
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greater material wellbeing than any other kind of coordinating mechanism. A robust ethical 
defense of massively reducing taxation and public welfare expenditure was subsequently 
provided by Robert Nozick (1974), who argued that private property rights and freedom of 
private decision making were paramount natural rights. Politically, Nozick’s ideal state 
would do little more than uphold private property law and the law of contracts, divesting 
itself, insofar as it is possible, of property rights and regulations over private transactions. It 
should be noted that the founding economists of neo-liberalism were somewhat more 
pragmatic and strategic than puritans like Nozick. For example, in his writings on policy, 
although Friedman was certainly in favour of limiting the economic activities of democratic 
government as much as was practicable, he also made it clear that he was not opposed in toto 
to a strong and interventionist state in certain situations where he felt it would improve 
economic welfare (e.g. Friedman 1974; 1978). As Philip Mirowski has argued, for neo-
liberalism, a strong and efficient state is required to re-regulate and where-ever politically 
practical, forcibly extend private property rights and construct a free, competitive order 
(Mirowski 2009; Van Horn & Mirowski 2009). 
That neo-liberalism is not an ‘anti-interventionist’ ideology is evident in the fact that it gained 
legitimacy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as a policy program which promised to increase 
productivity growth via privatisation and legislative curtailment of trade unions’ market 
power, reduce inflation by direct control of the money supply, and providing greater 
opportunities for subsidised investment thereby solving the puzzle of stagflation (Quiggin 
2008). So, just because neo-liberalism rejected Keynesian fiscal policies and the welfare 
state, it does not follow that they advocated a ‘policy free zone’. Instead, it amounted to a raft 
of quite specific “interventions” designed to promote industrial stability, increase investment, 
and boost the rate of profit.  
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From an economic policy perspective, neo-liberalism was known as “supply side” economics 
because it aimed to manipulate those variables affecting the aggregate supply of goods and 
services – especially factors that would reduce the costs of production for private investors 
(Offen 1984). This partly involved the implementation of tight monetary policy designed to 
reduce and stabilise inflation rates. It also involved policies and labour market programs 
reducing the industrial power of trade unions and discouraging welfare dependence as an 
alleged alternative to waged labour. Neo-liberalism moreover involved a tax reform program 
in which tax cuts to private firms and shareholders were introduced alongside a system of 
consumption, value-added and other indirect taxes. The underlying rationale of neo-liberal 
tax reform was that a subsequent increase in capitalist income would bolster private savings 
and thus reduce the cost of private borrowing and investment.  
Neo-liberal industrial, monetary and tax reforms were accompanied by demands for a 
significant curtailment of the Keynesian welfare state (Townsend 2009; Stephey 2008). The 
arguments against the welfare state were in part focused on the alleged need to increase the 
supply of labour by motivating more individuals to seek waged labour. However, more 
significantly, neo-liberals perceived state spending on pensions, unemployment benefits, 
income supplements, health, culture, and other social programs as crowding private firms out 
of finance markets and thereby raising the cost of investment. The accessibility and cost of 
financing investment were also the drivers behind an array of policies deregulating the 
financial sector and privatizing a range of state enterprises (Kotz 2002).  
Neo-liberalism is most commonly associated with Reaganism in the United States and 
Thatcherism in the United Kingdom. However, its policy program has also been championed 
by ostensibly social democratic governments in other nations. Australia proved to be no 
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exception. The Hawke and Keating Labor governments introduced neo-liberal reforms that 
were allegedly necessary in order to avert future crises. In 1983 a program of financial 
deregulation was implemented and Australia abandoned the Bretton Woods policy of fixed 
exchange rates. This was accompanied by the gradual, partial, and/or full sale of a range of 
highly profitable public enterprises including the Commonwealth Bank, the Government 
Insurance Office, and Telstra. At the state level, public energy utilities were either sold or 
corporatised and a range of public service functions (such as prisons and community care) 
were contracted out to firms operating on a private profit basis (Quiggin 1999; Kotz 2000; 
Powell 2000).    
In the mid 1980s the full employment programs of previous regimes were replaced by the 
rhetoric of “responsible fiscal management” with an emphasis on balanced budgets and a 
focus on monetary policy as the primary lever of macroeconomic policy. Maintaining a low 
inflation rate via the manipulation of interest rates came to be the primary concern. With low 
inflation and little government borrowing, a stable macroeconomic environment attractive to 
higher domestic and foreign investment would be created. Cyclical unemployment would 
thereby be taken care of without being specifically targeted (cf. Nevile 1997; Quiggin 2004). 
Unions were drawn into the fight against inflation by means of a state-union-corporate 
“Accord”. Under the terms of the Accord, key Australian unions agreed to refrain from 
pressing for wage increases in exchange for state and corporate pledges on providing 
employment and training opportunities (Stilwell 1986). However the dismantling of 
Australia’s tariff system during this time eventually resulted in a decisive shift of 
employment from full-time, secure manufacturing jobs to low-skilled, casual and part-time 
employment. This structural shift had the effect of decimating union membership. Moreover, 
the Keating government proceeded with legislation replacing the nation’s centralised 
53 
 
industrial arbitration system with decentralised enterprise bargaining, thereby removing the 
legal supports of union power (Van Gellecum et al 2008).  
 
1.4 Introduction of the three-pillared scheme in Australia: Hawke and 
Keating neo-liberal policies 
In Australia, the occupational superannuation system can be traced back to the 1850s. At that 
time a small number of banks, large private companies and the government started paying 
private pensions to their senior, long serving employees. These arrangements provided a 
select group of salaried employees with an independent retirement income. It may be noted 
that attempts were made between 1913 and 1938 to introduce public retirement income 
arrangements that were income-related, however, these attempts proved unsuccessful 
(Bateman & Piggott 2003). 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, some relaxation of means test arrangements for the Age 
Pension meant that, for an increasing number of salaried employees superannuation acted as a 
supplement to the Age Pension. From the 1970s until the mid 1980s, superannuation became 
more generally available, although it was still an employment fringe benefit enjoyed mainly 
by professionals, managers and administrators, public sector employees and the skilled 
workers in the financial sector (Australian Government 2007). In 1974, 32.2 per cent of wage 
and salary earners were covered by superannuation, comprising 40.8 per cent of male and 
16.5 per cent of female wage and salary earners (Commonwealth Treasury 2001).   
While concerns regarding the sustainability of the Age Pension as the basis of retirement 
income were common across many industrial nations, the policy response to these concerns 
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must not be narrowly interpreted as an inevitable or logically necessary technical response to 
a systematic problem. In principle, a government has a range of policy options available to it 
in dealing with anticipated or present problems. The decisive response to the apparent 
impending “crisis” of aged care and retirement income must therefore be examined in the 
historical context of the rise of neo-liberalism and attacks on the welfare state.  
As early as 1983, the Hawke Labor Government was anticipating increased demands of an 
ageing population on general revenue and began considering alternate forms of retirement 
funding. For this government, an income-based private superannuation scheme such the 
current system was not conceived simply an alternative to the Age Pension. It promised to 
also provide a means of reducing wage-based pressures on inflation and for boosting national 
savings (Jefferson 2005b, Coates 2004). For Hawke and Keating, a superannuation scheme 
could also be feasibly part of the Accord. It would appease the union movement by 
incorporating superannuation as an award condition (Thompson 1999).   
The path towards employment and income-based superannuation was paved by a 1986 High 
Court ruling that such a benefit should be regarded as a workplace matter – i.e. as a condition 
of pay and employment (Beal and McKeown 2006). The decision led to formalised 
negotiations between the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and the Hawke Labor 
Government for a Prices and Incomes Accord, incorporating superannuation into workplace 
agreements (Thompson 1999). Wage increases gained through indexation would thereby be 
traded for superannuation contributions.  
These Accord based changes to retirement funding however, appeared not to address the 
problem in its totality. Firstly, a large number of employee groups were not paid under 
awards and these would fail to receive any workplace superannuation. Secondly, trade union 
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membership was declining from just over half (51 per cent) of all employees in 1976 to 40 
per cent by 1992 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000a). The Australian Council of Trade 
Unions (2005) further highlighted the fact that some employers were reluctant to comply with 
these new award conditions and were not making contributions to superannuation on behalf 
of employees.   
Despite the government’s best efforts, it would appear that, as Bateman and Piggott (2003, 
p.3) note, superannuation contributions built into the award wage structure in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s ‘proved to be difficult and costly to enforce’. The government’s attempt in 
1991 to increase award-mandated superannuation by 3 per cent was unsuccessful. This 
proved to be the final straw for the Hawke government, which responded by announcing in 
the August 1991 budget that a new system of mandatory superannuation (SGC) would begin 
from 1 July 1992.  Under the new system, employers were required to deduct 3 per cent of 
the wage or salary of all employees earning more than $450 per month; the deduction was to 
be invested in a privately managed superannuation fund on behalf of employees. 
 
 
1.5 An outline of Australia’s current, three-pillared retirement income 
system  
1.5.1 The first pillar: the Age Pension 
Currently, males may be eligible for the Age Pension if income and assets are below a certain 
amount and the recipient is aged 65 or over. Females born before 1 January 1949 reach 
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qualifying age at 64 and a half, and females born between 1 January 1949 and 30 June 1952 
at age 65. From 1 July 2017, the qualifying age for the Age Pension will increase from 65 
years to 65 and-a-half years. The qualifying age will then rise by six months every two years, 
reaching 67 by 1 July 2023. Claimants for the Age Pension are also required to meet 
residency requirements with particular groups being exempted (Appendix A1:1; Table A1:1; 
Table A1:2). 
As at March 2014, the maximum payment rate for the Age Pension is $766 per fortnight or 
$19,916 yearly for a single person and $1,155 per fortnight or $30,025 per annum for a 
couple.  In essence, the amount of Age Pension paid is modified to consider whether the 
recipient is single, and to consider the amount of fortnightly income from other sources. 
Single pensioners are permitted to earn up to $156 dollars in fortnightly income with a 40 per 
cent per dollar reduction in their pension for every dollar earned above this. Between them, 
couples are permitted to earn up to $276 dollars fortnightly with a similar reduction for each 
dollar earned above this amount. This allowable income is increased by up to $25 per 
fortnight for each dependent child.  
Claimants for the Age Pension and part-Age Pension are also subject to an assets test, the 
limits varying according to whether the individual is single, in a couple or suffering from 
illness. The assets of homeowners and non-home owners are also considered differently. The 
Assets test allows a full pension for those who have existing assets at $196,750 for a single, 
and $279,000 for a couple (excluding the residential home), and $339,250 for a single, and 
$421,500 for a couple as non-home owners (Details of the current income and assets test for 
Pensioners are included in Appendix A1:1; Table A1:4; Table A1:5).  
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The rate of Age Pension payment and the means test are adjusted every 6 months in line with 
increases in male average total weekly earnings (MTAWE) increases. The most recent 
change, in March 2014, made the Age Pension a benchmark at 27.7 per cent for singles and 
41.76 per cent for couples of MTAWE. However here it is pertinent to note the current 
Federal Government’s proposal to index the Age Pension from 1 July 2017 to the Consumer 
Price Index rather than to Male Total Average Weekly Earnings (MTAWE). Historically the 
CPI has been a less generous formula than the current indexing arrangement (Klapdor 2014).  
Research conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 2011 indicates that government 
pensions and allowances are currently the most common source of personal retirement 
income for both men and women. Approximately two-thirds of retired men and women 
receive government pensions and allowances as their current main source of income (ABS 
2011a). 
 
1.5.2 The second pillar of Australia’s SGC: Mandatory superannuation contributions 
from employers 
The compulsory contribution to superannuation paid by an employer on behalf of an 
employee began in 1992 at 3 per cent of an employee’s ordinary time earnings. This rate 
increased on a sliding scale to 9 per cent in 2002 where it remained until 2013, increasing by 
a quarter of a percent in July of that year. In 2011, the Gillard Labor government introduced 
legislation to facilitate an increase of the minimum mandatory superannuation contribution 
for employers on a sliding scale from 9 to 12 per cent over 7-8 years (see Appendix A1:1; 
Table A1:8). However, the current Abbott government has indicated that it will freeze 
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mandatory contributions at 9.25 per cent until 2016, delaying the full 12 per cent contribution 
until July 2021 (Power 2013b) (see Appendix A1:1; Table A1:9; Table A1:10). 
Those exempted from making mandatory contributions at present include the employers of 
individuals paid less than $450 per calendar month, of those younger than 18 years, and of 
those working less than 30 hours a week. The employers of those who perform work of a 
domestic or private nature for a non-business employer for less than 30 hours a week are also 
included in this category. Those performing unpaid work are not directly acknowledged 
under the current system (Australian Tax Office 2002).   
 
1.5.3 The third pillar of Australia’s SGC: voluntary contributions 
Under the current system, high income individuals have a tax advantage when they make 
voluntary contributions to superannuation under salary sacrifice. The advantage occurs when 
money is diverted from remuneration directly into superannuation. Contributions are taxed at 
15 per cent or 30 per cent for individuals earning above $300,000 (from 1st July 2012), rather 
than at the personal marginal tax rate (Australian Taxation Office 2012). Depending on 
individual income, this allows a tax discount of up to 30 cents in the dollar. 
Under the current system, voluntary payments may also take the form of an eligible spouse 
contribution. This scheme allows taxpayers to make a superannuation contribution of up to 
$3,000 on behalf of their low income or non-working spouse in order to receive a tax offset. 
In this context a “spouse” includes another person who, although not legally married to the 
taxpayer in question, lives with him or her on a bona fide domestic basis as husband or wife 
(Australian Taxation Office 2007).  
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Although there is no limit on the spousal contribution that can be made in a spouse’s 
superannuation account, the tax offset is calculated on sums of $3,000 or less, making the 
maximum offset $540 (Australian Taxation Office 2007). To be eligible to claim the 
maximum tax offset, a spouse must be receiving $10,800 or less in income in a financial year. 
A reduced tax offset is payable for spouses earning up to $13,800 in a financial year.  
Eligible spouse contributions are treated as a tax free component in the complying 
superannuation fund or retirement savings account (RSA). This means that they are not 
subject to the tax that applies to assessable superannuation contributions. In effect, the full 
value of the contribution is invested for a spouse’s retirement. When contributions are 
withdrawn from a spouse’s superannuation fund or retirement savings account on retirement, 
they form part of the tax-free component of a lump superannuation payment. They are not 
included in a spouse’s assessable income and are therefore tax-free (Australian Taxation 
Office 2007).   
Additional contributions to a spouse’s superannuation fund will eventually provide retirement 
income generated from two sources and from a taxation perspective, retirement income can 
be effectively split. However, the advantages of spousal contribution have become less 
pronounced since the changes introduced in July 2007. These changes permitted withdrawal 
of superannuation funds without penalty at retirement. Furthermore, the abolition of the work 
test, which allows contributions to superannuation for those aged 65 years and over has made 
the spouse contribution less beneficial (Bullock 2006).  
The superannuation co-contribution was introduced in July 2003 to specifically assist low-
income earners in making additional contributions to their superannuation. Under the scheme, 
the government will match personal (voluntary) superannuation contributions with a co-
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contribution up to a certain limit. Since commencement, approximately 4.6 million workers 
have taken advantage of the co-contribution scheme and the government has contributed 
payments of $1.18 billion (Australian Government 2007).   
The eligibility criterion for the co-contribution has been adjusted over the years. However, 
the current guidelines have applied:  
you made one or more eligible personal super contributions to your super 
account during the financial year you pass the two income tests   
 
your total income for the financial year is less than the higher income 
threshold ($48,516 for 2013-14) 
 
10% or more of your total income comes from eligible employment-related 
activities or carrying on a business, or a combination of both 
 
you were less than 71 years old at the end of the financial year 
 
you did not hold a temporary visa at any time during the financial year  
(unless you are a New Zealand citizen or it was a prescribed visa) 
 
you lodged your tax return for the relevant financial year. 
 
You are not entitled to a super co-contribution for personal contributions you choose to claim 
and have been allowed as a tax deduction (ATO 2014).  
For 2010-11 a matching contribution by government of up to $1,000 would be provided to 
employees with incomes of up to $31,920 (with the amount available phasing down for 
incomes up to $61,920). These thresholds have been frozen.  But also, for 2010-12 the 
government froze the indexation of the income threshold above which the maximum 




1.5.4 Taxation of Contributions:  Changes introduced from 1st July 2007 render tax-free the 
withdrawal of lump sums of superannuation on retirement for 60 year olds and over 
(Previously a 15 per cent tax applied on the withdrawal of funds for retirement). Further, 
when an individual reaches their preservation age (see table below), superannuation funds 
can be accessed.  
 
Table 1:1 Preservation Age 
Date of birth Preservation age 
Before 1 July 1960 55 
1 July 1960 - 30 June 1961 56 
1 July 1961 - 30 June 1962 57 
1 July 1962 - 30 June 1963 58 
1 July 1963 - 30 June 1964 59 
From 1 July 1964  60 
 
Apart from reaching preservation age, retirement, or reaching the Age Pension age of 65 
years, superannuation funds can only be withdrawn under strict conditions such as severe 
financial hardship or terminal illness. If superannuation funds are withdrawn before 
retirement or before the designated age, a tax penalty is imposed.  
 
1.6 The expected period of maturation for the current system  
“Maturation” of the superannuation system refers to the time when all members of the labour 
force are making compulsory superannuation contributions for their working lives subject to 
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the same conditions. At present, there are members of the labour force who started their 
working lives before 1992-3, and so were not making contributions for a number of years. 
Also, there have been variations in parameters of the system (such as the mandatory rate of 
contributions) over the last 20 years. In order to evaluate the effectiveness and equity of the 
SGC system, researchers will have to wait until the system fully matures in order to acquire 
longitudinal data that is free from the complications associated with transitioning from the 
old two-pillared system to the new three-pillared one.  
There is some disagreement between researchers regarding the date at which the system will 
mature. This is because of differences in the parameters used to determine maturity. These 
parameters include the following. (1) The age at which individuals begin full-time work. The 
Keegan Harding and Kelly 2010 ), suggests the system could be mature in 2043, providing 
those who turned 15 years in 1993 with a lifetime of occupation and income based 
superannuation. However, this estimate could be regarded as somewhat unrealistic given that 
most people in Australia would not be earning the required threshold income until they are at 
least 18 years of age. Using this parameter, the system would mature in 2040. Alternatively, 
in its retirement income modelling, the Commonwealth Treasury assumes full-time adult  
 
remuneration is being received at 25 years of age in 1992 (1
st
 July 1992) in conjunction with 
a full-time working life of 40 years from 25 and 65. Using this parameter, the system would 
mature in 2032. (2) Rate of mandatory contributions. Calculations of when the system will 
“mature” could be judged according to when all employees have been making the same 
percentage of mandatory contributions from their incomes. The difficulty here lies in the fact 
that the rate has changed over time. Although the SGC began in 1992 at a rate of 3 per cent, it 
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increased by 1 per cent in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 2002 where it settled at 9 per cent for 
11 years before increasing to 9.25 per cent in 2013. It has been projected to remain at this 
level until 2016, and to gradually increasing to 12 per cent by July 2021. Assuming a 
workforce entry age of 18, if the mandatory contribution rate of 9 per cent is assumed to 
remain stable, the maturity of the system would occur in 2049. If however, the rate of 12 per 
cent is selected, maturity would occur in 2068. Worse still, it is likeley that there will never 
be a full 40 year period in which there is no change to the mandatory contributions rate. This 
means that whatever criterion is used, to mark the maturation of the system will at best be 
somewhat arbitrary, and at worst will not reflect the realities of changing parameters.   
Notwithstanding these problems with making reliable and robust projections about the 
performance of the Australian superannuation system, theoretical analysis and modelling of 
the likely results has generated a range of criticisms. These criticisms include the following. 
The superannuation contributions being made are insufficient for pension replacement for the 
majority of working Australians. The superannuation system is fragile and superannuation 
returns are highly sensitive to financial and macroeconomic fluctuations. The superannuation 
system is not cost efficient, is inequitable and unfair. And finally, being employment and 
income-based, some critics claim the system is inherently gender biased. In setting the 





















THE BROAD LINES OF CRITICISM OF AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT 
SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Australia’s three-pillared system is considered by some to be one of the best retirement 
income systems in the world. In this regard, the positive appraisal of international institutions 
such as the World Bank is matched by that of Australian institutions such as The Australian 
Centre for Financial Studies (Piggott 2004; Australian Centre for Financial Studies 2012). 
This positive institutional appraisal appears to be supported by cross-national studies in 
which Australia’s current system figures favourably (Hely 1993-1994; Holzmann & Hinz 
2005; Australian Centre for Financial Studies 2012). This assessment is encapsulated in the 
Australian Association of Superannuation Trustees’ description of the current Australian 
system as ‘a shining beacon amongst the world’s retirement schemes’ (Colquhoun, L 2012). 
However, such positive evaluations have been challenged by a growing body of literature 
offering a range of criticisms; the broad lines of these criticisms are as follows.   
 
2.2 Insufficient accumulation for pension replacement 
There is a robust body of literature predicting that mandatory contributions are unlikely to 
adequately fund retirement for the majority of Australians, given the current level of 
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contributions, average wages and the likely returns on financial assets (Colebatch 2009; Rice 
Warner Actuaries 2012; Brown 1994; Donath 1998; Tinnion & Rothman 1999; King 2001; 
Preston & Austen 2001; Kelly, Percival & Harding 2002a; Jefferson & Preston 2002). Such 
unfavourable conclusions in the scholarly literature have been given official credence by the 
Commonwealth Treasury (Commonwealth Treasury 2002). Constructing a series of income 
and earning scenarios, the Treasury’s Retirement Income Modelling Unit concluded that 
workers on average incomes may continue to rely to some extent on the Age Pension 
(Commonwealth Treasury 2002). However, the Treasury did not consider this as manifesting 
fundamental flaws in the system. Rather, the failure of the system to provide sufficient 
pension-replacement income in retirement was largely interpreted as a temporary 
imperfection that would be ironed out when the transition from public to privately funded 
retirement was completed. 
Critics, however, have been less sanguine in their interpretations. Some have questioned 
whether the current system is a viable alternative to the Age Pension as judged by the 
rhetorical claims about ultimately making the Age Pension largely unnecessary. As an 
example, the review of the SGC by the Certified Practising Accountants (CPA) of Australia 
concluded:  
...the superannuation system, as currently configured, has failed miserably in its aim 
of encouraging more Australians to save for retirement. Many who have spent a large 
portion of their working lives under this system will still be relying on the pension 
(Certified Practising Accountants Australia 2012, p.2).  
Several lines of argument have been proffered in explaining the likely shortfall in retirement 
savings, based on the current scheme. At the most pragmatic level, some analysts suggest 
that, although the system itself is well designed, the level of mandatory contributions should 
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be raised (e.g. Schiewe 1999; Fitzgerald 1993; Hanegbi 2010; Swift 2013). Analysts taking 
this approach may well refer to Paul Keating’s original intention of gradually raising the level 
of mandatory contributions to 15 per cent (Salusinszky 2008). Although these analysts 
perceive problems with the current system to be essentially technical (and therefore relatively 
easily amended), others focus on broader behavioural and cultural issues.  
A significant group of critics attribute the present and likely future deficiency in retirement 
funds to individuals’ capacities and attitudes around financial planning (e.g. Hallahan, Faff & 
McKenzie 2004; McCarthy 2009; Langford, Faff & Marisetty 2006). These analysts also 
implicitly accept the SGC architecture and focus instead on improving financial literacy and 
the quality of financial advice. Such individualist explanations seem vindicated by recent 
research indicating that most of the adult Australian population have limited knowledge about 
superannuation procedures and regulations (Australian & New Zealand Bank 2003; 2005; 
Kelly et al 2002b).  However, Jefferson (2003; 2005a,b; 2009) has noted that individuals’ 
attitudes to financial planning are themselves influenced by other institutional and structural 
patterns. However, at this point it must be noted that, regardless of their accuracy, 
observations levelled at alleged deficiencies in individuals’ behaviours must be assessed in 
light of studies identifying fundamental flaws in the very concept of employment and 





2.3 Instability  
Employment and income-based superannuation schemes are more susceptible than public 
pension schemes to the destabilising impact of macroeconomic shocks. Borowski (2013) 
observes, that employment and income-based superannuation systems are inherently 
susceptible to a range of institutional and political risks. For example, they may be 
destabilised by impacts on specific financial institutions or by changes of government. Even 
granted institutional longevity and continuity in public policy, employment and income-based 
superannuation schemes are still subject to inflation and macroeconomic fluctuations 
(Antolin 2008). The latter became apparent when invested superannuation contributions fell 
significantly in value during the 2007 Global Financial Crisis (Gerrans 2012). Indeed serious 
doubts may be raised about the future viability of private superannuation systems in light of 
the mounting household debt attendant upon global financial instability (Brown 2008; Keen 
2009). Of particular concern, is the high debt level of those aged 60-69 years and not retired 
(Kelly Research 2012). For these individuals, it would seem that superannuation funds will 
more likely be a means of extinguishing debt rather than the basis for retirement income. Of 
particular concern is that many “baby boomers” have acquired private debts driven by real 
estate and asset price bubbles, which they may have to pay off using their lump-sum 
superannuation. This behaviour has not been extensively studied as yet, but Bateman and 
Piggott (2003) certainly found that by the turn of the millennium, the most common uses of 
lump sum superannuation payouts were paying off the mortgage on the family home and 
clearing outstanding debts. Some twelve years later, Cooper (2013) – which included 
opinion-pieces by John Piggott and Simon Kelly – also suggested that superannuation funds 
were being “cancelled out” by the large debt levels of retirees. This view was also reported 




2.4 Cost inefficiency 
Charges of inefficiency have firstly been levelled at the apparently costly way that 
contributions are administered and invested at the institutional level (Vidler 2004; 2006). In 
this regard, Power (2002) notes that the already significant cost of administering Australia’s 
SGC is exacerbated by constantly changing regulatory regimes.   
Taking a broader perspective, some critics believe that the incentives currently associated 
with the third-pillar of the system make Australia’s superannuation system a greater fiscal 
burden than the Age Pension, both in the present and the future. Considering both the revenue 
and expenditure sides of the budget, Toohey (2009) suggests that tax concessions for 
superannuation are expected to exceed Age Pension payments by 2011–12. As he observes:  
...an executive on $300,000 a year who contributes $100,000 a year to super will 
receive a tax concession that costs general revenue $30,000 a year, even before 
adding the cost of concessions on fund earnings. If this executive retires on a tax-free 
pension of $180,000 a year, this costs the budget $68,000 a year compared to $14,815 
for the age pension (Toohey 2009, p.2).     
More recently, Richardson’s (2012) analysis of Treasury data indicates that Australia will 
spend some $45 billion on superannuation subsidies in 2015-16. Again, this is greater than 
the amount projected to be spent on the Age Pension. In questioning the efficiency of the 
three-pillared system, these projections also challenge the claims of the World Bank and 
others that private systems of superannuation are inherently more efficient than public 




2.5 Fairness and equity  
For some critics, employment and income-based retirement systems raise concerns not only 
about the stability and efficiency of Australia’s superannuation system, but also raise ethical 
questions about its equity and fairness (Asher 2011). This is particularly of concern in light of 
the growing disparity in wealth and incomes across most industrial nations over the past few 
decades (Palley 2007).  
For some critics, the question of fairness is inseparable from concerns about the cost 
efficiency of the system, given the disproportional benefit to high-income earners of 
subsidising voluntary contributions. High-income earners in the current system have a tax 
advantage when they make contributions to superannuation under “salary sacrifice”. The 
advantage occurs when money is diverted from wages or salaries directly into 
superannuation. As noted in chapter, part 1.6.3, pp.15-20,  depending on the relevant 
individual’s income, this scheme allows a tax discount of up to 30 cents in the dollar. On the 
other hand, those individuals in the lowest tax brackets are either worse off, or no better off, 
if they make voluntary contributions to superannuation. In this regard, it should also be noted 
that the concessions for voluntary contributions to spousal supplements also tend to benefit 
high income earners.  
The inequity of the superannuation system’s third-pillar has been featured as a theme of 
recent inquiries into the Australian Tax system – in particular the Henry Review (Henry, 
Harmer, Piggott, Ridout & Smith 2010). As Parker (2009) notes, the Henry Panel found that 
superannuants should continue to receive tax assistance, but there is a case for distributing 
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assistance more equitably between high and low income individuals, including limiting 
generous salary-sacrifice concessions. Ingles (2009) also observes, that the current 
superannuation tax concession policy is effectively a redistribution of scarce resources away 
from low-income earners towards more privileged individuals. 
Although some studies investigating the equity of Australia’s superannuation system focus on 
the tax treatment of voluntary contributions, a greater range of studies question whether the 
very concept of employment and income-based retirement provisioning can itself be fair (e.g. 
Sharp & Austen 2007; Clare 1994a; 1994b; Cox 1994; Larkin 1994; Pender 1994; Rosenman 
& Winocur 1994; Walpole 1994; Roseman 1995; Sharp 1995). This line of criticism draws 
attention to the social structural context in which such schemes are implemented. Here it is 
worth pointing out that the neo-liberal regimes which have implemented private employment 
income-based superannuation schemes have in the same period presided over increasing 
disparities in the distribution of income and wealth as well as marked shifts from permanent 
full-time to causal and intermittent employment (Palley 2007).   
With reference to the current Australian system, of particular concern are those who are 
unemployed and underemployed. Employers of the latter – i.e. casual and part-time workers – 
are exempted from making mandatory contributions, as are non-business employers. To the 
extent that individuals experience sustained periods of unemployment or underemployment 
during their lifetimes, their retirement funds are likely to fall well below those of the “ideal” 
candidates in continuous full-time employment.  
Although those who do not accumulate sufficient superannuation funds due to sporadic 
and/or poorly paid employment can always fall back on the welfare safety net of the Age 
Pension, its extreme modesty and the stringent qualifying conditions suggest that the 
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financial struggles of the poor will not cease upon retirement. The prediction that the 
impoverished are likely to continue struggling under the current system is supported by a 
range of studies indicating a rise in the rate of elder poverty in Australia over the past few 
decades (Council of the Ageing 2002; Harding et al 2001; Australian Council of Social 
Services 2012). This prediction is supported also by cross-national studies demonstrating a 
significant inverse relation between reliance on private retirement income and levels of elder 
poverty in nations with relatively mature superannuation schemes (Scheiwe 1999; Yamada 
2002; Blackburn 2002; Vidler 2003).   
 
 
2.6 Gender bias 
A wide range of studies have emphasised that, while Australia’s superannuation system is 
inefficient and inequitable, it is particularly so for women. Jefferson (2005a; 2009; 2012) 
provides a comprehensive review of this literature. Studies identifying the gender bias in 
more recent changes to the SGC include Stewart (2012), Jefferson (2012), Rosenman and 
Scott (2009), and Sharp and Austen (2007). What follows is a brief sketch of the key issues 
and analysis.  
Critics of Australia’s SGC emphasize that any assessment of the current system should 
proceed from recognition of the fact that women generally require a greater amount of 
retirement income than men. This is partly because, on average, women live longer than men 
(See Appendix A1; Table A1:6; Table A1:7). However, women also appear to require more 
income in retirement because at this period in their lives they are less likely than men to have 
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re-partnered or re-married (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012b). This is significant given 
the increasing rates of separation and divorce in Australia over the past half century 
(Appendix A2; Table A2:1; Table A2:2). Here their greater need may be attributed to the 
disproportionate burden on un-partnered adults of meeting household costs (Wells 2012). 
These gender patterns in longevity and re-partnering not only suggest that women’s income-
needs in retirement are greater than men’s. They also undermine any assumption that women 
can or should be expected to rely on male partners or male family members to meet their 
financial needs in retirement.   
Given that the financial needs of women in retirement will generally be greater than those of 
men, it is concerning that Australia’s SGC may be biased against women. The bias is 
suggested by studies highlighting the significant gender gap in existing levels of 
superannuation savings. For example, a 2010 study of approximately 25,000 people in 
Australia, highlighted an approximately 40 per cent gap between men and women, with 
women holding an average of $92,000 in superannuation savings and men holding an average 
of $154,000. Moreover, the difference appears to be more pronounced for those aged between 
58-62 – i.e. for those approaching retirement (Stewart 2012a; 2012b). Taking these and 
comparable statistics, many studies have predicted that the current Australian superannuation 
system will fail to adequately meet the retirement needs of many women. According to these 
studies, women in Australia will continue to rely heavily on the Age Pension in future 
(Olsberg 2001; Kelly, Percival & Harding  2001; Jefferson 2003; Jefferson 2003; 2005a; 
Phillips et al 2008; Australian Human Rights Commission 2009; Westpac Bank 2013; 
Women’s Super Summit Report 2014).  
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This pattern indicates a need to identify the underlying causes of women’s disadvantage 
under Australia’s current superannuation system. Here explanations that are focused on 
personal attitudes to risk and financial planning are apparently complemented by studies 
suggesting that unfavourable outcomes for women may be attributed to their particularly high 
aversion to risk. Such studies tend to be accompanied by suggestions that women should 
enhance their financial literacy (e.g. Jianakolpos & Bernasek 1998; Clitheroe 2008). But such 
individualistic suggestions tend to be ideologically regressive because they ultimately 
attribute women’s financial disadvantage in superannuation to their own ignorance and 
apparently “natural” timidity. Importantly, they also ignore the patriarchal socio-economic 
structures that constrain possibilities for women in ways that transcend individual actions, 
knowledge and dispositions to risk.  
Therefore, in articulating the theoretical context for the research undertaken in this thesis, the 
next chapter explains the systemic causes of gender bias in Australia’s SGC by means of a 
feminist political economy analysis of modern patriarchy. This type of structural analysis is 
necessary, not only to systemically assess the relationship between different aspects of the 
current superannuation system, but also to specify the ways in which different groups of 









FEMINIST POLITICAL ECONOMY, FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY 
AND SOURCES OF SYSTEMIC GENDER BIAS IN AUSTRALIA’S CURRENT 
SUPERANNUATION SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Feminist political economy 
Feminist political economy seeks to analyse the ways in which various social and economic 
structures are constituted by, and reproduce, specific gender – typically patriarchal – 
relations. Following Walby (1990, p. 20), patriarchy is defined here as ‘a system of social 
structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’. Walby 
proposes this “working definition” in order to acknowledge the various and conflicting 
meanings of patriarchy both within feminist theory and the social sciences generally.  
Within feminist theory, some of the difference and disagreement arises from the question of 
whether gender roles and relations are ultimately based on biology, material structures or 
cultural practices. For example, feminist materialists emphasise that understanding patriarchy 
requires, and is in turn required for, a structural analysis of the reproduction of specific 
societies and the historically varying ways in which surplus is expropriated within them.  
O’Brien (1981) in this regard, observes that dialectical materialist concepts such as 
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exploitation and alienation should be applied in a distinctive manner to the varied cultural and 
historically changing experiences of sex, gender and gender relations.  
However, post-structuralist feminists have questioned the adequacy of such materialist 
approaches to patriarchy on the grounds that these are at risk of employing essentialising 
patriarchal constructs. As Alcoff (1988, pp. 405-406) observes:  
…every source of knowledge about women has been contaminated with misogyny 
and sexism. No matter where we turn, to historical documents, philosophical 
constructions, social scientific statistics, introspection, or daily practices the mediation 
of female bodies into constructions of woman is dominated by misogynist discourse.   
Ferguson (1991) in this regard, emphasizes the need to expose modes of power embedded 
within the meaning-claims of particular social discourses so as to create a space for 
alternative meanings. Post-structuralist feminists therefore take the deconstruction of 
meanings and subjective identities as a constitutive part of feminist theory and practice. 
Feminist materialists however, insist that the essentially negative activity of deconstruction is 
insufficient. Hartmann (1981), for example, observes that effectively overcoming domination 
and exploitation requires an understanding of, and practical capacity to alter, its structural 
material bases of patriarchal oppression.  
Notwithstanding, the dialogue and disagreement between materialist and post-structuralist 
feminists, both recognise experiences of patriarchy as being structurally embedded 
(systemic), and culturally and historically varied. Both schools of thought emphasize that 
there is no “generic” exploitation and oppression of women by men, and that the varieties of 
gender experience must be historically, structurally and politically connected if patriarchal 
oppression is to be fully understood, explained and overcome.  
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Feminist political economy attempts such analysis. As an example, Folbre (1991) traces the 
changing nature of patriarchy and by association, attitudes to women’s labour in the transition 
from largely agricultural to industrial, market societies. She observes that in most pre-
capitalist societies, production was structured around the household and the family. In these 
societies “work” and “domestic” activity was effectively undifferentiated. However, 
according to Folbre, this changed with the rise of market societies. In the process of 
industrialisation, the “public” sphere of  “work” (and associated notions of “productivity”) 
became distinguished from the “private” sphere of household activity.   
Folbre observes that this development gave rise to a concomitant differentiation in the 
valuing of what came to be regarded as “men’s” and “women’s” work. The role of women 
became associated with caring, nurturing and other activities regarded as “moral” rather than 
“productive”. From this fundamental historical development Folbre and others trace the 
legally and culturally manifest conception of males as naturalised “breadwinners” and 
housewives as unproductive “dependents” in contemporary industrial societies, and the 
associated appropriation of their unpaid domestic labour (Folbre 1991; Offen 2010; Malone 
1998; Zeigler 1996).  
For Nelson (2005), the definitive expression of this notion of housewives and mothers as 
“unproductive” is the exclusion of their unpaid labour in the calculations of Gross Domestic 
Product based on exclusively monetary transactions. Various attempts to calculate the 
magnitude of the annual value of such unpaid labour face the difficulty of ascribing monetary 
values to activities which are, for the most part, not subjected to market processes. Typically 
such attempts at determining shadow prices draw on one of two theoretical sources. One 
approach, drawn from the neoclassical tradition of Becker (1965), holds that time devoted to 
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household activities is subjectively valued by the decision-maker, and so can be conceived of 
in terms of the monetary opportunity costs – the highest foregone wage for work preferred by 
the decision-maker. Another approach is closer to the classical political economy tradition in 
that it focuses on an equivalent exchange value of the goods and services produced gratis in 
the household. Thus, instead of the value of non-market labour being conceptualised as the 
opportunity cost of time (a foregone wage), it is measured in terms of the monetary cost of 
the replacement of the household products (e.g. Abraham & Mackie 2004). There are 
significant difficulties associated with these attempts to measure the monetary value of 
household work (OECD 1995, pp. 15-16). Perhaps the most intractable methodological 
difficulty is that both of these approaches abstract from the causal relations between 
extensive unpaid work and the monetary proxy that would be used to estimate its value (be it 
present alternate wages or present prices for similar paid work). Specifically, we cannot 
speculate what unpaid housework is worth in precise money terms when the great majority of 
such tasks are not subject to labour market processes and institutional wage setting processes 
(cf. Ironmonger 1994; 1996).  
This kind of methodological difficulty notwithstanding, attempts to calculate unpaid labour 
are at least indicative of its extent and its indispensability to the reproduction of the 
conditions of formal, market-based production. In this regard, Himmelweit among others, 
applying a Marxist theoretical framework, draw out the structural implications of the 
appropriation of unpaid women’s labour in terms of the reduced value of labour power, the 
possibility of reducing real wages, and therefore in terms of the enhanced possibilities for 
capitalist expropriation of labour generally as surplus value (Himmelweit 1989; Peterson 
1996; Mies 1998). Marxist feminists therefore emphasize the patriarchal exploitation and 
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oppression of women as integral to the systemic reproduction of modern societies organised 
around accumulation and commodity production.  
Some feminist scholars believe that the basis of such exploitation in cultural stereotyping is 
indicated by the fact that most unpaid domestic labour is undertaken by women, even when 
the latter are engaged in paid work or when male partners are unemployed or retired (Pahl 
1984; Kynaston 1996). This tendency is reflected in time-use surveys showing that women on 
average, work slightly longer hours than men, but spend more of this time on unpaid care and 
domestic work (Craig 2007).  
For feminist political economists, this modern ideological conception of domestic labour as 
an essentially “moral” or “natural” duty rather than as a productive activity, accounts not only 
for the appropriation of women’s unpaid labour. It also helps to explain the continuing under-
representation of women in the paid workforce and the labour market segmentation and 
discrimination that occurs when women do undertake waged labour. The under-
representation of women in the paid workforce has been attributed to the need to focus on 
what is socially regarded as women’s duty to raise children and to care for other household 
members. As a consequence, women are more likely to either work part-time or to withdraw 
from workforce participation for extended periods of their lives.  
The connection between family duties and under-representation in the workforce, is indicated 
by women forming by far the greatest proportion of part-time workers. For example, the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013c) found that for 2011-12, 43% of employed females 
worked part-time whereas only 14% of employed males worked part-time. And for those 
women who did work full-time, they worked fewer hours on average compared to their male 
counterparts (36.4 hours per week compared to 40.6 hours per week). Moreover, Baxter and 
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Hewitt’s (2012) cross-national study suggests that the proportion of women working part-
time in Australia (44 per cent) is particularly stark compared with the United States (19 per 
cent). This study notes that although women in Australia have consistently increased their 
participation in the workforce over recent decades, they are more likely to be working part-
time as the “secondary” household income earner. That is, the male of the household will be 
the “consistent” or “permanent” income earner in a household, and the female will tend to 
“supplement” the household income (by a smaller proportion than her male counterpart), 
allowing for “breaks” in participation. Indeed, from the perspective of life-time workforce 
participation, Australian women currently spend, on average, 17 years in the paid labour 
force, compared to 39 years for men (Clare 1994 quoted in Kelly, Percival & Harding 2001).  
While patriarchal attitudes regarding the “natural” and “moral” role of women as mothers and 
housewives gives rise to an under-representation of women in the workforce, to some extent 
these attitudes also explain the gender discrimination that occurs when women are at work.  
Anker (1997) observes that gender discrimination in the paid workforce takes place along 
both vertical and horizontal lines. Horizontal gender discrimination occurs when females are 
paid less than males within the same occupation or when they are performing essentially the 
same tasks. Invoking the analogy of the “glass ceiling”, feminists attribute horizontal 
discrimination to often officially imperceptible patriarchal tendencies to informally or 
clandestinely value and promote male employees over female employees (Estévez-Abe 2001; 
Workplace Gender Equity Agency 2014 ). Here it should be noted that in Australia and other 
OECD countries, relatively recent Acts legislating “equal pay for work of equal worth” may 
be effectively thwarted by the difficulty in demonstrating gender discrimination as the basis 
of wage gaps in individual cases (Smith 2011). The statistical pattern in promotions and pay 
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rates within occupations across industrial nations is nonetheless telling (Lewis & Giullari 
2006). 
Apart from horizontal discrimination within occupations, vertical discrimination is the result 
of labour market segregation between occupations. Labour market segmentation can be partly 
attributed to the concentration of women in “feminised” occupations usually associated with 
social services. Within occupations including nursing, teaching, childcare, clerical work, 
social work and community support, women tend to be paid significantly less for work which 
can be roughly estimated to be of comparable skill and worth to that performed in other 
occupations (Nowak & Preston 2001). Such discrimination may arise from the patriarchal 
perception that female employees in such occupations are sufficiently rewarded by carrying 
out duties that are “natural” to them and therefore intrinsically satisfying. Labour market 
segmentation has also been explained in terms of the perceived need for women to accept 
jobs closer to home or with the flexible hours and conditions conducive to continuing 
responsibility for the raising of children and other domestic activities. Given the conception 
of their household responsibilities, women are more likely to trade the “flexibility” afforded 
by such occupations for lower pay (Lewis & Giullari 2006; Mitto 2012). As Palmer and 
Eveline (2012) observe, the results of such decisions include not only lower pay but also 
include diminished occupational status and fewer opportunities for formal training and 
promotion.   
In Australia, numerous inquiries into and reviews of the gender wage gap have culminated in 
institutional recognition of the undervaluation of “feminised” paid work in the Fair Work Act 
of 2009. However, Cortis and Meagher (2012) find that the Act has not been successfully 
enforced for the many Australian women still working in female dominated service industries 
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or in other occupations where women remain on low levels of remuneration compared to 
men. Smith (2011), suggests that here the ineffectiveness of legislation may to some extent be 
due to the difficulties of demonstrating employer discrimination as the basis of wage 
differentials in specific cases. In Australia, the difficulty in implementing such policies is 
indicated in the oscillation of the gender wage gap for part-time workers between 15 to 18 per 
cent over the last two decades (Cassells et al; Australian Council of Trade Unions 2013). The 
Workplace Gender Equity Agency currently estimates the gap to be 17.1 per cent (Workplace 
Gender Equality Agency 2014). 
Feminist political economy thus explains the economic disadvantage of women in 
contemporary industrial societies in terms of their under-representation in the labour force 
and in terms of labour market discrimination and segregation. The combined effects of these 
factors translate into the likelihood that the average woman will earn considerably less 
income over a lifetime than the average man (Booth & Wood 2006; Chalmers & Hill 2007). 
For Australia, this is indicated in NATSEM modelling which suggests that based on the work 
patterns of males and females in 2006, a 25 year old man is likely to earn $2.4 million over a 
lifetime while a woman is likely to earn $1.4 million (AMP 2009). 
Feminist researchers including Pearce (1985), Chant (2008) and Donald (2012), emphasize 
that the impacts of the earnings gender gap are significantly exacerbated by the growing 
number and proportion of female-headed sole parent households in industrial nations. In this 
context, these researchers have focused on what they perceive to be a “feminisation of 
poverty”. The significant connection between sole parenting and poverty is indicated in 
female-headed households being up to five times more likely to be living in poverty 
compared to married non-parents in wealthy developed countries (Christopher et al 2002).  
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In Australia, the predominance of female-headed households among sole parent families is 
reflected in recent ABS data. In 2012, 15 per cent of families (961,000), were headed by a 
sole parent with 81 per cent being female (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012f). Feminist 
theorists would explain this proportion in terms of the patriarchal cultural, legal and policy 
practices informed by “naturalizing” ideologies which, as we’ve seen, deem caring for 
children as predominantly the “normal” role of women. Although many female-headed 
households rely on family and household members for both social and income support, in 
Australia in 2004 some 52 per cent of all sole parents relied on government pensions and 
allowances as their principle source of income. This compared with 22 per cent of all adults 
during this period (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2004a). Further, the relative poverty 
experienced in many female-headed households is one component of explaining the fact that 
currently 14 per cent of women in Australia live below the poverty line compared to 12 per 
cent of men (Australian Council of Social Service 2012).  
So feminist political economy identifies the contemporary patriarchy as an underlying causal 
factor connecting the under-representation of women in the paid labour force, the gender pay 
gap, and the relative poverty of women – particularly sole parents and older women. The 
essential point of this analysis is that the various dimensions of disadvantage that many 
women currently experience in Australia is not the result of an accidental convergence of 
unrelated factors. Indeed, the overarching hypothesis and finding of feminist political 
economy is that in modern patriarchal societies these experiences and individual 





3.2 Superannuation and patriarchy 
This analysis of gendered labour force disadvantage, discrimination and poverty supports the 
arguments of critics who claim employment and income-based superannuation systems are 
inherently gender biased. Indeed, given the ways in which various patriarchal meanings and 
practices mutually interact, a feminist analysis indicates the extent, the depth and the 
complexity of the gender bias in such schemes. As an example, in Australia concerns about 
the financial vulnerability of single older women in retirement have culminated in policies 
encouraging equal splitting of a couple’s combined superannuation balances in property 
settlements upon separation or divorce (Maloney et al 2000). However, as Sheehan, 
Chizanowski and Dewar’s (2008) evaluation of post-reform practice and settlement outcomes 
indicates, women are likely to forgo a share of their former partner’s superannuation balance 
in exchange for a greater portion of the family home. Such arrangements are explicable in a 
patriarchal context where women are more likely to be responsible for sole parent households 
upon separation, and where men are more likely to afford the purchase of another dwelling.   
Similarly, the need to explain superannuation policies and outcomes in the context of the 
connection of various patriarchal meanings and practices becomes apparent when considering 
the dialogue around superannuation and women’s financial literacy. Taking studies indicating 
women’s relatively higher aversion to investment risk and their allegedly poor financial 
literacy, several critics of the current SGC have advocated allocating greater resources and 
efforts in this regard (Gallery N, Newton C, Palm C 2011).   However, Jefferson’s (2007) 
qualitative study of women’s attitudes to financial planning indicates that the concepts of 
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“work” and “retirement” are themselves significantly informed by gender roles. This being 
so, it is not simply a matter of providing women with information about regulations and risk 
calculations, but rather it is a matter of transforming the very conceptions about whether it is 
a woman’s “role” or “responsibility” as a “wife and mother” to investigate complex financial 
arrangements in the first place. Jefferson shows that individual decisions and practices 
regarding savings are meaningful in an (institutional) household context. Her study showed 
such household dynamics to revolve around concepts of males as primary “breadwinners” 
and financial planners. These observations compliment Jefferson’s (2005b) review of 
literature indicating that decisions about working, saving and family finances are particularly 
difficult and varied for some women, given the complexity of household dynamics over long 
periods of time.  
Jefferson’s (2007) study of women’s attitudes to financial planning, and Sheehan et al’s 
(2008) evaluation of superannuation splitting upon divorce, suggest a need to consider 
systemic connections between what seem to be disparate elements of gender bias in 
Australia’s current SGC. These studies more generally indicate the depth, extent and 
complexity of patriarchal meanings and practices underlying current retirement income 
policy and outcomes. Indeed, a number of researchers have advocated a specific and systemic 
gender analysis of retirement income and related social policies (Sharp & Austen 2007; 





3.3 Feminist standpoint theory 
Calls for a distinctively gender-aware analysis of socio-economic and financial practices may 
be theoretically and methodologically informed by feminist standpoint theory. In general 
terms, standpoint theory challenges the legitimacy of claims to a singular authoritative 
representation of reason and experience. It rejects outright what Nagel (1986) calls the 
objectivist ideal of the “view from nowhere” presupposed by both classical rationalism and 
empiricism – a supposedly “God’s eye” view, or theory, which impartially sees all of reality 
as it “truly” is. It holds that how reality is both conceptualised and experienced by different 
groups of people, is always partial and situated in multi-dimensional ways: politically, 
economically, socially and culturally. 
Further, standpoint theory holds uncompromisingly to a certain conception of epistemic 
justice – namely, that groups which are politically, economically, socially and culturally 
marginalised have distinctive perspectives on reality which are prima facie just as worthy of 
consideration as anyone else’s. Indeed in certain circumstances, the direct experiences and 
conceptual tools developed by marginalised groups may be more valuable in understanding 
some aspects of reality with which these groups are confronted. Moreover, it is possible that 
by taking the ‘standpoint’ of the marginalised, the disenfranchised, the oppressed and the 
ignored, a researcher may achieve insights into some phenomenon of interest that would not 
otherwise be possible (Harding 1986).  In this regard, standpoint theory allows the researcher 
to gain insight into those issues which are generally obscured when one seeks to take a 
statistically mediated aggregate view of the entire population – a view which tends to bury 
inequitable realities faced by certain socio-economic groups in what can be “pleasing 
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averages”. Significantly, such insights are likely to be invaluable for framing policy to 
address precisely this marginalisation or exploitation or oppression.  
As such, standpoint theory encourages the researcher to seek out and attend to the views and 
experiences of multiple, qualitatively different groups when investigating social, economic 
and political phenomena. This is not merely a moral obligation, but is also a necessary 
scientific one: if one is to hope for a richer, more objective understanding of some 
phenomenon under investigation, one must grasp that phenomenon from different, especially 
neglected “standpoints” (Nielsen 1990; Wood 1993).  
In these terms, the feminist standpoint approach places a focus on women’s lives and life 
experiences in order to acquire new, more objective knowledge. Given the systemic and 
pervasive presence of patriarchy across and within societies, feminist scholars including 
Harding (1986), Nielson (1990) and Hartsock (1998), have advocated feminist standpoint 
theory as an illuminating and fruitful framework for politico-economic research. Feminist 
standpoint theory has become popular as a methodology for the social sciences because it 
lends legitimacy to the disaggregation of experience along gender lines and explicitly 
sanctions qualitative phenomenological “data-analysis” of the concrete circumstances of 
women’s lives (Swigonski 1993). Historically, men’s lives have always been recognised and 
studied, often being universalised as the study of humanity per se, whereas women’s lives 
have been much less recognised, documented and studied. Nielson states that women’s 
culture, history and lives have thus remained ‘underground and invisible’, most often 




However, whilst feminist standpoint theorists focus on the manner in which patriarchal 
structures systemically give rise to a distinctively female interpretation and experience of the 
world, other feminist scholars have stressed the need to differentiate between women’s varied 
and sometimes conflicting experiences. In this regard some critics of feminist standpoint 
theory have compared its assumption of a unitary and singular female view of reality to 
biological determinism (Ferguson 1991). Yet others have questioned the theory’s alleged 
application of a blanket conception of patriarchy across nations and societies with radically 
different cultural practices, and family and household structures (Narayan 2004; Koopman 
1991).  
In the context of Western, industrial societies, key studies highlight the ways in which ‘many 
persons experience gender-related issues as inseparable to race, class, age and disability-
related issues’ (Zerbe Enns, 2010, p.333). In this regard feminist historians, cross-cultural 
theorists and contemporary policy analysts have focused on the ways in which an assumed 
white, Western feminist viewpoint has in past and present practice, inadvertently exacerbated 
the oppression and marginalisation experienced by non-Western women, racial minorities 
and working class women (Davis 1981; Baines 1997; Narayan 2004).   
In addressing these problems, Chant (2007, p.338) has observed that feminist theory must 
explain gendered poverty and gender discrimination in terms of a matrix of specific variables 
including tradition, class, race, sexuality, age, lifecycle positions, ethnicity and other ‘axes of 
difference’. Similarly, examining the practical and political consequences of patriarchy, 
Matua (2000-2001) suggests that differences and commonalities should be mapped out as the 
basis for genuine and viable coalitions committed to social justice. As she observes:  ‘Our 
politics must be informed by affinity rather than identity, not simply because we are not all 
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alike, but because we each embody multiple, often conflicting, identities and locations’ 
(Matua 2000-2001, p.1208).  
In this regard, some standpoint theorists would suggest that the increasing use of the feminist 
standpoint has had less to do with gender per se, and more to do with the fact that previously, 
women’s standpoints were not sought and were therefore not represented in the development 
of knowledge, moral codes and social institutions and conventions. As Krane (2001, p.403) 
puts it: ‘women have a distinct standpoint because of the power differential between females 
and males in our society’.   
Some feminist standpoint theorists have accordingly emphasised that this theory is not only 
consistent with, but strongly encourages articulation and analysis of difference, diversity and 
contradiction. So, for Narayan (2004, p.221), one of the most interesting insights of feminist 
standpoint theory ‘…is the view that oppressed groups, whether women, the poor or racial 
minorities, may derive an “epistemic advantage” from having knowledge of the practices of 
both their own contexts and those of their oppressors’. In similar terms, Moreton-Robinson 
(2014) has proposed feminist standpoint theory as the basis of a uniquely female indigenous 
Australian experience of the world.  
 
 
3.4 Feminist standpoint theory applied to superannuation 
When considering women’s experiences of Australia’s current retirement income scheme, 
difference and contradiction are at the very least implied in the complexity and diversity of 
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poverty in contemporary Australian society (Richardson 2012; Kostenko 2009; Department 
of Social Services 2013b). In this regard, several studies have assessed Australia’s SGC by 
constructing micro-models which differentiate between impacts on specific groups 
considered to be marginalised or particularly at risk. For example Parr, Ferris and Mahuteau 
(2007) have used the first and second wave of the 2002-2003 HILDA surveys to examine the 
relationship between an individual’s superannuation balance and the number of her or his 
children. To refine their conclusions, the authors also test this relationship by reference to a 
range of attributes including age, level of education, birthplace and marital status. The study 
finds that in general, the value of a woman’s superannuation balance is in inverse proportion 
to the number of her children.   
Here, Parr et al’s (2007) conclusions, support Kelly and Harding (2002) finding that couples 
without children have on average higher superannuation balances than those with children. 
However, Parr and co-researchers emphasize that the inverse relationship between the 
number of children and the median value of superannuation was much less significant for 
men than it was for women. This indicates that the cost of raising children played only a 
minor part in explaining the low level of superannuation balances compared to the financial 
effect of women’s non-participation in the paid workforce. Feminist political economists 
would, as we’ve seen, explain this difference in terms of the patriarchal cultural constructions 
of women’s roles as mothers and carers. Investigation of the superannuation balances of 
specific groups of women in Australia also includes Maloney, Marshall, McConnell, Elliot, 
Banks and Hausknecht’s (2000) study of the impact of separation and divorce, and Murphy’s 




While these studies have mostly extrapolated from existing superannuation balances, others 
have constructed micro-simulations upon various assumptions regarding wage rates, labour-
force participation and other variables. When examining likely superannuation outcomes for 
specific groups, some researchers advocate micro-simulations as the best alternative to (at 
present undeveloped) Australian longitudinal data. Preston and Austen’s (2001) cross-
sectional model is a particularly comprehensive example. The authors use 1996 ABS Income 
Distribution Survey Data to construct a range of likely retirement incomes based on the 
lifetime workforce engagement and earnings profiles of a range of typical individuals. The 
life profiles include a man and woman engaged in part-time work from the ages of 20 to 65; 
women leaving the workforce in their late twenties to raise children and eventually return to 
either full or part-time work; and a woman with a very few early years of workforce 
participation. The model is controlled for level of education, years of potential labour market 
experience, birthplace, marital status, as well as the presence and age of dependent children. 
Each of these individuals is assumed to have an average level of education, and allowance is 
made for the gender wage gap from the beginning of paid work.  
To assess the effects of differences in levels of education and occupational status, Preston and 
Austen develop additional scenarios, depicting higher salaried, higher educated individuals. 
The superannuation outcomes for these are compared with those of a woman employed as a 
cleaner. In their conclusions, Preston and Austen (2001, p.14) stress that the ‘...importance of 
education, occupation of employment, hours of employment as well as timing and length of 
exits from the paid workforce, in a retirement income system where the emphasis is on self-
funded retirement’.  
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Preston and Austen’s results confirm the conclusions of a large number of previous studies 
indicating that women are marginalised and disadvantaged under Australia’s current 
retirement income system. However, from the perspective of feminist standpoint theory, 
Preston and Austen’s approach is particularly illuminating in its painstaking specification of 
the relative disadvantages experienced by different categories of women. For example, their 
results indicate that the gender bias in Australia’s current retirement income system has a 
greater impact on women temporarily leaving the workforce to raise children than it does on 
women receiving relatively lower wages over a life of continuous part-time work. These 
results highlight the importance of the life-course timing of paid employment when 
determining financial outcomes in retirement.  
As noted, the above discussed range of studies, estimate retirement income for various groups 
in the population by constructing lifetime earnings scenarios from static, cross-sectional data. 
Alternative approaches seek to capture the dynamic effects on retirement income of various 
events and policy changes over the lifetime of representative individuals. This dynamic 
approach more sensitively responds to the significance of the timing of superannuation 
contributions over the life-course and to life altering circumstances and capacities of 
individuals over many decades. NATSEM dynamic simulations of superannuation outcomes 
in Australia include Kelly, Percival, Schofield, Shresthe, Callander & Passey’s (2012) 
analysis of the impact of illness and Schofield et al’s (2011) estimates of the effects of early 
retirement due to depression and other mental illness. They include also Keegan’s (2011) 
estimation of the effects on superannuation balances of higher labour force participation, 
reduced disability among those aged over 40, higher labour force participation among 




The capacity of such dynamic simulations to compensate for the absence of relevant 
longitudinal panel data will be discussed in Chapter 5. Here, it is significant to note that 
Keegan’s (2011) conclusions with regards to the likely distributional impacts in retirement of 
the various hypothesised and actual policies and events. Keegan emphasises that while 
“broad-brush” approaches to retirement income reform (such as increasing the mandatory 
contribution rate) have an impact on the greatest number of people, smaller and more targeted 
policies such as reducing disability and increasing the labour force participation of mothers 
disproportionately affects those with relatively little in the way of superannuation savings.  
Other NATSEM superannuation researchers have, in this respect, criticised the  abstracting 
from what other research indicates will be highly divergent outcomes between different 
population cohorts (Kelly, Percival & Harding 2001).  
This emphasis on the disproportionate effects of superannuation policy on specific groups in 
the population would seem to vindicate an analysis of Australia’s current retirement income 
system from the standpoint of those groups of women most marginalised and disadvantaged, 
regardless of them comprising a minority of the Australian population. In this regard, it is 
significant to note the dearth of research on the actual and likely retirement incomes of 
female informal primary carers in Australia. Moreover, as we’ll see in Chapter 4, the two 
studies that do address this issue have overlooked significant cohorts within the female carer 
population. Within the framework of feminist political economy, the disproportional 
representation of women among informal primary carers, the functional significance of their 
unpaid labour and the intensity of their physical, social and financial disadvantage are 
particularly poignant indicators of the operation of patriarchy in contemporary Australian 
society.      
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Considering that this group currently provides the major elder care in Australia (Rice et al 
2008), predictions that Australia’s SGC will address the fiscal problems associated with an 
ageing population must be considered in light of the social, financial and physical 
disadvantages experienced by informal carers as direct and indirect consequences of their 
caring activity. In this regard, a critical assessment of Australia’s SGC efficiency must, at the 
very least, examine likely financial outcomes in retirement for informal primary carers.  
The following chapter puts the case, firstly, for the need to consider superannuation outcomes 
for female primary carers in Australia, and secondly, for detailing scenarios based on a range 
of carer profiles in doing so. Chapter 4 thus offers a statistically informed overview of the 










THE NATURE, EXTENT AND FUNCTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORMAL 
CARE IN AUSTRALIA AND ITS IMPACTS ON CARERS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter’s outline of feminist political economy highlighted the patriarchal 
origins of the conception of women as “natural” and “moral” carers. We noted the causal 
connections between such gender stereotyping and the social and financial disadvantage 
experienced by women in contemporary industrial societies, relative to men. This 
disadvantage is manifest, as we saw, in various dimensions. It is apparent firstly, in women’s 
relatively lower participation in paid employment, explicable in terms of their perceived 
principal duties as residing in the private, domestic sphere. We observed also the manner in 
which patriarchal concepts of nurturing as women’s natural role and moral duty informed the 
concentration of women in “caring professions” with subsequently lower rates of pay and 
fewer career prospects.   
Examining the structural significance of women’s unpaid domestic labour, we noted the 
feminist emphasis on unpaid domestic labour as structurally integral to the production and 
continual reproduction of contemporary industrial societies. We saw that, while materialist 
feminists specified this in terms of the reduced value of labour power and enhanced 
production of surplus value, feminists generally articulate the value of women’s unpaid 
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labour (and the implicit associated degree of economic exploitation) in terms of market-based 
value contributions to Gross Domestic Product. 
In this chapter, within this feminist theoretical framework, we shall broadly outline the 
nature, extent and functional significance of informal primary care in Australia as well as 
examine the impact of caring on carers. This broad picture draws on various sources of 
statistical information. These include the 2012 Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of 
Disability, Ageing and Carers (SDAC) and the 2008 ABS publication, A Profile of Carers in 
Australia. This chapter also draws on the 2007 Families Caring for a Person with a 
Disability Study (FCPDS) conducted by Australian Institute of Family Studies and the 
Department of Families, Housing, Community Service and Indigenous Affairs (as reported 
by Edwards et al 2008), and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics Survey in 
Australia (HILDA) Waves 1-11 (as reported by Wilkins 2014). In these publications, carers’ 
responses and characteristics were matched as far as possible with those of respondent elders 
and persons with a disability. Details of the scope and terms of reference for these surveys are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
4.2 Definitions of formal and informal care, primary carers and others  
In the 1970s when women began entering paid employment in large numbers, they were less 
able to combine previous caring responsibilities with paid work, especially when the caring 
responsibilities were demanding or onerous. This, along with the rise of the feminist 
movement, brought the issue of caring activities – who carers are, where and how they work, 
whether they are recognised and how they should be conceptualised – into the arena of public 
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discourse. As a result, over time, the terms “carer” and “care-giver” have become part of the 
vocabulary in post-industrial societies (Fine 2007). Nonetheless, such terms commonly have 
vague boundaries and multiple uses. A specific terminology is required in order to avoid 
conceptual and empirical confusion. This thesis, by and large, relies on definitions developed 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics.  
Formal care work typically includes legally contracted work in childcare, aged care, nursing, 
and other health and welfare services in the community service sector which primarily entail 
direct, personal assistance with bodily or psychological wellbeing (ABS 2003). As women 
have increasingly entered the workforce, families struggle when confronted with the need for 
child-care, elder-care and care of the chronically ill and/or disabled. The care industry has 
consequentially grown exponentially (Smith 2013).  As noted in the previous chapter, the 
paid care industry is particularly gender based in Australia and internationally. The gendered 
experiences and exploitation of formal care workers in Australia and in other countries has 
been extensively analysed and documented (Palmer & Eveline 2012; Hogan 2004; De Bellis 
2006; Healy & Moskes 2005; Nelson 1999).  
While acknowledging the relatively low rates of pay and onerous working conditions 
experienced by those (mostly) women working in the formal care industries, this thesis 
focuses on superannuation outcomes for unpaid or informal carers and in particular on those 
providing primary care. The ABS 2012 Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers in this regard 
defines a carer per se as ‘... a person of any age who provides informal assistance, in terms of 
help or supervision to an older person or someone who has a disability or a long term health 
condition. This assistance has been, or is likely to be, ongoing for at least six months’ p. 1. As 
such, informal care work includes activities covered by the above definition that are not 
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provided because they have been legally contracted such as to establish an employer-
employee relation or formal service provision. 
In Australia care work is further categorised in terms of the degree of assistance required and 
provided in carrying out activities in three core areas such that a primary carer is defined as 
‘… someone who provides the most informal assistance to a person with a disability with one 
or more of the core activities of mobility, self-care and communication’ (ABS 2012a). 
   
4.3 The extent and duration of informal care in Australia 
In estimating the extent of informal care work in Australia, it must be noted that the nature of 
the activities that can fall within this category makes it difficult to obtain precise figures.  
Many individuals providing such assistance may not regard their activity as ‘work’ or may 
not self-identify as carers (Qu, Edwards & Gray 2012). Here, the difficulties are exacerbated 
by care work being undervalued, unrecorded and invisible in most industrial nations (Hess 
2013). As an estimate, in Australia in 2012, approximately 2.7 million people (11.9 per cent) 
of the population were carers. Of these, 770,000 (3.4 per cent of the population) identified as 
primary carers (ABS 2012). These numbers vary only slightly from those reported in earlier 
ABS Surveys and in HILDA Waves 5-11 (ABS 2008a, Wilkins 2014).   
According to the 2012 SDAC, 39 per cent of carers reported providing 40 hours or more of 
care per week. This is comparable with the hours reported in the ABS (2012) Survey of 
Disability, Ageing and Carers and the Australian Government House of Representatives 
Standing Committee on Family, Community, Housing and Youth (2009) publication Who 
Cares…? Inquiry into Better Support for Carers. The greatest portion of this group were 
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female primary carers. Examining the 2006 cohort of carers receiving Carer Payment or 
Carer Allowance, only 11.6 per cent reported caring for a person with a disability for twenty 
hours or less a week, and 58 per cent reported providing more than 100 weekly hours of care. 
This was likely to include being “on call” as well as direct care. However, as the authors of 
the survey observe:  
While the number of hours caring may not always represent direct care, even being on 
call has implications for the lives of the carers and their families. Carers may not feel 
that they can leave the person in care by themselves, which has implications for 
engaging in a social life outside of the house, independent of the care recipient, and 
also in employment (Edwards et al 2008, p.xiv).  
In Australia the relative immaturity of existing longitudinal data makes it at present difficult 
to compile a statistical picture of the duration of informal care over the carer’s lifetime. 
Moreover, given the variety of care recipients’ conditions and the associated episodic nature 
of care-giving (Schofield et al 2014; Bittman et al 2007; Falkiner 2011), compilation of so-
called “typical” durations from cross sectional data would be risky at best. The significant 
problems this presents for estimating the life-course impacts of care on retirement incomes 
shall be discussed in Chapter 5. At this point, a limited picture of the duration of care may be 
gleaned from responses to survey questions affording some degree of retrospection on the 
part of the respondents. We may also have some indication of the duration of care from 
matching these responses with information on individuals with a disability.  In this way, the 
2007 Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study estimated that approximately 25 
per cent of carers have provided care for between 10 and 24 years and a further 25 per cent 




4.4 The nature, functional significance and value of informal care in 
Australia 
In 2006, almost half of primary informal care recipients had some type of physical disability, 
sixteen percent had an intellectual or learning disability, approximately eleven percent had a 
psychiatric condition, approximately five percent had a sensory or speech impediment, and 
almost three percent had brain injury (Edwards et al, 2008). In 2012, the most common types 
of physical illness or disability experienced by informal care recipients included back 
problems, arthritis and related disorders, diseases of the nervous system (for example 
multiple sclerosis and cerebral palsy) and autism and congenital problems (ABS 2012a). 
Those with intellectual and developmental disabilities requiring care are likely to be younger 
while those with physical disabilities are more likely to be elderly. Individuals with a 
psychiatric illness requiring high levels of care (predominantly schizophrenia and substance 
related disorders) are most likely to be aged between 18 and 24 years. Although 60 per cent 
of young people with mental illnesses recover over the course of their lifetimes, 15 per cent 
commit suicide and at least 20 per cent live with mental illness for the rest of their lives (ABS 
2007c).   
From the perspective of the carers, HILDA data pooled for 2005-2011 indicates that 44 per 
cent of these were caring for a co-resident partner, 16.8 per cent were caring for a co-resident 
elderly parent or partner’s parent, 15.1 per cent for an elderly parent or partner’s parent living 
elsewhere, almost 11 per cent for a co-resident adult child with a disability, and 
approximately 9 per cent for a young child with a disability (Wilkins 2014, See Appendix 
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A4, Table A4:1). ABS (2008a) data indicates similar proportions, noting that more than two 
thirds of these caring for a child with a disability spent 40 hours or more on such activities. In 
this regard, it is also interesting to note that although the majority of carers were partners of 
the care recipient, female primary carers were just as likely to be the parent or child of the 
care recipient as a partner (Wilkins 2014). Females providing primary care for an elderly 
parent or partner’s parent comprise almost 30 per cent of all carers. Edwards et al (2008) note 
that a significant number of those providing primary elder care did so for more than 40 hours 
a week.  
Here it is pertinent to note that the proportion of females providing informal elder care tends 
to be obscured in surveys focusing on co-resident carers, since elderly parents are less likely 
than children or partners to be living with their primary carer. The significant proportion of 
female carers providing primary care for a parent tends also to be obscured if both male and 
female primary carers are considered, since the great majority of the relevant males are aged 
over 70 and are caring for a partner (Wilkins 2014).  
When considering the nature of care, it is also interesting to note the statistical significance of 
providing either simultaneous or sequential care for multiple recipients. For example, in 
2006, 13 per cent of primary carers cared for two to three people with disabilities. Almost 33 
per cent cared for at least one non-disabled child while simultaneously attending the needs of 
a person with a disability. The great majority of these carers were women (Edwards et al` 
2008). To view multiple caring from another perspective, in 2003 thirty seven percent of all 
parents in Australia aged between 35 and 54 years were also carers. Almost half of these 
were caring for a child with disability, and a significant proportion of the remainder were 
carers of elder parents and spouses (ABS 2008a). Moreover, from the limited collections of 
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carers’ oral accounts available, it would seem that many women are simultaneously, or have 
been sequentially caring for multiple family members with the same congenital conditions 
(see e.g. Carers Victoria 2004).   
This cohort of (mostly female) individuals caring for multiple care recipients could be 
considered members of a “sandwich generation”. This term is used to describe the group of 
mostly female baby boomers who, having had children at a relatively later age, are 
consequently faced with the dual responsibility of supporting and caring for teenaged and 
young adult children as well as their elderly parents (Fuller-Thomson et al, 1997). Some 
researchers predict that an increasing number of individuals will be part of this generation, 
given the ageing population, and given a simultaneous increase in the number of young adults 
who are for various reasons unable or reluctant to leave the family home (Cohen & Casper 
2002).  
The existence of a significant cohort simultaneously caring for elderly parents and non-
disabled children is supported by ABS data indicating that most carers of elderly parents are 
aged between 35-65 years; almost half of primary carers in this age range are themselves 
parents of children younger than 15 years of age (ABS 2008a). However, while the impacts 
of simultaneously caring for multiple individuals are reportedly considerable (Edwards et al 
2008), the impacts of sequentially raising children and primary caring for an elderly parent 
(or spouse) are equally, if not sometimes more significant, for financial outcomes in 
retirement. The data on working aged carers with children is not likely to capture the full 
extent of sequential “sandwich care” since it excludes parents of children over the age of 15. 
The employment and financial impacts of this type of care are likely to be more spread across 




4.5 The functional significance of informal care and its imputed national 
value 
In its 2013 Community Guide to recognizing and valuing those who provide informal care, 
the Australian Human Rights Commission notes that:  
At some point in every person’s life they will be involved in a care relationship. Care 
relationships are a valuable part of Australia’s social and economic fabric. The help 
and support provided by unpaid carers is not only essential to the people being cared 
for, it is also an important contribution to the community as a whole (Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2013a, p.2). 
The likely increasing necessity of informal primary care in Australia and other OECD nations 
must be considered in light of a combination of several factors. Firstly, the ageing population 
places increasing demands on family members and others to provide informal care given the 
absence of increased public funding of formal aged care services (Productivity Commission 
2011). Secondly, projecting from current trends in survival rates for pre-term infants, the 
number of children with a chronic illness or disability is also likely to increase over the next 
few decades (Schofield et al 2014). The increasing necessity for informal care in Australia 
becomes apparent when these trends are considered in light of the deinstitutionalisation or 
privatisation of a range of care services in Australia and the increasing cost to individuals of 
formal care over the past few decades (Rice et al 2008).  
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When considering the current monetary value of informal care in Australia, a number of 
counterfactuals must be employed. The value of such care could be represented either in 
terms of the hourly cost of replacing it with formal care. However, as noted in the previous 
chapter, this method problematically assumes a lack of casual connection between the extent 
of informal care and the market remuneration to formal care workers. Alternatively, the 
monetary value of informal care can be estimated in terms of the hourly wages or salaries that 
informal carers forgo when not participating in the paid labour force. Using both methods, 
Access Economics has estimated that the annual value of informal care in Australia is set to 
exceed $40.9 billion per annum in 2010, which is 33 per cent higher than in 2005 (Access 
Economics 2010).  
This value and functional centrality of informal care in itself makes a case for examining 
Australia’s SGC in terms of retirement outcomes for informal carers. The system’s failure to 
meet the needs of informal carers is in this regard inextricable from the sustainability of 
Australia’s society and economy generally. In assessing Australia’s SGC along these lines, it 
is firstly necessary to articulate both the characteristics of informal carers and the impacts of 
care-giving on them and their families.  
 
4.6 Characteristics of informal carers 
4.6.1 Gender 
In Australia in 2012, a higher proportion of females than males provided primary informal 
care. Females comprised almost 70 per cent of primary carers and 56 per cent of all other 
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carers. Moreover, female primary carers were significantly more likely than male 
counterparts to spend more than 40 hours a week providing care. Female primary carers were 
also much more likely than males to care for their children with a disability or an elderly 
parent (ABS 2012a). Similarly, pooled HILDA data for 2006 to 2011 indicates that, among 
the cohort of working aged people in Australia, women are much more likely to be primary 
carers than men (Wilkins 2014). However, after the age of 70, men are more likely to be 
primary carers than women (ABS 2008a). The gender related influences on and impacts of 
providing primary care are discussed in the gender analysis below.  
4.6.2 Age 
The majority of carers are of workforce age (18-64 years), and represent 75.6 per cent of all 
carers. The ABS 2012 Survey of Disability Ageing and Carers specifies that most of these are 
aged between 35 and 64 years (ABS 2012a). However, the HILDA data pooled for 2005-
2011 indicates that the likelihood of becoming an informal carer increases with age, such that 
carers are on average older than non-carers. People in Australia were less likely to be 
informal carers at a younger age (Wilkins 2014). It is nonetheless interesting to note that in 
2003 approximately 101,600 children aged less than 15 years were caring for disabled parents 
or other family members (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2004).   
4.6.3 Level of Educational Attainment 
For the working age population (over 15 years of age), carers were less likely than non-carers 
to have completed a Bachelor’s degree or above. Of all carers, 83 per cent did not hold a 
Bachelor’s degrees or above. Dividing carers into primary and non-primary carers, only 15 
per cent of the former group, and 18 per cent of the latter group held Bachelor’s degrees or 
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above. This is a relatively smaller proportion of tertiary educated non-carers of whom 23 per 
cent held Bachelor’s degrees or higher (ABS 2012a).  
4.6.4 Country of birth and English proficiency 
The great majority of carers were born in Australia, and the remainder most commonly 
immigrated from the United Kingdom or New Zealand (ABS 2012a). However, pooled 
HILDA data for 2005-2011 indicates that the proportion of primary carers who are either 
immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds or indigenous Australians is 
significantly greater than the proportion of these groups in the population (Wilkins 2014). 
This has significant implications for understanding the carer’s motivations and the ways in 
which care-giving impacts on them, as discussed in Chapter 9.  
 
4.7 The impact of caring on carers 
In assessing the impact of caring on carers, it is interesting to note, at the outset, that levels of 
health, social interaction, employment and finances for all categories of carers generally fell 
somewhere between those for primary carers and the population of non-carers. This is a key 
conclusion of the HILDA data on carers pooled for 2005-2011. The HILDA researchers 
emphasise that this in itself indicates the significant negative correlation between the degree, 
intensity and duration, of the provision of informal care and the carer’s wellbeing (Wilkins 
2014). With regard to duration, the HILDA researchers emphasise that there is an “overall 
tendency” for outcomes to be worse the longer an individual has been a main carer. The 
researchers in this regard emphasise that conclusions relating to effects of the duration of care 
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are at this stage limited by the absence of longitudinal data. (Comprehensive and detailed 
HILDA data on informal carers is available only from Wave 8 onwards). Considering the 
three years from Wave 8 to Wave 11, Wilkins (2014, pp.84-85) observes that:  
…those who have been caring for at least three years have relatively high rates of 
poor general health and poor mental health, and relatively low average levels of 
satisfaction with life overall and with their financial situations, feeling part of the 
local community and the amount of free time they enjoy. 
Given that longitudinal data, specifically on carers in Australia, is currently limited to a few 
years, conclusions about the long term impacts of duration of care cannot be strongly 
statistically supported.  
4.7.1 Mental and physical health   
In considering the health of groups and populations, researchers must consider the possibility 
of inflated results due to self-reporting. However, in the case of informal carers this may be 
neutralised by a tendency to under-report health conditions, particularly those relating to the 
impacts of caring (Schofield et al 2014). Pooled HILDA data for 2005-2011, indicates that 
primary carers had significantly higher rates of severe and moderate disability, poor short and 
long term health and poor mental health, compared both to other carers and the population of 
non-carers (Wilkins 2014).  
Considering that the likelihood of being a primary carer increases with age, these conclusions 
may ostensibly be related to older people more generally being in poorer health. However the 
2007 Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study (FCPDS) found that female 
primary carers in all age groups were more likely to be in poorer health compared to female 
non-carers of the same age with the exception of those aged 65 years or older (Edwards et al 
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2008). This study noted that the main factors associated with self-reported poor physical 
health were caring for a person with a disability who has high care needs, caring for more 
than one person with a disability, experiencing one or more problems with family functioning 
and not receiving sufficient support (Edwards et al 2008).  
This 2006 study moreover indicated significantly greater reported instances of mental illness 
among primary carers relative to their non-carer counterparts. These were mostly prolonged 
depressive episodes. Primary carers most at risk of experiencing a depressive episode lasting 
more than six months, included those caring for a child with a disability, caring for a person 
with high care needs and having another caring role (most commonly caring for other 
children). 
4.7.2 The impact of primary care on other family members 
In the 2007 Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study (FCPDS) 2007, carers 
reported experiences of problems in family functioning were significantly higher than those 
for the Australian population (Edwards et al 2008). The study noted families of carers and 
care recipients themselves reported higher than average levels of depression. Approximately 
27 per cent of carer’s partners, 12 per cent of their parents and 11 per cent of their other 
children had experienced depressive episodes of six months or more. Carers of people with 
psychiatric disorders were more likely to report two or more problems with family 
functioning compared to carers of people with physical disabilities. Moreover, carers 
generally were dissatisfied with relations between their children, suggesting the inordinate 
impact of caring for a child with a disability on his or her siblings.  
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From the perspective of assessing likely outcomes in retirement for informal primary carers, 
it is interesting here to note that the Australian Productivity Commission 2011 inquiry found 
that many informal care situations lead to family breakdown (Australian Productivity 
Commission 2011). Indeed, the 2007 Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study 
(FCPDS) observed that almost one-third of female primary carers under the age of 50 and 
one-seventh of those aged over 50 had divorced or separated since they started care-giving 
(Edwards et al 2008).  
4.7.3 Social interaction and community participation 
According to the 2007 Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study (FCPDS), most 
primary carers judged their circle of family and friends to be unchanged since assuming their 
caring role. Primary carers in all age cohorts reported reduced face-to-face social contact and 
substantially fewer hours engaging in activities outside the home since assuming a caring 
role. As an indication, the survey found that those caring for 40 hours a week or more were 
less likely to have participated in activities outside the home without the care recipient in the 
past three months (Edwards et al 2008). In this regard, the Australian Institute of Family 
Studies researchers suggest that the poor health of carers and their reduced income 
exacerbated the effects of reduced personal time. At any rate, carers for persons with high 
care needs expressed their need for more hours of face-to-face and out-of-home social 
contact.  
4.7.4 Support in the caring role 
The 2007 Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study (FCPDS) found that, although 
carers had supportive family and friends, one fifth of them received no assistance in carrying 
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out the caring work itself. Moreover, although 13 per cent of carers used respite care and 11 
per cent consulted General Practitioners with regards to their care recipients, almost half of 
carers did not use formal support services at all. The study also noted that informal assistance 
with care-giving was often accompanied by conflicts and a lack of cooperation between the 
primary caregiver and others (Edwards et al 2008).   
4.7.5 Labour force participation of carers 
The large body of Australian and international literature on the labour force participation of 
carers overwhelmingly notes the correlation between the extent and intensity of unpaid 
primary care and carer’s lower levels of employment and financial wellbeing. (For recent and 
comprehensive reviews of this literature see Nguyen et al 2014; OECD 2011). The main 
variables associated with carer’s lower labour force engagement include lower levels of 
educational attainment, poor health of the carer, provision of full-time care, caring for a child 
with a disability and lack of support from people outside the household.   
In assessing the impact of caring on carers’ retirement finances and on other factors it is here 
important to determine the direction of causality between these correlates. This is also 
necessary for designing appropriate remedial policies. In the Australian literature, such as 
Carers Victoria (2010) debate around this causality problem arises from the fact that certain 
characteristics of primary carers as a national cohort are in some respects not typical of the 
general population. Explanatory problems arise when some of these characteristics are 
associated with lower labor market engagement for non-carers as well. This leaves open the 
possibility that the relevant individuals may have had relatively low levels of labour market 
engagement, irrespective of their caring roles, notwithstanding the fact that the majority of 
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unemployed or partially employed carers highlighted the need to withdraw from paid labor to 
provide care (ABS 2007b; ABS 2012a).  
We have seen, for example, that primary carers are more likely to have lower levels of 
educational attainment. A primary carer of working age is more likely to be female. Primary 
carers are more likely to be older than other carers and non-carers, and they are less likely to 
be in good health.  Each of these factors is correlated with relatively low levels of labour 
market engagement for the population as a whole. Indeed Leigh (2009), and others, have 
taken some of these patterns to suggest a reverse causality, positing that many individuals 
may become carers because their labour market prospects are in any case relatively low.  
To some extent this problem is addressed through multiple variable regression analysis. For 
example, Edwards et al (2008) note that the correlation between poor health and primary 
care-giving is robust across all age groups. Their results suggest that age is not the only, or 
main, casual determinant of primary carers’ poor health and (indirectly) the determinant of 
their lower labor market engagement. Moreover, casting doubt on the view that individuals 
with lower levels of education tend to opt for caring as a result of having fewer labour market 
prospects, Bittman et al (2007) have noted that on average, individuals’ annual incomes in the 
year before undertaking primary care and their hourly income from paid work during caring, 
are no different from those of the general population. The authors observe that ‘these results 
are consistent with the idea that acquiring caring responsibilities is more like a random hazard 
than a rational (self-selected) response to smaller opportunity costs’ (Bittman et al 2007, 
p.264).   
Notwithstanding these results, in the absence of mature Australian longitudinal data,  Nguyen 
et al (2013) have emphasised that the carer-labour market causation debate can be settled 
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only by isolating one or more variables which affect carers’ labour market outcomes, 
specifically or only through the provision of care itself. In this regard, Schofield et al’s (2014) 
cross-sectional analysis based on the ABS 2009 Survey of Disability, Ageing and Care 
revealed a significant correlation of the likelihood of carers’ lower labor market participation 
with a range of specific disabilities and conditions. This study suggests that it is the condition 
of the care recipient, and not the attributes of the carer, which dictates the latter’s 
engagement with paid employment. For example, Schofield et al (2014) noted that the caring 
for a person with an acquired brain injury was most significantly correlated with absence 
from the labour force. This was followed by caring for individuals with chronic conditions 
including schizophrenia, dementia, Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimers, diabetes, osteoporosis, 
and certain disorders of an endocrinal, nutritional and metabolic nature. These researchers 
noted that 60 to 70 per cent of carers attending the needs of individuals with these conditions 
were not in the paid workforce. They moreover noted, that the correlations remained 
significant after adjusting for carers’ age, level of education, health and sex. Matching this 
information with data on actual conditions of care recipients and Australian population data, 
these researchers conclude that approximately 215,000 Australians of working age are not 
engaged in the labor force because they are primary carers of one or more individuals with 
the chronic conditions above specified. However, it is important to note that this number 
excludes primary carers of children with developmental or intellectual disabilities, that is to 
say, the great majority of those providing unpaid primary caring for their disabled child. 
Schofield et al (2014) note, that these individuals are also likely to be out of the workforce. 
(There will be further discussion of a qualitative nature of labor market participation and 




4.8 Financial outcomes of caring over the life-course of carers 
A 2011 OECD cross-national study, using household surveys from Australia and United 
Kingdom, South Korea and two surveys for individuals aged over 50, the European Survey 
on Health and Ageing (SHARE) and the United States Health and Retirement Survey has 
indicated that those of working age undertaking informal care are at greater risk of 
experiencing poverty (OECD 2011). As well as lower labour force participation, the study 
highlights lower wages due to career interruptions and lack of opportunities for career 
advancement as being of possible significance. Panel data derived from HILDA Waves 8-11 
(2008-2011) indicate that these adverse financial impacts of caring intensify with each year 
of care (Wilkins 2014). However, it must be noted that at that time of this study, sufficiently 
detailed HILDA data was available only for those four years. This is problematic given that 
many carers report caring over much longer periods or at different points in their life-course. 
Here, as noted, conclusions for Australia are severely hampered by the lack of mature 
longitudinal data. However Bittman et al’s (2007) cross referencing of some retrospective 
comments of carers reported in Waves 1-4 of HILDA with international longitudinal patterns 
suggests that the adverse financial (and other) impacts of caring are experienced by carers 
often years after the main caring activity has ceased. (We shall discuss the methodological 
significance of this temporal asymmetry for assessing the impacts of informal care on 
retirement income in Chapters 5 and 9). 
Taking cross sectional data, the ABS 2012 Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers noted that 
carers were more likely than non-carers to have household incomes in the lowest two 
quintiles of equivalised gross household incomes. 53 per cent of carer households and 65 per 
cent of primary carer households fell into the poorest two quintiles as compared to 36 per 
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cent of non-carer households. Moreover, only 7 per cent of primary carer households had 
gross equivalised incomes in the highest quintile compared with 23 per cent of non-carer 
households. These findings are supported by both the HILDA pooled data for 2005-2011, and 
the Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study (FCPDS) 2007 (Edwards et al 2008).  
In this regard, the economic costs of caring are not confined to foregone wages and salaries. 
As Dow and Meyer (2010) note, the carer’s household budget may be stretched by the need 
to purchase special equipment, to undertake home modifications and to pay for community 
support services, medical care and pharmaceuticals. Moreover, if the carer must work to 
cover the cost of such items, home-, or centre-based respite services become an additional 
expense.   
This adverse financial impact of care-giving on primary carers is explicable not only in terms 
of zero to relatively low labour force participation and the costs of meeting the specific needs 
of the care recipient. It is also a consequence of the extreme modesty of public welfare 
payments bestowed upon carers in Australia. Currently, the rate is $118.20 fortnightly for a 
Carers Allowance and $766.00 fortnightly for a Carers Payment. Subject to a means test, 
Carers Payment is provided on the condition that the recipient provides constant care to a co-
resident frail or aged person or to a co-resident person with a disability or medical condition. 
A Carers Allowance is paid when additional daily care and attention is provided to a person 
with a disability or medical condition or someone who is frail aged, and the carer meets the 
residence requirements (Department of Human Services 2014). 
In its report, Disability Care and Support 2011, the Productivity Commission observed that 
this current level of relevant payments is inadequate (Productivity Commission 2011). This 
inadequacy and the attendant financial hardship is indicated by the fact that, in 2006, 30 per 
115 
 
cent of families receiving a Carer Allowance, and 29.2 per cent of families receiving a Carer 
Payment, had experienced difficulties with due payment of bills for basic utilities such as gas, 
electricity and telephone services. Moreover, a significant number had pawned or sold 
possessions or asked family and friends for financial assistance (Edwards et al 2008). These 
findings for 2006 support similar observations in earlier ABS surveys (ABS 2008a).   
According to Carer’s Australia, the financial hardship experienced by carers and care 
recipients relying on public welfare payments is likely to be exacerbated by the current 
Coalition government’s proposal to index the Carer’s Payment to inflation to the CPI (rather 
than to Male Total Average Weekly Earnings) from September 2017. Carers Australia 
estimate that based on historical changes, this proposed change is likely to reduce the Carer 
Payment by about $80 over a decade (Carers Australia 2013). The full impact of this on 
carers’ household and families should be considered in light of the current Coalition 
government’s plans to similarly and simultaneously index the Disability Support Pension, the 
Age Pension and Parenting Payment Single from 1 July 2014.   
 
4.9 A gendered analysis of the nature, value and impacts of primary 
informal care in Australia 
Taking this statistical overview, it is clear that the nature and the provision of informal care in 
Australia is a gender-based issue. This is partly because the vast majority of those people 
experiencing the adverse impacts of informal care-giving are primary carers and, as noted, 
approximately 70 per cent of these are women. This gender pattern in the provision of 
primary informal care extends across all OECD nations (OECD 2011).  
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However, interestingly, the relatively greater adversity experienced by female carers in 
Australia cannot be attributed entirely to their over-representation in the population of 
primary carers. The gender effects are manifest also in the fact that female primary carers are 
significantly more likely to provide more than 40 hours a week of primary care than their 
male primary carer counterparts (ABS 2012a). This is compatible with the increased 
likelihood of male primary carers being in full-time work than their female counterparts. In 
2012, of the female primary carers, only 15 per cent were employed on a full-time basis, and 
approximately one quarter were employed part-time (24 per cent); the vast majority of the 
remainder were full-time carers and so were not participating in the labour force (ABS 
2012a). In this regard, an earlier ABS study notes that males are more likely to use paid 
leave, rostered days off, flex time and work from home to fit in care activity, whereas females 
are more likely to withdraw from the labour force or reduce their weekly hours (ABS 2000). 
Moreover, while all primary carers generally experience poorer mental health than non-
carers, 51 per cent of female primary carers were more likely to experience a six month, or 
longer depressive episode in 2006 compared with 30.7 per cent of male primary carers. 
Further, female primary carers were also less likely than their male counterparts to have face-
to-face social interaction outside the home, and were more likely to experience family 
conflicts arising from undertaking caring (Edwards et al 2008). Similarly, in 2012, female 
primary carers were almost three times more likely to have a severe or profound core activity 
limitation, despite the male cohort of primary carers being concentrated in the 70 plus age 
group (ABS 2012a).   
That these gender effects arise at least in part from internalised patriarchal constructs, 
becomes apparent when considering the difference between males and females in the life-
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course timing of their primary care provision. As Falkiner (2011) and Wilkins (2014) find, 
males of working age are much less likely to be providing primary carer to their elderly 
parents, their children with disabilities or their partners. Instead, they are more likely to 
engage in non-caring waged work outside the home than females cast into the same 
circumstances. Indeed, as noted above, even when men are primary carers, they devote less 
time to caring activities and more time to paid work than female primary carers of the same 
age in the same situations (Wilkins 2014). Put in different terms, men with elderly parents, 
disabled children or disabled partners are more likely to have access to a “non-household 
realm”, which provides opportunities for earning income, developing and interacting with 
friends, and engaging in recreational activities not available to female carers who are more 
likely to be bound to the “private realm” of the household caring environment. As such, the 
economic, psychological and social impact of caring on male primary carers is much less 
than on women primary carers.  
These facts are indicative of the continued prevalence of patriarchal conceptions of women as 
naturally “caring” and men as naturally “breadwinners”. This conclusion is strengthened 
when we consider that the disproportionate representation of males among primary carers 
over the age of 70 (as carers of partners) is largely due to the fact that women of this age are 
more likely to be widowed, single or divorced (Falkiner 2011).   
This account of gender effects arising from internalised patriarchal constructs is also 
supported by a consideration of the most commonly reported motivations for assuming a 
caring role by primary carers. In 2012, these reported motives on the part of women included 
a sense of responsibility, a feeling that they could provide better care than anyone else, 
feelings of emotional obligation, and the unavailability of other family or friends (ABS 
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2012a). M’Dougal et al (2014) noted a high degree of maternalism on the part of primary 
carers that was independent of the care recipient’s objective level of disability: primary carers 
often performed additional tasks believing that they knew better than anyone else their care 
recipients’ needs. The authors note that this “unconditional responsibility” is also often 
associated with the belief that others should not be burdened with this duty. As one carer 
expressed this: ‘Women are through birth the ‘carers’ of the universe and the rewards of such 
achievement are “self-worth”’ (Carers Victoria 2004, p.82). Furthermore, female primary 
carers are much less likely to access respite services than their male counterparts despite such 
services being equally available to both genders. In this regard Rice et al (2008) note that 
female primary carers may avoid asking for help because they anticipate disapproval or 
judgement of their caring capacity or their failure to fulfil their duty.  
In this way, a statistical overview of the nature, functional significance and impacts of 
primary care in Australia manifests key themes of feminist political economy. Given the 
adverse impacts of caring on primary carers, the motivations and patterns of activity 
surrounding the care of the disabled and the elderly in Australia are a particularly poignant 
manifestation of gender stereotyping. Moreover, in considering the social value of women’s 
unpaid labour, more than two thirds of informal primary care could be included. We have 
seen that the considerable health, social, financial and employment impacts of this 
(effectively) “gift” to the nation, place female primary carers and the families among the 




4.10 The need for an analysis of financial outcomes in retirement for 
female primary carers 
Considering the employment and financial disadvantages accruing to female primary carers, 
several researchers have indicated a need for analysis of likely retirement outcomes for this 
group (Qu et al 2012; Rice et al 2008; Dow and Meyer 2010). Such an analysis would be 
informed by Feminist Standpoint Theory’s emphasis on the viewpoints of the marginalised in 
light of the differing and conflicting ways that specific groups of women experience 
patriarchy. However, in estimating retirement incomes for female primary carers we face a 
series of methodological difficulties not applicable to estimating the retirement incomes of 
other cohorts of women. As noted in the previous chapter, conclusions based on profiles 
drawn from cross-sectional data can be reasonably generalised to the relevant cohorts in the 
Australian population. However, these procedures cannot be straightforwardly applied to 
projecting likely financial outcomes in retirement for female primary carers. The statistically 
informed analysis in this chapter indicates that, even within the cohort of female primary 
carers, there is an unusually wide disparity of experiences, employment and financial 
outcomes.   
This unusual disparity can be attributed firstly to the significantly varying needs of care 
recipients, and to the varying contexts in which care is provided. The time and effort spent 
caring for a person with a disability or a person who is impaired by age may depend on the 
nature of the disability, the living arrangements of the care-giver and recipient, as well as the 
nature and degree of involvement of community, other family and friends. These 
circumstances may vary over time as well as from case to case. A Carer’s Association of 
NSW report emphasises in this regard that each carer’s situation is unique, noting that:  
120 
 
Some carers need to assist with tasks of daily living, and spend their days feeding, 
bathing, dressing, toileting, transferring or administering medications. Others care for 
people who are fairly independent but need supervision or help with their finances 
and transport. ...[Some] carers also provide emotional support day in and day out... 
(Carers Association of NSW 2010, p.1). 
This wide disparity of experience stems in part from the distinctively episodic nature of 
informal care and (as discussed above) the causal connection between the specific nature of 
the care recipient’s condition or disability and the primary carer’s workforce engagement 
(Falkiner 2011; Schofield et al 2014; Bittman et al 2007). As noted, providing unpaid primary 
care is not typically a lifestyle choice, and the range of disabilities strongly correlated with 
carers’ lack of engagement with the paid labour force is quite disparate. Moreover, the 
cessation of caring is also often dictated by episodes including the death of a parent, 
improvements in the condition of the care recipient, the need to transfer to institutional care 
or a change in the primary carer (Edwards et al 2008).   
Of course, it may be argued that the lives of individuals generally are dictated to some degree 
by episodes and that the experience of no two persons is the same. However, the episodes 
triggering informal primary care fall outside the range of events typically experienced by the 
majority of the population. The life-course timing and extent of disabilities and chronic 
conditions, and the duration of associated informal care cannot be predicted with the degree 
of confidence with which we could predict the timing and duration of such life events as 
leaving school, undertaking tertiary study, finding a job, moving in with one’s first or only 
partner, giving birth to and caring for non-disabled children, and retiring from the workforce.  
In estimating retirement incomes for primary carers, this difficulty in generalising is 
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especially pertinent given that variations in the life-course timing of employment and 
earnings may result in widely disparate superannuation balances on retirement.  
The problems with estimating superannuation outcomes for female primary carers from one 
or two life-time scenarios become apparent when examining the two major Australian studies 
which have to some extent attempted this task. Nepal et al’s (2008) study of female primary 
carers’ health and financial wellbeing includes estimates of likely lifelong earnings and 
superannuation outcomes as part of its scope. In a subsequent paper, Nepal et al (2011) 
compared the lifelong economic prospects of primary carers to those of other women in 
specific age groups in terms of their health and other variables. The authors focused on 
outcomes for women rather than men, acknowledging the large volume of Australian and 
international research indicating the great proportion of primary carers to be women.  
These studies calculated likely superannuation outcomes by constructing lifetime earnings 
scenarios from cross-sectional data. The data was derived from Wave 6 (2006) and Wave 7 
(2007) of Australia’s Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey and the 
2003 ABS Survey of Disability, Ageing and Carers (ABS 2003). While the 2011 study took 
females engaged in various kinds of primary informal caring as a single cohort, the earlier 
study distinguished between women with two or more children caring for a child with a 
disability, and women fifty years of age and over caring for a spouse or partner with a 
disability.  
The authors acknowledge the highly diverse and complex nature of primary care work. 
However, their research was undertaken on the assumption that in Australia the majority of 
the primary carer population is comprised of females caring for a partner or a child with a 
disability. The two primary carer cohorts and their non-carer demographic counterparts were 
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further disaggregated in terms of level of educational achievement and marital status. These 
studies found that primary carers were likely to be disadvantaged under the current retirement 
income system and even more so if they were lone parents or if they had relatively low levels 
of educational attainment. The work of Nepal et al (2008) moreover supports the conclusions 
of earlier studies indicating a significant correlation between the life-course timing of 
employment and financial outcomes in retirement. In this study, the earning scenario for a 
woman who leaves the paid workforce in mid-age to care for a spouse is considerably more 
favourable than the (dire) outcome of a mother with children raising one child with a 
disability. The study emphasizes that lone mothers raising a child with a disability are most at 
risk of financial distress.     
These conclusions enhance and support the range of studies emphasising the significance of 
the life-course timing of employment for financial outcomes in retirement. They also offer 
insights into the financial impacts of care on women, caring simultaneously for children with 
and without disabilities. Moreover, the 2011 publication’s analysis of the relation between 
carers’ health, levels of education and marital status is particularly valuable in assessing the 
impacts of primary care on carers. However, the extent to which these conclusions can be 
applied to financial outcomes in retirement for the majority of female primary carers is 
limited. This is partly because care is episodic. As noted, its life-course timing (and 
associated carer employment patterns) depends on a range of factors, including the care 
recipient’s own history and condition. However even granted this, females caring for children 
with a disability and mid-aged females caring for a partner or spouse by no means exhaust the 
majority of cases in which women provide informal primary care.      
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In this regard, Nepal et al’s abstraction from females providing primary care for an elderly 
parent is significant. As noted, in 2011 almost 30 per cent of carers were caring for a parent 
or partner’s parent living either with them or elsewhere. Moreover female carers are 
statistically almost as likely to be caring for a parent as for a child or partner (Wilkins 2014). 
(Nepal et al appear to have inadvertently included males aged 70 years and older in the cohort 
of female primary carers of partners or spouses. This would have misrepresented the 
proportion of females caring for a spouse relative to those caring for a parent). In estimating 
female carers’ retirement incomes, here it is also important to note that females caring for a 
parent are more represented in the cohort of working aged carers than in the total carer 
population (Wilkins 2014; ABS 2012a).   
When focusing on likely financial outcomes in retirement for female carers of parents, certain 
methodological difficulties arise. Firstly, the relatively wide range of the working age cohort 
means that the age at which a woman reduces or ceases employment to care for a parent 
cannot be assumed within a narrow range. One may note that a woman caring for a partner or 
spouse is more likely to be closer in age to the care recipient. Further complexities arise when 
we recall that a significant proportion of informal elder care is likely to be “sandwiched” with 
raising children or at least financially supporting them. As noted earlier in this chapter, the 
employment and financial impacts of providing “multiple” care are as likely to arise from the 
intensity of meeting simultaneous demands as from cumulative impact of sequentially caring. 
In this regard, the likely retirement incomes of working aged women raising children and 
then caring for an elderly parent or spouse are of particular concern.   
Considering the significance of life-course employment patterns for superannuation balances, 
retirement incomes for these other carer cohorts cannot be subsumed under the two types of 
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caring considered in Nepal et al (2008) without further investigation. Given the relative 
immaturity of relevant longitudinal data for Australia, this investigation would require at least 
an expansion of the types of carer profiles drawn from cross-sectional data to include profiles 
for women caring for an elderly parent and various profiles of “sandwich generation” women 
caring for an elder parent or partner while raising children or afterwards. As well as these, the 
range of profiles estimating financial outcomes in retirement for female primary carers should 
address the fact that 11 per cent of informal care is provided for persons with a psychiatric 
illness (Edwards et al 2008). Given that individuals aged 18 to 24 are most susceptible to the 
types of psychiatric illnesses that require high level prolonged care (ABS 2007c), parents or 
partners caring for these individuals are likely to experience significant financial impacts. 
Estimates of retirement income for female primary carers based on this expanded range of 
profiles are discussed in Chapter 8.  
However, at this point we may also note that while expanding the range of hypothetical types 
of caring drawn from cross-sectional data may go some way towards addressing 
methodological problems in estimating female carers retirement incomes, this procedure will 
not in itself address certain other methodological problems. These additional problems, as 
noted above, arise from the episodic nature of caring combined with what we’ve noted are 
distinctively temporally asymmetrical impacts. These shall be discussed in the following 







METHOD AND METHDOLOGY: PROBLEMS WITH CONSTRUCTING 
SCENARIOS FROM CROSS SECTIONAL DATA GIVEN TEMPORAL 
ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS, COMPLEX CAUSATION AND OPEN SYSTEMS.   
 
5:1 A key methodological difficulty: paucity of longitudinal data 
When critically assessing a retirement income policy that has been proposed or relatively 
recently implemented, one is confronted with a range of methodological challenges and 
difficulties. When a system is “immature”, it is not possible to confidently judge it on its 
present performance and the existing limited empirical record. We cannot draw on any 
significant history of this system, and need to exercise caution when drawing lessons from 
the operation of similar systems in other social, economic and national contexts. In 
attempting to make the necessary projections, one is required to make somewhat tenuous 
assumptions about the continuity of existing political and social trends as well as relative 
global and national macroeconomic stability over many decades. Alas, recent history does not 
elicit great confidence in the making of such projections. On the other hand, the making of 
projections is methodologically necessary so as to distinguish possible flaws in policy from 
the accidental “interference” of historical events.  
In addition to the fact that the system under investigation is new, and that a complex reality a 
priori makes prediction difficult, there is the additional problem that longitudinal panel data 
on a range of variables relevant to calculations of superannuation accumulation for carers in 
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Australia is simply not available. In Australia, longitudinal sociological and economic data is 
being accumulated in two key programs. One is the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, operated by the Melbourne Institute, which collects 
information relating to employment, income, family dynamics and economic and subjective 
wellbeing by means of structured questionnaires and interviews with a sample of adult 
household members (www.melbourneinstitute.com/hilda/). Each member of the household 
based panel (currently approximately 13,000 individuals) is tracked annually. HILDA is, and 
will most likely continue, to be an invaluable resource for social analysis and policy in 
Australia. At present, HILDA has accumulated twelve years of panel data, extending from 
Wave 1 (2001), to Wave 13 (2013). This thesis draws on Waves 1 to 11, and particularly on 
the report relating to informal carers in the Melbourne Institute’s 2014 publication, Families, 
Incomes and Jobs, Volume 9 (Wilkins 2014). However, participating individuals have only 
been asked to identify themselves as carers since Wave 5 (2005). Moreover, some questions 
relating to the provision of informal care have been included only since Wave 8 (2008). It is 
for this reason that Wilkins’ (2014) report on HILDA information about carers relies mostly 
on data pooled over three to four years. Thus in the present context, HILDA is limited as a 
source of longitudinal data on life-course employment, earnings and financial outcomes in 
retirement for female primary carers. This is particularly so since estimates based on 
recollections recorded in ABS and other surveys indicate that at least 50% of primary carers 
have provided care for a period ranging from 4 to over 24 years, with at least half of these 
indicating that they have provided care for 10 to over 24 years (ABS 2008). Considering 
Australian and international research suggesting that the impacts of caring on the carer 
become intensified with the duration of care (as discussed in Chapter 4), it would seem that 
available panel data on carers in Australia may need to be supplemented by information from 
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other sources for some years. This is especially the case when considering the life-course 
employment and earnings information required in estimating carers’ likely incomes in 
retirement.   
The problems raised by the absence of relevant longitudinal panel data are illuminated when 
considering estimates of financial outcomes in retirement projected using information from 
the second major longitudinal data base in Australia. This is the DYNAMOD program 
conducted by the National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling (NATSEM).  
NATSEM superannuation researchers have emphasised that a ‘longitudinal element is 
essential to capture the accumulation processes that underlie superannuation’ (Kelly et al 
2002, p.3). In attempting to address this issue (while simultaneously projecting outcomes for 
hypothetical individuals representing various cohorts), Kelly et al (2001), Keegan et al (2011) 
and others have imputed various “typical” life-course events into retirement income 
projections for a “base population” derived from a 1% Census sample of the Australian 
population. As discussed in Chapter 3, these events include early retirement due to illness, 
divorce, bearing and raising children, and unemployment.   
However, as NATSEM’s methodological discussions of the DYNAMOD program indicate, 
the outcomes depend on the reliability of historical data used to bestow detailed 
characteristics on each individual in the “base population”. More significantly, to be credible, 
the timing of the subsequently imputed dynamic events needs to be aligned with what is 
called “benchmark” information (King et al 1999). NATSEM DYNAMOD research in this 
respect relies on cross-sectional data collected by the Australia Bureau of Statistics and other 
sources. Painstaking cross-referencing notwithstanding, DYNAMOD technicians highlight 
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the “lack of historical information” as a “key problem” with attempts to plausibly estimate 
the timing and duration of life-course episodes (King et al 1999).   
These problems highlight the methodological difficulties that the relative immaturity of 
Australian longitudinal panel data presents when estimating financial outcomes in retirement 
for various groups in the Australian population. However as noted, these problems are 
particularly acute when estimating likely retirement incomes for female primary carers since 
panel data relating specifically to this cohort is just several years from infancy. Given the 
relative immaturity of Australia’s current retirement income system, timely assessments 
informing modifications and reform must currently rely on projections from cross-sectional 
data. The research in this thesis therefore draws to some extent on static techniques 
comparable to those underlying existing estimates of likely retirement incomes for various  
cohorts in the Australian population (as these are discussed in Chapter 3). In Chapters 7 and 
8, we construct likely retirement income scenarios based on a range of life-course 
employment and earnings profiles constructed largely from cross-sectional data. The 
reasoning underlying the selection of these profiles is outlined in the following section.     
 
5:2 Assumptions regarding the selection of profiles 
This thesis focuses on financial outcomes in retirement for female primary carers. It expands 
on the range of cohorts in the existing literature on carers and superannuation to include 
women providing elder care, some of whom are doing so while simultaneously or 
sequentially raising children (“sandwich” carers). It also includes a profile for a female 
providing primary care for her child diagnosed with schizophrenia at 17 years of age. As 
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discussed in chapter 4, retirement outcomes for these statistically and functionally significant 
cohorts have been overlooked in the existing literature. Thus Chapter 8 estimates likely 
superannuation balances and retirement incomes based on life-course employment and 
earnings for five carer profiles.  
As points of reference for interpreting the retirement outcomes for female primary carers, 
Chapter 7 develops a range of profiles for various other cohorts in the Australian population. 
Such a comparison is informed by Feminist Standpoint Theory’s emphasis on the need for 
disadvantaged and marginalised groups to articulate their reality in contrast to the experiences 
and outcomes of the other social groups, including those who would not be regarded as 
particularly marginalised (as discussed in Chapter 3). For this research, these cohorts include 
males and females in full-time, continuous work receiving various rates of pay and women 
whose labour force participation has been interspersed with raising children. Notwithstanding 
the general trend in Australia to increased part-time and casual workforce participation, these 
part-time and intermittent worker profiles represent females. This is because in Australia 
women are significantly more likely to be working part-time than males, as discussed in 
Chapter 4.   
In what follows, we outline the specific assumptions which have been made when estimating 
accumulated superannuation for all, or most, profiles in Chapters 7 and 8. These largely 
quantitative assumptions cover the following variables: the age at which people enter the 
workforce; the age at which women have children; the periods of time spent in full-time 
and/or part-time work; weekly hours of work; nominal and real wage growth; mandatory 
contribution rates; the timing of mandatory contributions; the rate of return on contributions; 
superannuation fund administration fee rates; and post-retirement rate of return on 
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investment. Additional assumptions have been made for specific carer profiles. These 
additional assumptions will be discussed in Chapter 8.   
The assumptions made below are not arbitrary or pure idealisations. Rather, as will become 
clear, they are reasonable, empirically-informed approximations. They are also, for the most 
part, in line with the kinds of assumptions made in the existing research on superannuation. 
 
5:3 Assumptions regarding life-course employment for each profile  
5.3.1    Full-time workforce entry age 
The results of existing literature emphasise that the age at which individuals enter the full-
time workforce is highly significant in determining the amount of superannuation they are 
likely to have accrued upon retiring. In this research, it is assumed that individuals typically 
enter the full-time employment at 25 years of age. This reflects Australian data indicating that 
most full-time workers are represented in the 25-29 year age cohort (Australian Institute of 
Family Studies 2008). That this is a peak cohort for full-time workers, may be explained by 
the following combination of facts: after completing high school, individuals may be 
undertaking tertiary education (Diplomas or Degrees), or may have taken up apprenticeships 
which do not pay normal award wages, or may have taken up part-time or casual employment 
to gain work-experience, or may simply be unemployed. This assumption of full-time 
employment beginning at 25 years of age, is comparable to those made in similar studies, 
including those undertaken by the Commonwealth Treasury’s Retirement Income Modelling 
Unit (Commonwealth Treasury 2002).  
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For the five carer profiles in Chapter 8, however, likely retirement income has been estimated 
assuming entry into part-time work at 20 years of age. This was included to reflect the fact 
that carers are far less likely to have undertaken or completed a Bachelor’s degree (as 
discussed in Chapter 4), and as such, may be more likely to enter the workforce earlier than 
the average non-carer. At the same time, being relatively unskilled, carers are more likely to 
be working on a part-time or casual basis at this relatively early stage in their lives and 
careers. 
 
5:3.2 The age of motherhood and break in a mothers’ employment 
It is assumed that all mothers have two children, reflecting the national average. It is further 
assumed that non-carer women will have their first child at 27 years of age. This reflects the 
current average in Australia, including married and unmarried women (Australian 
Government 2008). It should be noted that the age at which an Australian woman first 
becomes a mother correlates positively with her level of educational attainment; that is, the 
age of motherhood increases as the level of educational attainment increases (Australian 
Government 2008). Considering this, the profiles in chapter 8 assume that carers, who are 
mothers, have their first child at 25 years of age rather than at 27 years.   
With respect to life-course employment, a non-carer mother is assumed to take up part-time 
employment after five years of raising toddlers. We assume she resumes full-time work when 
her youngest child turns 15 years of age. These assumptions reflect long term trends in the 
life-course labour force participation of mothers in Australia (Gray & Edwards 2009). In the 
context of estimating retirement incomes, it is also important to note these trends have 
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remained constant through various policy changes in Australia and are not projected to 
significantly change over the next few decades (Evans & Kelley 2007). This life-course 
profile is utilised in Chapter 7 when providing a “base case” against which to compare carer 
mothers. 
As noted in Chapter 4, providing primary care is episodic, so the life-course employment 
profiles for the five types of carer mothers utilised in Chapter 8 will vary from the “base 
case” depending on the nature of the care, and the particularity of the situation in which it is 
being examined.  
 
5:3.3 Preservation age and life-course years in paid employment 
The likely future preservation age is at present somewhat uncertain because of recent federal 
government changes and proposals to incrementally increase the preservation age over time.  
The scenarios in this thesis, nonetheless assume a typical preservation age of 65 for men and 
women, comparable with much of the existing retirement income modelling literature (for 
example, Nepal et al 2008).  
Statistically, the average life-course full-time continuous employment in Australia is 
currently estimated at 35 years (from ages 30 to 65) (Commonwealth Treasury, 2009). 
However, given the age of entry into full-time employment is assumed in this study to be 25 
years, the typical non-carer male will have continuous full-time work for 40 years. For female 
non-carers, since their work history will be “interrupted” by motherhood, it is assumed they 
will be employed full-time for 2 years, then be employed part-time for 15 years, then be 
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employed full-time again for 18 years. This forms the “base case” against which the various 
five female carer profiles are compared in Chapter 8.  
 
5:3.4 Hours worked each week by full-time and part-time workers 
The ABS (2012b) indicates that in 2010 male and female part-time workers engaged in paid 
employment for approximately 17 hours a week. However the Productivity Commission 
notes that recent increments in hours worked by part-time and full-time workers in Australia 
reflect boom conditions associated with mining, and are thereby highly regional and likely to 
be temporary (Greenville et al 2013). For this reason, the scenarios developed in Chapters 7 
and 8 assume that part-time workers are employed for 15 hours per week. The average 
number of weekly hours paid for full-time work in Australia is currently between 35 and 38 
hours (ABS 2011c). In what follows, it is assumed that full-time workers are employed for 48 
weeks annually and receive annual leave payments for the remaining four weeks. 
 
 
5:4 Assumptions regarding rates of pay and earnings from paid  
       employment 
5:4.1 Average, mean and median wages for males and females in Australia 
Income and earnings estimates for all scenarios in this thesis are based on Average Weekly 
Ordinary Time Earnings (AWOTE). This provides a base income covering full-time working 
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males and females which excludes overtime. This amount corresponds to the earnings base of 
most superannuation plans. AWOTE is also the basis for indexing most dollar value 
thresholds in superannuation. However, as noted by the Commonwealth Treasury’s 
Retirement Income Modelling Unit, most employees (70 per cent) in Australia earn less than 
AWOTE, with median earnings being 75 per cent of AWOTE and mean earnings being 83 
per cent of AWOTE (Commonwealth Treasury 2002). These variations reflect both 
increasing inequality of income distribution in Australia and the increasing incomes of higher 
income earners. For this reason, for illustrative purposes the scenarios for male and female 
full-time workers in Chapter 7 have been calculated assuming the AWOTE, mean earnings 
(83 per cent of AWOTE), median earnings (75 per cent of AWOTE), and total earnings as 
recorded by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2013a; 2013b).  
Additionally, scenarios for females have factored in the current gender income gap as 
reflected in the current difference between male and female wage rates (See Appendix A3:1). 
The calculations assumed, perhaps overly cautiously, that the gender wage gap will remain 
constant (even though, as noted in Chapter 3, there is evidence that it has been very slowly 
closing over the past few decades (Mumford 2010). (Methods of calculating the AWOTE and 
total earnings are included in Appendix A5:1). 
5:4.2 Assumptions regarding nominal and real wage growth 
For each scenario, annual rates of growth in money wages are drawn from ABS data until the 
year 2008, as indicated in Appendix  A7:1. After this point wages have been increased by 4 
per cent per annum. The 4 per cent per annum increase represents the average increase for 
wages reflected in the ABS statistics (ABS 2006a). However, all values in this thesis have 
been discounted to 2014 prices assuming a continuous 3 per cent inflation rate. The choice of 
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3 per cent is based on the fact that for the last two decades, and into the foreseeable future, 
the Reserve Bank of Australia strives to maintain annual consumer price inflation between 2 
and 3 per cent. By and large, the Reserve Bank has been successful in its targeting efforts, 
with consumer inflation rate average over the last 20 years being 2.7 per cent, and it never 
falling in any given year to 0 per cent and never rising above 5 per cent (Debelle 2009). Thus 
each earnings profile has factored in annual average real wage growth of 1 per cent per 
annum over the life-course. As such, the various earnings profiles do not assume significant 
life-course increases in real rates of pay.  
For the scenarios for females (especially mothers with intermittent employment patterns), 
relatively flat life-course real earnings reflect gender discrimination and fewer opportunities 
to benefit by way of promotion and bonuses from full and continuous employment (as 
discussed in Chapter 3). For the scenarios for males, relatively flat life-course real earnings 
reflect the combined effects of long term slowing productivity growth and an increasingly 
uneven distribution in national income. As noted by the Australian Productivity Commission 
(Greenville et al 2013), the benefits of the very modest productivity growth that is occurring 
appear to have accrued mainly to wage and salary earners in the highest income quintiles.  
This analysis is supported by that fact that over the past few decades the level and timing of 
increased real earnings is related to increased hours worked rather than higher real rate of 
pay. Taking this trend, we may conclude that increased recent real earnings over the past 
decade are primarily related to the effects of the (now diminishing) resources boom rather 
than to increases in labour productivity (ABS 2014).  
The Reserve Bank of Australia (2013) has also noted recent sluggish real wage growth, 
suggesting that this is due to a combination of factors including a decline in employment in 
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the high paying mining sector, federal fiscal restraint on public sector wages, rising 
unemployment, and low inflation expectations. Taking all this into account, there is little 
reason to assume that real rates of pay will incrementally increase for the 70 per cent of full-
time workers in Australia earning below the AWOTE.  
 
 
5:5 Assumptions regarding financial parameters for superannuation 
       accumulation 
5:5.1 Rate of mandatory contributions 
In estimating likely retirement incomes in each of the scenarios, it is assumed that only 
mandatory employer contributions are made ranging from 3% of wages (in 1992), to 9% (in 
and after 2002), and that these are taxed at 15%. The variation in contribution rates reflects 
the fact that Australia’s SGC has been introduced in real historical time and that it was 
explicitly designed to respond to what was perceived to be an impending fiscal crises 
attendant upon the ageing of the “baby boomer” generation. Connected to this, the problem of 
an ageing population cannot be assumed to persist into the distant future. For this reason, this 
thesis has not raised the rate of mandatory contribution, notwithstanding periodic proposals 
by political parties to do so. As it stands, the current federal government has signalled an 
intention to indefinitely delay such a rise (as discussed in Chapter 1). The focus on mandatory 
contributions reflects the difficulty that low and average income earners may have in 
generating the savings from income to make additional contributions (as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2). The scenarios in Chapters 7 and 8 also assume the continuation of current 
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regulations exempting employers from making mandatory contributions under certain 
conditions.  
It is noted that these assumptions effectively presuppose the continuity and stability of 
political regimes over decades to come. Ideally, scenarios could be developed comparing the 
costs and benefits accruing to different population cohorts assuming varied policy initiatives. 
However, given that the focus on research in this thesis is on relative outcomes for carers 
under the current system, we have abstracted from the range of policy variations that may 
possibly be introduced over the decades to come. At any rate, estimations of financial 
outcomes that assumed substantial future changes in policy would need to consider the 
indirect impact of such policies on macroeconomic variables such as employment, 
consumer’s demand and real income. Predicting effects of substantial changes Australia’s 
superannuation regime in decades to come is therefore likely to be highly precarious.      
5:5.2 Timing of contributions 
The timing of contributions to a superannuation provider from an employer will impact 
significantly over time on the final amount of retirement savings. The more often 
contributions are made to the fund provider, the faster the accumulated funds will compound. 
The more contributions made, the more capital compounded and the better overall return on 
that capital. Since the introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee Charge Amendment Bill 
2002 (Cwlth) (Parliamentary Library 2002), employers have been required to make 
contributions to a complying superannuation provider or retirement savings account on behalf 
of their eligible employees on at least a quarterly basis. For the calculations in Chapters 7 and 
8, this quarterly timing will be assumed as typical for contributions after 2003, with earlier 




5:5.3 Rates of return on investment and administration of funds 
Superannuation balances have been calculated for each scenario assuming both a relatively 
favourable (7 per cent per annum) and a relatively unfavourable (4.27 per cent per annum) 
rate of return on investment. The higher rate reflects the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission’s (ASIC), and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) 
estimates that the average rate of return from 1994 to 2008 was approximately 7.8 per cent 
after taxation (ASIC 2008; APRA 2007b). However, it should be noted that this figure 
applies to a relatively extended period of prosperity in Australia’s recent history and also 
reflects the “bullish” conditions leading up to the Global Financial Crises. Historically, 
comprehensive cross-national studies of returns for key types of investment from 1901 to 
2001 indicate approximately 4% as a more realistic very long-term rate of return (Dimson et 
al 2002). (Dimson et al ‘s conclusions, and the reasoning underlying the long-term rates of 
return assumed in this research are detailed in Appendix A5:3 and A5:4). Here, one may note 
that assuming both a favourable and relatively modest rate of return addresses, to some 
extent, the difficulties associated with abstracting from long term fluctuations in 
macroeconomic and global trade conditions. Estimating retirement outcomes assuming two 
rates of interest also, to some extent, indirectly addresses the varying investment performance 
of individual financial institutions.  
It has also been assumed that institutions administering the funds deduct a uniform fee for 
their services amounting to 1.36 per cent per annum (ASIC 2006). Assuming this fairly stable 
and uniform rate is not unwarranted given that large financial institutions may be engaged in 
tacit collusion in setting their fees whilst competing in terms of complex product 
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differentiation (Bryan et al 2009). Some observers may think this assumption problematic 
given the growing number of self-managed funds in Australia. However, as Power (2013a) 
notes, these self-managed institutions are more suited to people with substantial 
superannuation funds and extensive skills in financial and legal matters. As such, their 
performance is not really relevant to the cohorts of interest in this study.  
 
 
5:6 Assumptions regarding estimates of retirement income 
It is assumed that upon retirement, lump sums are invested at a relatively conservative rate of 
a 5 per cent per annum return. Both investment return on funds and life-span after retirement 
can only be estimated, and these estimates consider firstly that retirees are not in a position to 
take risks with their investment and are therefore more likely to choose returns with an 
emphasis on safety over risk. This estimate secondly reflects the fact that most banks in 
Australia will not provide long-term investment returns of more than 5 per cent on average. 
For example, Reserve Bank of Australia data on retail deposit and investment rates for bank 
term deposits of $10, 000 over 3 years shows the average rate of return for 2000-2014 as 4.92 
per cent per annum (See Appendix A5:5). 
When estimating likely retirement income for the various cohorts, it has been assumed that 
future annual income from investment of superannuation balances will not be supplemented 
by the Age Pension. Given the present political regime and current superannuation balances, 
such an assumption would seem unrealistic. However, a principle aim of this research is to 
assess claims that Australia’s current SGC will efficiently meet the financial needs of an 
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ageing population, and especially with regards to likely financial outcomes in retirement for 
female primary carers. It is therefore necessary to distinguish the likely private income of this 
group from whatever publicly funded supplements they may receive in future.    
In this regard assessment of adequacy should compare likely retirement incomes with 
financial needs in retirement. Likely needs in retirement are discussed and variously 
estimated in Chapter 6. Here it is pertinent to recall the body of research indicating that 
women’s financial needs in retirement are likely to be greater than those of males (as 
discussed in Chapters 2, 3 & 6).  
 
 
5:7 The methodological challenges presented by open systems  
Given this range of assumptions, the scenarios developed in Chapter 8 facilitate an 
assessment of the adequacy of Australia’s current SGC in meeting the retirement income 
needs of female carers while the scenarios developed in Chapter 7 facilitate an assessment of 
the equity of these likely outcomes for carers. However, the limits of such conclusions are 
starkly defined by the highly episodic nature of care and the likely significant temporal and 
spatial asymmetry of its impact on carers, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
The likely temporal asymmetry of the impacts of caring in particular raises significant 
methodological problems when considering likely outcomes in retirement. It implies that the 
impacts of caring on carers’ employment and income cannot be straightforwardly inferred by 
simply deducting the likely number of years a person is on record as being a primary carer 
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from the typical life-course duration of employment. More significantly, even if procedures 
could be devised to approximate some average period over which the impacts of caring are 
experienced, the applicability of this average would be limited by the extent to which the 
impacts, and intensity of impacts, vary within the various cohorts of carers at any point in 
time. Such temporal and spatial asymmetry is more likely the greater the number of causal 
variables and the greater the chances of these variables interacting. In other words, given 
causal complexity and compounding effects, the intensity and temporal extent of the impacts 
of care giving on financial outcomes in retirement may vary significantly for carers with 
ostensibly similar attributes and situations. Given the absence of relevant longitudinal panel 
data, the presence of these highly “open systems” of multiple causes and effects limits the 
applicability of conclusions based on correlations of variables drawn from cross sectional 
data. (A “closed system” is a situation, in its simplest form, where a single, known causal 
variable is in operation. A less simple form would be where there is a known set of causal 
variables that are in operation, but their behaviour is entirely determinant and known thereby 
enabling the deduction of a known effect).  
 
5:7.1 Critical realists on causal explanation in ‘open systems’ 
Given highly open systems, a number of methodologists suggest the need to supplement 
quantitative conclusions drawn from correlations of cross sectional variables with analogy, 
illustration and other qualitative forms of causal explanation (e.g. Cartwright 1999; Hodgson 
2008). As an example, Critical Realists argue that causal inference from regular sequences or 
correlations of empirical social and economic events is limited by the typical occurrence of 
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such events in systems of multiple interacting and neutralising causes and effects (Bhaskar 
1979; 1989).  
This argument begins by deducing, from the intelligibility of science, an ontological 
distinction between generative mechanisms and the empirical events to which they give rise 
(Bhaskar 1978; Collier 1994; Moussa 2007). Critical realists emphasise that, although these 
generative or causal mechanisms give rise to distinct empirical sequences and conjunctions, 
causation cannot always be meaningfully strictly inferred from these regularities. This is 
because generative mechanisms typically operate in open systems of cause and effect in 
which the actions of one mechanism may be modified or neutralised by others, but not in a 
manner that could be controlled or necessarily predicted beforehand by an observer.  
In this regard, Lawson (1997) and other Critical Realists (e.g. Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, 
Lawson & Norrie 1998) identify social structures as highly open systems characterised by a 
multiplicity of interacting physiological, mental, cultural and economic causal factors. 
Lawson argues that, given such complexity and uncertainty, it is precarious to assume that 
systems are closed, as empiricist social scientists typically do when reducing causal 
explanations to observed correlations. Critical realists argue that in such cases, conclusions 
drawn from static correlations of variables should be at least supplemented by qualitative 
explanation or description of underlying causal mechanisms or at least an attempt to discover 
these (Lawson 1997). Critical Realists observe that, in the case of social science, such causal 
descriptions must in some way draw upon the perceptions and case histories of human 
subjects themselves, given individuals’ intentions and articulation of such intention as 
constitutively human causal mechanisms. Noting the significance of subjective intentions, 
Critical Realists emphasize emancipation a key objective of social scientific research.  
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Some Critical Realists have, where possible, highlighted affinities between this approach to 
social explanation, and the methodologies advocated by Feminist Standpoint Theory (Lawson 
2003; New 2003). Notwithstanding Austen and Jefferson’s (2006) analysis of key 
disagreements between these schools, in light of the research in this thesis, the similarities 
between Critical Realism and Feminist Standpoint Theory are methodologically interesting. 
In essence, both schools of thought emphasise the need to understand social reality in terms 
of the contrasting and varying perspectives and experiences of different groups. At the very 
least, this implies social scientific effort in listening to the experience of the marginalised and 
disadvantaged and in facilitating the capacity of such groups to express their reality. 
In the discussion of the life-course financial and superannuation impacts of caring on female 
primary carers, we have noted that conclusions drawn from quantitative analysis of cross-
sectional data are significantly qualified by the likely interplay of an unusually large number 
of relevant variables. In Critical Realist terms, the experience of care giving appears typically 
to operate in highly open, causally complex systems. Hence this analysis of likely financial 
outcomes in retirement for female carers in Chapter 8 is supplemented in chapter 9 with 
qualitative explanations and descriptions based on the accounts and histories of carers 
themselves. These accounts illustrate the interacting complexity of the physical, emotional, 
social and financial effects of caring on carers. This latter chapter moreover explains and 
illustrates the manner in which these complex effects in turn generate temporally asymmetric 




5:8 Data sources used to construct scenarios 
5:8.1 Employment, earning and retirement income 
The employment, earnings and retirement income scenarios in Chapters 7 and 8 have been 
constructed using Australian cross sectional data drawn from a variety of sources. 
Information about carers in Australia is based principally on the following sources. 
[1] The 2012 Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of Disability Ageing and Carers (SDAC) 
is the latest in series including the 2003 SDAC, the 2006 SDAC and the 2009 SDAC. This 
survey was conducted throughout Australia from 5 August 2012 to 2 March 2013. The survey 
collected information from three target populations. These were people with disability, older 
people (i.e. those aged 65 years and over), people who care for persons in both urban and 
rural areas in all states and territories, living in both private and non-private dwellings 
(including persons in cared-accommodation). Multi-stage sampling techniques were used to 
select the sample for the survey. After sample loss, the household sample included 
approximately 27,400 private dwellings and 500 non-private dwellings, while the cared-
accommodation sample included approximately 1,000 health establishments. Results for 
carers in each of the ABS SDAC surveys are cross-referenced with results for people 
reporting disabilities. 
[2] The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, Waves 1-11, 2001-
2011 (HILDA) (as reported by Wilkins 2014). The information on carers accessed for this 
survey was drawn mainly from Waves 5-11 (2005-2011), and specifically from the last three 
waves. This temporal window is narrow because Waves 1-4 did not ask respondents if they 
provided ongoing care to a person with a disability or an elder, and Waves 5-6 had only a 
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limited range of questions in this regard. The HILDA surveys use a slightly narrower 
definition of informal care than SDAC, focusing strictly on the three core activities of self-
care, mobility and communication. However a somewhat different range of questions are 
asked, thereby increasing the scope of variables and consequent inferences. 
[3] Families Caring for a Person with a Disability Study (FCPDS) 2007 (as reported by 
Edwards et al 2008) is a collaborative project of the Australian Institute of Family Studies 
and the Commonwealth Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous 
Affairs. This study is based on the results of computer-assisted interviews with 1002 
Australians receiving Carer Payment or Carer Allowance. By implication all of the 
respondents would be primary (or main) carers. The survey focused on the impact of care 
giving at the family and household level. The respondents were part of a random sample of 
5,000 carers selected from the Centrelink database in 2006. The response rate for the survey 
was 73% and the characteristics and situations of the respondents were very similar to the 
entire population of individuals receiving Carer Payment or Carer Allowance – with the 
exception of age. Respondents to the survey were less likely to be aged 18-24, compared to 
the population of individuals receiving Carer Payment or Carer Allowance. The study also 
used a wider definition of care than the HILDA and ABS surveys, including categories 
relating to emotional functioning and ability to form friendships.  
[4] The ABS 2008 publication, A Profile of Carers in Australia draws together information 
on carers from a range of surveys including the ABS 2003 SDAC, the 2006 Census on 
Population and Housing, the ABS 2006 General Social Survey, and the 2006 ABS Time Use 
Survey. This study was funded by the Department of Families, Housing, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs. 
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Information about carers from these sources has been cross referenced and supplemented 
with Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Institute of Families Studies HILDA, OECD 
and Australian Productivity Commission survey data on trends in labour market participation 
and earnings, family structure and dynamics, and other demographic trends (as mentioned 
above).  
 
5:8.2 Personal experiences 
The experiences considered in Chapter 9 are drawn mostly from first-hand accounts collected 
by several state and national carers associations as well as from secondary sources. The data 
from carer associations includes Care for Caregivers 1998, Carers Australia 2000 (Fisher & 
Briggs 2000), and the two editions of the Carers Victoria 2004 publication, Caring Matters - 
Snapshots from the Lives of Carers. Carers’ associations aim at effective advocacy and as 
such are possibly a biased source of information. Moreover, there is the possibility that 
collections of carers’ accounts may be biased due to self-selection. Here it may be the case 
that carers who are members of carer’s associations or who have documented and offered 
their experience may be impacted differently or to a greater extent by providing care than 
other carers. However, as will become evident, the very wide range of attitudes, experiences, 
moods, perceived levels of competency and coping, presented in collections of carers 
accounts’ appear to refute the view that only carers with particular attitudes, or perceived 
levels of tolerance and competence have contributed their experiences.   
In the next chapter, an examination is made of what levels of accumulated superannuation 
would be required for a person to live “comfortably”, or at least not in poverty, for the 
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duration of their retirement. This, of course, is crucial to a determination of whether the 
Australian superannuation system is capable of living up to the promises made of it when it 
was first introduced in the early 1990s. These calculations are made, but only after a 
necessary discussion of the somewhat problematic conceptions of “need” and “poverty” 




















6:1  Introduction  
In this chapter, estimates are made of the amount of yearly income that would be required in 
order for a single retiree to live a reasonable life. As part of that effort, the amount of 
superannuation that would need to be accumulated to generate that income has also been 
estimated. This is done by using three different approaches: one is simply to take the current 
Age Pension as satisfying the yearly income needs of a person; the second is the Replacement 
Approach; and the third is the Standard Budget Approach. Before making such estimates 
however, it is first necessary to discuss what would constitute the human “needs” that would 
have to be satisfied and concomitantly, what would count as living in poverty.  
 
 
6:2  Defining “need” and measuring poverty  
A rounded assessment of Australia’s SGC would ideally consider likely retirement income 
for different cohorts (including female primary carers) in terms of the financial needs of these 
individuals in retirement. In light of the gender pay gap highlighted by feminist political 
economists, estimating needs in retirement is necessary considering that women’s financial 
needs are likely to be similar to men’s for each year of retirement and greater over the span of 
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years. However, few existing studies have assessed Australia’s current system from the 
perspective of financial needs in retirement (as opposed to at retirement). To a certain extent 
this is understandable, given the intricacies and difficulties in defining such subjective 
concepts as “need” and “adequacy” and filling them with specific content. While the concept 
of “need” implies something more than mere wishes or wants, it is nonetheless difficult to 
accept any socially, culturally or historically specific list of needs as sufficiently objective to 
drive long term, wide ranging social policy (Heller 1976).   
 
 
The difficulty in objectively defining “need” is reflected in the approaches of various schools 
of social scientists. One approach pioneered by applied sociologists working on poverty, was 
to define needs in terms of an “objective” measure such as a certain physical needs, 
sometimes measured in terms of required biomass to be consumed for survival (Peet 1992; 
Brooks et al 2010). On other hand, some Marxists economists argue that needs are created 
and changed in and by historical processes. For this school, the historicity of “need” is 
expressed in the capitalist mode of production in cultural and political influences on the value 
of labour power (Lebowitz 1977-8). Most neoclassical economists, following Lionel 
Robbins’ lead, similarly reject the possibility of objectively specifying, comparing and 
ordering the needs of different individuals and social groups (Robbins 1935; cf. Lutz & Lux 
1988). It is for this reason that neoclassicists focus on subjective “wants” as a core 
component of demand for goods and services, rather than “need” and moreover insist on 
measuring the quantitative dimensions of demand (through money offer-prices) rather than 




The difficulty in abstracting hierarchies of need from specific historical, social and 
geographical circumstances is associated with current dialogues on the nature of “poverty” 
(Bradshaw & Finch 2003; United Nations 2005; Alkire 2005). Sen (1993), for example, has 
approached this problem in terms of an individual’s capacity to realize a range of ethical, 
social, cultural, physical and other capabilities. In such terms, poverty may be 
multidimensional and it may revolve on ostensibly non-material experiences of social 
exclusion. Levitas et al (2007, p. 9) in this context define poverty to include:   
 
...lack of or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to 
participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of 
people in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects 
both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a 
whole.  
 
Considering the earlier noted health, social and employment impacts of providing primary 
care on female carers, these social dimensions of poverty are germane.   
 
The possibility of social exclusion points to difficulty and complexity in comparing levels of 
poverty across widely different cultures and over long periods of time. Moreover, if an 
individual experiences deprivation as the inability to realize one or more his or her 
capabilities, then estimating degrees of poverty should consider the interplay of monetary and 
non-monetary variables (Bourguignon & Chakravarty 1998). For example, in specific 
historical and geographic circumstances, a person may be income rich but culturally 
impoverished. Taking this, Kostenko et al (2009) have interpreted data from waves of the 
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Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey to examine the 
relationship between poverty and social exclusion. They identify variables including 
employment, education and skills, health and disability as well as social, community and 
personal safety as central to assessing the extent of poverty in contemporary Australia. 
However, these researchers also emphasise that ‘social exclusion is inherently 
multidimensional and is most appropriately measured at the individual level rather than at the 
societal level’ (Kostenko et al 2009, p.63). 
 
The problem of specifying objective levels of poverty is further complicated by the tendency 
of some to associate need and poverty with notions of moral “worthiness”. For example, in 
Australia the politically charged nature of debates on “need” and “poverty” is highlighted by 
recent campaigns on the inadequacy of the Age Pension. Following a campaign in 2008 by 
the Federal Coalition leader to draw attention to the plight of pensioners, the Harmer review 
recommended substantial increases to the single rate pension (Harmer 2009). However, 
conspicuously absent from this debate on income levels and rising costs living was the plight 
of sole parents and those who were unemployed. Saunders and Wong (2011) note that in this 
regard, conceptions of justice and income adequacy appear to be implicitly connected to 
judgements on “deservedness”.   
 
Focusing on money incomes, disagreements regarding levels of need and poverty are 
reflected in the historic debates in Australian arbitration courts between labour unions and 
employers associations on the level of the “living wage” (Macarthy 1970).  They are reflected 
also in dialogue on the best methods of establishing national poverty lines. In this regard, 
some social scientists advocate poverty lines based in income while others place greater 
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emphasis on expenditure on certain items (Saunders & Bradbury 2006). Attempts to consider 
both are reflected, for example, in some recent adjustments to reflect the steeply rising cost of 
private rental accommodation in most Australian cities (ACOSS 2012, Nicholson, 2009). The 
significance of housing costs in contemporary Australian dialogue on poverty and income 
adequacy is reflected also in the findings of Phillips et al (2013). 
 
However, it must be noted that such flexible responses to regional and historical 
circumstances limit the capacity of poverty lines to identify long term and widespread trends 
in poverty. Here the degree of sensitivity must be continually balanced against the capacity to 
make long range forecasts. This is especially relevant in our context, in assessing the future 
adequacy of Australia’s currently immature SGC.   
 
Given these difficulties in developing objective definitions of need and broad ranging 
measures of income poverty, this research approaches the question of retirement income 
adequacy with reference to individuals’ pre-retirement standards of living. Given that the aim 
of this research is to assess the capacity of Australia’s current SGC in meeting the retirement 
needs of primary carers, a focus on financial needs may be somewhat narrow. However, 
superannuation and pension policy is primarily concerned with providing money incomes, 
notwithstanding the relation of this to non-financial needs and poverty. 
 
Assessing financial needs in retirement is commonly undertaken using either a Replacement 
Approach or a Standard Budget Approach. The replacement method takes as its base the 
retiree’s standard of living before retirement and the standard budget approach focuses on the 
real cost of living in retirement (Commonwealth Treasury 2013a). Both approaches are used 
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since the replacement method has been criticised for assuming constancy in the relationship 
between real and money incomes over long periods of time (Nielson 2006a). In this thesis 
results using these methods are compared with the amount of the Aged Pension. For 
comparison and consistency, all three methods have been calculated based on income 




6.3 The Age Pension   
The Age Pension is included as a reference point for two reasons. First, approximately 73 per 
cent of Australians over 65 years are currently receiving 90 per cent of the maximum pension 
rate (ABS 2009). Secondly, there is an assumption that the superannuation system should at 
least provide income equivalent to the current Age Pension. (The relevant amounts for the 
Age Pension are outlined in Appendix A6:1). Note that in order to reflect changes in the cost 
of living, Base pensions are indexed twice a year to reflect growth in the Consumer Price 
Index and the Pensioner and Beneficiary Living Cost Index (whichever is the larger change is 
chosen for indexing). Thus the Base level Age Pension increases (based on a 20 year average) 
by approximately 3 per cent per annum. This means that in real terms, the Age Pension is 
effectively constant over time at the level of $19,900 worth of consumer goods and services 
per annum. 
 
As noted earlier, many Australians would consider the Age Pension as providing a very basic 
standard of living, and analysts suggest that it is by no means a guarantee of escaping poverty 
(Connelly 2007; Whiteford  2010b; Clare 2008). Research conducted by the Australian 
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Council of Social Services and NATSEM (on behalf of the Brotherhood of St Laurence) 
indicates that the impact of relying solely on the Age Pension is likely to be felt most by 




6:4 The Replacement Approach  
The replacement approach is based on the assumption that only some percentage of pre-
retirement salary
1
 is required to provide an adequate post-retirement income. The Australian  
Senate Committee on Superannuation in 2002 noted a strong consensus among 
superannuation industry representatives to specify 60 per cent to 65 per cent of gross pre-
retirement income as “adequate” in retirement (Nielsen 2006, p.11).  
 
Using ABS data for the Average Weekly Ordinary Times Earrings (AWOTE) of income 
earnings for 2014, Appendix A6:10M shows the amount of retirement income that a retiree 
would need based on the replacement method. The calculations for this table are based on 
earnings for males. Appendix A6:9W calculates financial needs in retirement based on 
female earnings. The difference between the tables highlights the gender wage gap and the 
financial disadvantages experienced by women, given that the cost of living in retirement is 
similar for either sex. (Adequate retirement income for both “modest” and “comfortable” 
                                                 
1
 Pre-retirement salary is here calculated by reference to Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings (AWOTE) 
just before retirement as defined by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (Australian Bureau of Statistics  2012c). 
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living using the budget approach method has been outlined in Appendix A6:11W and 
A6:16M). 
 
Since pre-retirement real income exhibits trend changes over time, it would be reasonable to 
index Replacement retirement income by a measure of real wage growth. As shown in Figure 
6:1 for the period from 2002 to 2014, real wage growth has fluctuated from year to year, but 
also exhibits a present downward trend. Since estimations of real wage growth rely ultimately 
on long-range predictions of productivity, trade conditions and other factors likely to affect 
real wages, it is impossible at this point to say with any degree of certainty what the trend 
fluctuations will be in the next 20 years. We shall therefore assume, for reasons explained in 




6.5 The Standard Budget Approach 
By contrast with the Replacement Approach, the Standard Budget Approach measures a 
person’s post-retirement income by calculating what funds might be required to cover all 
costs of living in retirement. In this regard, the standard budget approach provides a 
comprehensive, but “basic needs” budget. It can be adjusted on an ad hoc basis to reflect 
changes in living standards, expectations of retirees, and their evolving spending patterns.  
Moreover, the standard budget approach requires some kind of definition of basic needs, 
particularly in distinguishing between “modest” and “comfortable” lifestyles in retirement. In 
essence, a budget should include the cost of communications, health, energy, clothing, 
household goods and services, recreation and transport. In using the standard budget method, 
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the Association of Superannuation Funds Australia (2014, p.4) suggest that the difference 
between a “modest” and “comfortable” lifestyle is the focus on leisure and recreational 
activities. However, the analysis of these budgets allows greater expenditure on basics 
(including food and health) in estimating income required for a more “comfortable” lifestyle 
in retirement. This is significant since higher spending on health and food will facilitate 
levels of care and wellbeing denied to “modest” budgets. Moreover, in this analysis the 
“modest” budget is very modest and makes no allowance for gifts, alcohol or tobacco. 
Although these items are not necessary for survival, a budget with no allocation at all for a 
few basic pleasures is meagre and would most likely fall below the standards acceptable to 
many in the community for themselves and their families. Furthermore, as ASFA (2014, p.4) 
observes ‘Both budgets assume that the retirees own their own home outright and are 
relatively healthy’. This may be a somewhat problematic assumption because according to 
CPA (2012) the debt to superannuation ratio for those households between the ages of 50-54 
yet to retire was 91 per cent. Notwithstanding these problems, the Standard Budget Approach 
may be a valuable supplement to the Replacement Approach to calculating adequate 
retirement income.  
 
In what follows, the calculation of cost of living in retirement is taken from ASFA (2014, 
p.3), which estimates that, as at March 2014, a single person would require approximately 
$23,000 per year for a “modest” lifestyle in retirement and approximately $42,500 per year 
for a more “comfortable” lifestyle. Since this approach aims to reflect the cost of living of 
retirees, it is sensible that it is indexed to the consumer inflation rate, which thereby renders 
the required “modest” and “comfortable” income streams constant over time in real terms – 





6.6 Comparing estimates of adequate retirement income   
In what follows, up-to-date calculations are provided of the annual income that is deemed to 
be required in requirement in order to live “modestly”, “adequately” or “comfortably” 
(depending on the measure and definitions used). These include [1] the Age Pension that is 
widely regarded as the historical default “standard of living” for retired people in Australia; 
[2] the income that would just cover the cost of living in retirement “modestly” and 
“comfortably”; and [3] the income based on 60 per cent of pre-retirement (i.e. verging on 
retirement) income. These calculations are shown in Table 6:1.
2
 The Table also shows the 
real growth rate that could be expected from each of the measures if one assumed (plausibly) 











                                                 
2
 Figures have been rounded to the nearest $100. 
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Age pension Male and 
female 
$19,900 Indexed to CPI inflation  
Standard budget 
approach - modest 
Male and 
female 






$42,300 Indexed to CPI inflation 
Replacement approach 
- 60% of pre-retire 
income 
Male $48,700 Indexed to WPI inflation 
Replacement approach 
- 60% of pre-retire 
income 
Female $39,800 Indexed to WPI inflation 
 
 
The calculations in Table 6:1 highlight the differences in assessed (so-called) adequate 
retirement income using the Replacement Approach, the Standard Budget Approach and the 
Age Pension. Most notable is the significant gap of approximately $3,400 per annum between 
the Age Pension and a “modest” standard of living budget under the Standard Budget 
                                                 
3
 CPI = consumer price index. WPI = wage price index. 
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Approach. But still more obvious is the massive gaps between the Age Pension and the 
“comfortable” Standard Budget and Replacement income calculations for both men and 
women. For men and women, the “comfortable” Standard Budget generates an income level 
that is 2.1 times larger than the Age Pension – a gap of $22,800 per annum. And the 
Replacement income is double the Age Pension for women, but for men, it is 2.4 times the 
Age Pension – a gap of $19,900 per annum and $28,800 per annum respectively. Given that 
the “default” standard of living has traditionally been presumed to be the Age Pension, this 
comparison starkly renders the extent to which reliance on the Age Pension falls below a 
standard of living that the average Australian will have grown accustomed to by the point of 
retirement as exemplified by the Replacement Approach. 
 
The variations over time are also noteworthy. The first point to note in this regard is that the 
gaps between the Age Pension and the Standard Budget, estimates in real terms remain 
constant over time because they have all been indexed to consumer inflation.  The  





6.7 Required accumulation of superannuation to ensure adequate 
retirement  income   
Having variously estimated the income likely to sustain an adequate standard of living in 
retirement, the next step is to calculate the amount of lump sum superannuation savings 
needed at retirement to meet each of these estimates for each year of retirement.  
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We shall cautiously focus on estimates of a relatively long lifespan. In this regard, the 
Australian Master Superannuation Guide (2012-13) and the Australian Institute of Health and 
Welfare (2012) estimate life expectancy for most Australians to be approximately 84 years. 
However, generally, if a woman reaches the age of 55 years, she could expected to live to 
~85 years on average, but if she reaches 70 years of age she can expect to live to an extra two 
years. If a male reaches the age of 55 years, he could expect to live ~82 years (Australian 
Master Superannuation Guide 2012-13; Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2012).  
Taking these lifespans into account, the amount of lump sum savings needed for a male has 
been calculated assuming a need for income for 18 years after retirement at 65 years of age. 
For females, lump sum savings will be required for up to 22 years after retirement at 65 years 
of age.  
 
To provide an estimated annual income, the lump sum upon retirement has been invested at a 
fixed rate of 5 per cent per annum return and thus at a real rate of return of 2% given an 
inflation rate of 3%. This rather conservative rate has been chosen on the assumption that 
retirees are not in a position to take risks with their investment and are therefore more likely 
to choose returns with an emphasis on safety over risk. Moreover, most banks in Australia 
will not currently provide long-term investment return of more than a nominal rate of 5 per 
cent (Infor Choice 2014) (See Appendix A6:6 which shows the rates of return for over 
different periods of time for retail deposit savings accounts). 
 
 
It is assumed that retirees can erode their accumulated stock of superannuation until the last 
(estimated) year of their life without any substantial remainder. (Here, of course, we are 
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abstracting from a “bequeath motive” that retirees might have). Thus considering the male 
and female lifespan in Australia, the following table estimates the accumulated lump sum 
savings at retirement required to match the Age Pension and the annual income specified by 
the Standard Budget Approach and the Replacement Method respectively. (Calculations can 
be reviewed in Appendix A6:8 to A6:17W).  
 
Table 6:2 shows the lump sums required for men who retire at 2014 and who live until the 
age of 83.
4
   
 
Table 6:2 Accumulated superannuation required for retirement income of men 
Superannuation Lump Sum Savings Required at Retirement for Men  
  Income Per Annum  Retirement  Lump Sum Needed 
Age Pension   $19,900  $304,300 
      
Budget   $23,300  $356,350 
Modest Life Style 
 
  
      









 $48,700  $744,650 
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Table 6:3 shows the lump sums required for women who retire at 2014 and who live until the 
age of 87.
5
   
 
Table 6:3 Accumulated superannuation required for retirement income of women 
Superannuation Lump Sum Savings Required at Retirement for Women  
  Income Per Annum  Retirement  Lump Sum Needed 
Age Pension   $19,900  $371.300 
      
Budget   $23,300  $435,000 
Modest Life Style 
 
  
      









 $39,800  $742,650 
        
  
 
Because women live longer than men, the accumulated superannuation required to maintain 
them in retirement is greater than for men for all the methods of determining lump sums 
required in retirement to maintain a standard of living determined by each approach. 
Additionally, because of the gender gap in AWOTE, the required lump sum of capital to fund 
retirement will reflect that gap.   
                                                 
5




In the following chapters we shall calculate the amount of superannuation savings that can in 
fact be expected to be accumulated for three groups of retirees, rather than the amounts that 
would be required in order to live sustainably without relying on the Age Pension. These 
three cohorts of retirees are: female primary carers, women whose employment is interrupted 
by motherhood and both men and women who work continuously during their working life 
(ideal candidates under the SGC). These outcomes will then be compared to the amount of 
lump sum savings needed at retirement, as calculated in this chapter in order to establish the 





















POINTS OF REFERENCE: ESTIMATES OF LIKELY RETIREMENT 
INCOMES FOR NON-PRIMARY CARERS 
 
7.1 Introduction  
Using the methods and assumptions outlined in Chapter 5, this chapter estimates the likely 
retirement incomes of three cohorts: [1] male full-time workers, [2] female full-time workers, 
and [3] women who have left the paid labour force for a certain period to care for children 
and then returned to the workforce. Given the focus in this thesis on financial outcomes in 
retirement for female primary carers, this chapter is intended as a point of comparison for that 
cohort. Informed by Feminist Standpoint Theory, its aim is to compare and contrast the 
experience of female primary carers as a marginalised group with that of other social groups 
which face few burdens and disadvantages.  
Since the scenarios explored in this chapter have been developed as a point of reference, they 
are presented only as hypothetical cases rather than representatives of Australian society 
proportionately drawn from cross-sectional data. Nonetheless, as will become evident, the 
conclusions drawn from these scenarios are comparable with those drawn from the 
statistically based projections of Austen and Preston (2001), Kelly and Harding (2007), 
Donath 1998; Harding, King and Kelly (2002), and others referred to in Chapters 2 and 3.      
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7.2 Summary of parameters for the scenarios 
In what follows, the likely accumulated superannuation for the three cohorts of interest will 
be calculated and compared to the required accumulation for self-funded retirement. The 
three cohorts are defined by gender and the period of time working during their lives. Various 
scenarios are developed for all of the cohorts: these entail four levels of income and two rates 
of return on pre-retirement superannuated funds.  
Superannuation balances on retirement are calculated for each employment and earnings 
profile assuming the policy regime, administrative practice and rates of return outlined and 
explained in Chapter 5. In particular, for all three cohorts, the following parameters hold true. 
First, with respect to age, full-time working life begins at 25 years old and the preservation 
age is 65 years old. That said, many Australians do not have a continuous working life until 
preservation age of 65 years. For this reason the following tables highlights the amount of 
superannuation savings achieved after 26, 35 and 40 year working life. It is assumed men live 
until they are 83 and women until they are 87. 
Second, calculations of contributions by each cohort are based on four different income levels 
up to retirement (preservation) age of 65 years old. Although the AWOTE is the main 
measure of income used in Australia, the ABS defines income as the AWOTE and total 
earnings. However, as discussed in Chapter 5, the Commonwealth Treasury, in their 
Retirement Income Modelling Unit (2002) state that most Australian employees, some 70 %, 
earn less than the AWOTE, these employees actually earn the median been 75 % of the 
AWOTE or the mean been 83% of the AWOTE (Rim 2002, pp.18-19). For this reason, this 
research project has calculated expected retirement income based on the AWOTE, the Mean 
Earnings, Median Earnings, and Total Earnings. (For definitions of each see Appendix A7:8).  
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Third, the mandatory rate of contributions from income (above) begins at 3 per cent in 1992 
and progressively rises to 9 per cent in 2002, and these contributions are taxed at a flat rate of 
15 per cent per annum so that the actual new additions to accumulated superannuation are net 
of this tax.  
Fourth, as highlighted in the methodology section, the rate of return on superannuation funds 
can be difficult to predict, particularly over a lifetime. For this reason, two rates of return 
have been calculated; these being a 7 per cent rate of return commonly used in the last decade 
and a more conservative rate of 4.27 per cent a likely return over many decades. Further, an 
annual superfund administration fee of 1.36% is deducted in all scenarios. At the end of each 
set of scenarios for women and men, a table provides the ability to compare the expected 
retirement savings price-deflated to their 2014 values.  
Fifth, as per Chapter 6, the lump sum of superannuation required at the point of retirement to 
sustain a retiree has been calculated based on the Age Pension, the Standard Budget 
Approach for both a “modest” and “comfortable” retirement, and the Replacement Approach 
using the four different levels of retirement income noted above (AWOTE, the Mean, Median 
and Total Earnings). Based on per annum figures, the amount of funds needed for each level 
of retirement income has been calculated by finding the lump sum amount, invested, with a 
return of 5 per cent, to provide income based on the life expectancy of a male and a female.  
Lifetime superannuation contributions are firstly calculated for a range of income categories 
for males in full-time continuous work. It is then replicated for females in full-time continuous 
work. Each of these full-time continuous work profiles assumes that full-time adult 
remuneration is being received at 25 years of age in 1992, and that the preservation age is 65 
years. In other words, the subjects have been contributing to their superannuation since the 
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inception of the compulsory scheme. Continuous full-time employment over the life-course is 
assumed to be 40 years. However, scenarios have also been developed for individuals 
working full-time at 26 year, and 35 year intervals, and accumulating funds until preservation 
age of 65 years. Moreover, the current gender income gap in Australia is factored into the 
earnings for females.  
The third cohort examined in this chapter is women who have children and then work part-
time for a period. As explained in the methodology chapter, we assume that this base case 
mother leaves the full-time workforce at 27 years of age to bear and raise two toddlers, that 
she returns to part-time work after 5 years, and that 12 years later she resumes full-time work 
when her youngest child turns 15 years of age. Her earnings from paid employment are 
assumed to correspond to 75 per cent of the AWOTE, thus factoring in the gender gap. This 
scenario is intended as a base case for comparing financial outcomes in retirement for 
mothers who are carers.  
 
7.3 Financial outcomes in retirement for men working continuously full-
time 
The following – Table 7:1 – shows the accumulated compulsory savings at the point of 
retirement for fully employed men under a variety of circumstances. One variable is the 
period at which they ceased working – after either at 26 years, 35 years, or 40 years of 
continuous employment. Another variable is their income strata whilst employed as per 




Figure 7:1 Timeline of possible life-courses 
 
These strata range from “Total earning” (which is relatively high because it is derived by 
dividing estimates of gross weekly earnings by estimates of total weekly hours paid, which 
includes all employees’ total earnings) to 75 per cent of AWOTE (which is relatively low, but 
constitutes the median AWOTE for Australia). The final variable is the rate of return which is 










Table 7:1 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age for men working 
continuously full-time (in real terms)
6
 
  7% nominal rate of return 
  Retire at 26 yrs Retire at 35 yrs Retire at 40yrs 
75% AWOTE (median AWOTE) $192,889 $255,587 $286,639 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE) $213,464 $281,213 $317,214 
AWOTE $255,943 $339,171 $382,186 
Total earnings $274,025 $362,378 $406,245 
      4.27% nominal rate of return 
  Retire at 26 yrs Retire at 35 yrs Retire at 40 yrs 
75% AWOTE (median AWOTE) $97,024 $145,460 $174,628 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE) $107,699 $160,284 $193,255 
AWOTE $128,260 $195,255 $234,260 
Total earnings $137,141 $205,295 $246,164 
 
Clearly the rate of return on accumulated superannuation funds has a very significant impact 
on the overall size of the lump-sum at the preservation age. This can be most starkly seen, for 
example, in Figure 7:2, which shows accumulated lump-sums for men working continuously 





                                                 
6
 Recall that “Retire at x yrs” refers to the number of years worked, not the age of the retiree. 
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This Figure also makes plain that for 40 years of accumulated superannuation, the income 
strata that one is in, whilst making a significant difference for a given rate of return, is in fact 
swamped by the impact of different rates of return. To take the extremities of the Figure, the 
lowest income strata (median AWOTE) at a rate of return of 7 per cent per annum generates 
accumulated funds 1.17 times greater than that generated by the highest income strata (Total 
Earnings) at 4.27 per cent per annum rate of return. Furthermore, one can also see the 
significance of the rate of return by comparing accumulated funds for different points in 
retirement. See Figure 7:3 which compares the lump sums at presentation where a male who 
is obtaining 7 per cent return retires after 26 years of employment accumulates more 
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superannuation at each income strata than a male who works continuously for an additional 
14 years but obtains only 4.27 per cent rate of return. 
Figure 7:3 Accumulated superannuation for male making 26 years of contributions at 7 





Coming now to the matter of whether accumulated superannuation under the various 
scenarios for men will be sufficient to cover the accumulation required in order to maintain 
what, under different measures, is defined as an adequate income, Table 7:2 provides a 
summary of the findings. 
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Retire at 26 yrs, 7% ROR
Retire at 40 yrs, 4.27% ROR
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Table 7:2 Differences between required and accumulated lump sums for males at 


















Lump sum required $304,300  $356,350  $646,700  $744,650  
     
 
Required – accumulated funds at 7% rate of return 
75% AWOTE (median 
AWOTE)  $ 17,661  $69,711  $360,061  $458,011 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE)  $ 12,914  $39,136  $329,486  $427,436 
AWOTE  $ 77,886  $25,836  $264,514  $362,464 
Total earnings $101,945  $49,895  $240,455  $338,405 
     
 
Required – accumulated funds at 4.27% rate of 
return 
75% AWOTE (median 
AWOTE)  $129,672  $181,722  $472,072  $570,022 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE)  $111,045  $163,095  $453,445  $551,395 
AWOTE  $  69,698  $121,748  $412,098  $510,390 
Total earnings  $  58,236  $110,186  $400,536  $498,486 
 
These results indicate that in some cases – namely, men working full-time and receiving at 
least the mean of AWOTE, will be able to accumulate funds equivalent to income based on 
the Age Pension, assuming they average a relatively favourable 7 per cent return on 
accumulated funds throughout their lifetimes. However, fully employed continuously 
working men who do not satisfy these minimum requirements cannot be confidently expected 
                                                 
9
 Note that all numbers coloured red are negative numbers. In the context of this and similar tables, the red 
coloured numbers indicate a shortfall in accumulated superannuation with respect to “required” superannuation 
for self-funding retirement from preservation age onwards. 
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to garner sufficient funds by preservation age to self-fund their retirements. Certainly, none 
can expect to garner enough super to live according to the “comfortable” Standard Budget 
criterion or the Replacement criterion, no matter what the rate of return on investments. And 
if the rate of return on investments falls somewhat below 7 per cent per annum, no working 
man can expect to generate sufficient superannuation at any level of income according to any 
“needs” criterion. As noted, the Commonwealth Treasury’s Retirement Income Modeling 
Unit (2002) places most men working continuously full-time in these latter types of 
categories. As such, these results support the concerns of critics who claim that Australia’s 
current SGC is in itself unlikely to meet the financial needs of most Australians in retirement 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). 
 
7.4  Financial outcomes in retirement for women working continuously 
full-time 
Here we essentially repeat the above calculations as done for men except now for women 
who can work continually without the “interruption” of motherhood. Again, as above, we 




, or 40th year of their working 
life, but do not access their accumulated superannuation funds until the preservation age of 





Table 7:3 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age for women working 
continuously full-time (in real terms)
10
 
  7% rate of return 
  Retire at 26 yrs Retire at 35 yrs Retire at 40yrs 
75% AWOTE (median AWOTE) $159,328 $211,446 $237,322 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE) $176,323 $234,000 $262,637 
AWOTE $212,438 $275,031 $316,430 
Total earnings $213,193 $283,294 $319,768 
      4.27% rate of return 
  Retire at 26 yrs Retire at 35 yrs Retire at 40yrs 
75% AWOTE (median AWOTE) $79,857 $120,060 $144,167 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE) $67,531 $132,123 $159,223 
AWOTE $107,596 $161,238 $192,223 
Total earnings $108,938 $161,485 $195,466 
 
The essential difference between the female and male accumulations will be due to the 
gender gap in AWOTE-based incomes. And thus, the potential for a shortfall in accumulated 
superannuation funds with respect to required income in the post-preservation period of life 
will be much greater than it is for men. 
Although, just as it is for men, the accumulated superannuation of women varies significantly 
depending on the rate of return, the gap between the final accumulation for a rate of return of 
7 per cent and 4.27 per cent is smaller for women than for men. This, obviously, is due to the 
fact that women’s retirement income levels are lower than men’s. See Figure 7:4. 
 
                                                 
10
 Recall that “Retire at x yrs” refers to the number of years worked, not the age of the retiree. 
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Figure 7:4 Differences in accumulated superannuation for 40 continuous years of 





As to the gender gap between men and women who work continuously full-time, this is 
marked, substantial, and increasing with income strata. This gap is illustrated in Figure 7:5, 
which shows the difference between male and female accumulated funds after 40 years for 
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Figure 7:5 Gender gap between males and females in accumulated superannuation for 




As with the analysis of working men, we come to the matter of whether accumulated 
superannuation under the various scenarios for women will be sufficient to cover the 
accumulation required in order to maintain what, under different measures, is defined as an 
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Table 7:4 Differences between required and accumulated lump sums for women at 
preservation age after 40 years of continuous contributions 
 














Lump sum required  $371,300 $435,000  $789,300  $742,650   
     
 
Required – accumulated funds at 7% rate of return 
75% AWOTE (median 
AWOTE)  $133,978  $197,678  $551,978  $505,328 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE)  $108,663  $172,363  $526,663  $480,013 
AWOTE  $  54,870  $411,857  $472,870  $426,220 
Total earnings  $  51,532  $115,232  $469,532  $422,882 
     
 
Required – accumulated funds at 4.27% rate of 
return 
75% AWOTE (median 
AWOTE)  $227,133  $290,833  $645,133  $598,483 
83% AWOTE (mean AWOTE)  $211,704  $275,404  $629,704  $583,427 
AWOTE  $179,077  $242,777  $597,077  $550,427 
Total earnings  $175,834  $239,534  $593,834  $547,184 
 
Unsurprisingly, women fare worse than men when it comes to generating sufficient 
superannuation funds to meet their income “needs” (however they are measured) after 65 
years of age. This is simply because of the income gap between men and women, but no such 
gap exists when it comes to the calculation of a required accumulation. 
Table 7:4 highlights the fact that on every level of remuneration, expected accumulated 
savings over a life time of paid work is likely to fail to match that provided by the current 
Age Pension. To be bleakly accurate, it is unlikely that the average female of any income 
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strata here, for either rate of return on investments, for any criterion of “needs”, not matter 
how meager, can reasonably expect to be able to self-fund her retirement from the 
preservation age onwards. This supports the concerns of feminist economists that, given the 
gender pay gap, income and employment based retirement income systems tend to be 
inherently biased against women. (See chapter 3). Indeed, the central message of Table 7:4 
would seem to be that the current superannuation arrangements fails the average woman 
utterly and systematically.  
 
 
7.5 Financial outcomes in retirement for women working intermittently 
due to motherhood 
Since Australian women are likely to have intermittent work patterns and to work part-time 
due to motherhood, it is important to examine the likely accumulated superannuation, under a 
range of scenarios, for women who interrupt full-time paid work to raise children. These 
scenarios have been developed as points of reference for comparing outcomes for both 
women engaged in continuous employment (as above), and for carers who are mothers 
(below in Chapter 8). 
The assumptions regarding the superannuation regime (including the administration fees) and 
two rates of return used in all of the above scenarios continue to hold for the following 
scenarios. It should be noted, however, that the income strata used is restricted to median 




7.5.1 Hypothetical life-course 
The timing of superannuation contributions over the life-course can impact significantly on 
accumulated savings. For many individuals who have full-time careers, interruptions from 
paid work may occur due to ill health, accident, or unemployment. Such interruptions can 
have a considerable impact on the final superannuation savings outcomes because of the 
compounding effect of super accumulation over time – this being especially so if these 
interruptions occur relatively early in a person’s adult life. This is an issue of particular 
concern for women who have children and take time out of the workforce to engage in 
childrearing. For the members of the cohort of women with children that is examined here, 
we have attributed to them a patterned set of scenarios for their life-course.  
The life-course for this cohort of mothers who work intermittently is taken to be the 
following. A woman starts full-time work at the age of 25 years. At the age of 27 she leaves 
the workforce to have her first child. She remains out of the workforce for the next 5 years 
during which time she has another child. At 32 years old she returns to the labour force to 
work part-time for 15 hours per week for the median AWOTE. She engages in part-time 
work for the next 12 years until she is 44 years of age. Thereafter she again returns to full-
time employment at the median AWOTE. As per the previous cohorts, three possible 
scenarios are then envisaged: the woman retires at 51 years of age, she retires at 60 years of 





Figure 7:6 Timeline of life-course for women having two children 
 
 
7.5.2 Accumulated and required superannuation at preservation age 
Table 7:5 shows the estimated superannuation lump sums at preservation age for the above 
life-course at the mean AWOTE and Table 7:6 shows whether accumulated superannuation 
under the various scenarios for women will be sufficient to cover the accumulation required 
in order to maintain what, under different measures, is defined as an adequate income 
 





7% rate of return 4.27% rate of return 
Retire at 51 yrs of age  $83,573  $45,851 
Retire at 60 yrs of age  $137,665  $86,384 
Retire at 65 yrs of age  $163,905  $111,908 
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Table 7:6 Differences between required and accumulated lump sums at preservation 

















Lump sum required $371,300   $435,000  $789,300 $742,650  
     
 
Required – accumulated funds at 7% rate of return 
Retire at 51 yrs of age  $287,727  $351,427  $705,727  $659,077 
Retire at 60 yrs of age  $233,635  $297,335  $651,635  $604,985 
Retire at 65 yrs of age  $207,395  $271,095  $625,395  $578,745 
     
 
Required – accumulated funds at 4.27% rate of return 
Retire at 51 yrs of age  $325,449  $389,149  $743,449  $696,799 
Retire at 60 yrs of age  $284,916  $348,616  $702,916  $656,266 
Retire at 65 yrs of age  $251,392  $323,092  $677,392  $622,742 
 
Table 7:6 clearly shows the disadvantage in terms of superannuation faced by women with 
children who re-enter the workforce on a part-time basis after having children, and who only 
re-start full-time work after the youngest of two children is well into high school. If they 
work full-time until 65 years old, they are seriously disadvantaged even compared to women 
(let alone men) who don’t take on a child-rearing role – and the disadvantage is only 
magnified if they work for less than this (retiring at 51 or 60 years of age). So, not only is the 
superannuation system systemically biased against women per se, but it essentially 
                                                 
14
 Recall that “Retire at x yrs” refers to the number of years worked, not the age of the retiree. 
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“punishes” women in retirement who take some amount of time out of their work-life to raise 
children.  
 
7.6 Concluding comments 
The above hypothetical cohorts and scenarios were developed as points of reference for 
examining financial outcomes in retirement for certain cohorts of female primary carers. It 
may be noted that although they are hypothetical, they nonetheless roughly accord with 
empirically existing cohorts of Australian men and women who do, and don’t, take on child-
rearing responsibilities.  
This chapter has calculated the amount of expected retirement savings based on a number of 
different levels of remuneration for men and women participating in paid work for different 
periods continuously all their working life. The number of different scenarios provides a 
multi-faceted insight into what the average man or women can expect when funds are 
accumulated over a lifetime of paid work within the current superannuation system. All the 
outcomes have been calculated using the same parameters – the only difference between the 
cohorts of full-time working men, full-time working women, and intermittently working 
women being remuneration, and for the latter cohort particularly, the periods of contributions. 
It has been these variations alone which have determined the differences in accumulated 
superannuation sums at preservation age.  
These differences in outcomes highlight the impact of the remuneration or the gender wage 
gap on superannuation savings – not just for accumulated superannuation, but also for the 
calculation of what would be “required” in retirement. In fact, what becomes clearer in this 
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chapter is that irrespective of the method of determining “required” accumulations to self-
fund retirement, most women and men who are “ideal” candidates under the current 
superannuation regime have little chance of saving sufficient funds for their future retirement.  
Clearly, if the current superannuation regime is not caring to the self-funding retirement 
needs of “ideal” cohorts, “non-ideal” cohorts are going to do worse still under the system. It 
is a question of identifying these cohorts, determining the degree of disadvantage that they 
face, and identifying the particularities of these cohorts. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, 
much work has been done for a number of different cohorts in the Australian population, but 
as noted in Chapter 4, there are certain cohorts of female carers who have not as yet been 
examined, but face serious burdens that impact significantly on their ability to save 
superannuation funds, let alone a lump sum that could be deemed “sufficient” for their needs. 











ESTIMATES OF RETIREMENT INCOMES FOR FEMALE PRIMARY CARERS 
 
 
8.1 Background to carer profiles  
This chapter constructs retirement income scenarios for a range of female primary carers and 
thereby aims to enhance and supplement interpretation of the existing literature on this 
subject (Nepal et al 2008; Nepal et al 2011). As noted in Chapter 4, the retirement income 
scenarios for female carers in the existing literature are based on two carer profiles and 
situations. These are: a mother caring for a child with a disability from birth while raising 
other children; and a female of fifty caring for a partner or spouse. However as earlier noted, 
estimates of retirement income based on these two situations cannot be generalised to the 
majority of female primary carers. This is partly due to the large proportion of females 
engaged in certain other types of primary care. Here the most conspicuous are the 29.8% of 
female primary carers of (co-resident or non-co-resident) relatives or partners’ relatives 
(Wilkins 2014). This group are significant, not only because they constitute nearly one third 
of all carers. At present these elder carers are subsidising the real social cost of ageing in 
Australia because they are, by and large, unpaid workers who are performing such caring 
work in lieu of (in part) explicitly paying for their elderly relatives to be looked after by 
(effectively) for-profit aged care and nursing home care facilities. 
 
The financial and other impacts of unpaid elder care on primary carers must therefore be 
considered when assessing claims that Australia’s current SGC will sustainably meet the 
needs of an ageing population. However, as suggested in Chapter 4, estimating retirement 
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incomes for carers of elders raises some difficulties. Outcomes for this group cannot be 
straightforwardly subsumed under the two life-course employment and earnings profiles 
constructed in the existing literature. This is firstly because the age at which a woman begins 
primary care of a relative is unlikely to fall within as narrow a range as that of a woman 
caring for a partner or spouse. This is partly because the age range of new mothers has 
widened in Australia over the past few decades (ABS 2008b; Australian Institute of Family 
Studies & FaCSIA 2008).   
 
Figure 8:1  Age-specific birth rates, Australia, 1921-2006
 
Source:  Australian Institute of Family Studies and FaCSIA 2008 
 
However, narrow estimates of workforce exit are also more difficult to construct if the 
relatives providing elder care have multiple offspring. This increases the chances of a carer 
being the youngest child of a relatively older mother and so being required to provide elder 




Further complexities arise in estimating the life-course employment and earnings of those 
carers “sandwiching” elder care with raising children, or at least financially supporting young 
adults. The extent of this “sandwich” generation is suggested by ABS (2008a) data showing 
that most carers of elder relatives are aged between 35 and 65, and that nearly half of these 
are themselves parents of children aged fifteen years or younger. In this regard, the cohort of 
individuals caring for adults and children should also include mothers caring for their partner 
or spouse. Viewed from another perspective, in 2003 nearly thirty seven percent of all parents 
in Australia aged between 35 and 54 years were caring for a person with a disability. While 
almost half of these parents were caring for a child with a disability, the remainder were 
almost all caring for an elder parent or spouse (ABS 2008a).   
 
When estimating retirement incomes, the impacts of such simultaneous caring should be 
considered alongside those of caring for multiple individuals sequentially over the life-
course. As noted in Chapter 4, the ABS (2008) data on working aged carers with children is 
not likely to capture the extent of sequential “sandwich” care since it excludes parents of 
children over the age of 15. However, the employment and financial impacts of raising 
children and then caring for a relative or partner are also likely to be considerable. Taking 
these issues, this chapter estimates financial outcomes in retirement based on likely life-







8.2 The carer profiles 
The range of carer profiles that are to be examined include the following: 
[1] A woman with no children caring for an elderly relative.  
[2] A woman caring simultaneously for a child and an elderly relative.  
[3] A woman caring sequentially for a child and then a disabled partner. 
[4] A woman caring for a child with a disability from birth.  
[5] A woman caring for a child who requires care from the age of 17.  
 
The last scenario has been included to address the fact that 11% of informal care is provided 
for a person with a psychiatric illness (Edwards et al 2008), coupled with the fact that 
individuals aged 18 to 24 are most susceptible to the types of psychiatric illnesses that require 
high level, relatively prolonged care (ABS 2007c). Moreover, while profile 4 has been 
considered in the existing literature (Nepal 2008), this chapter aims to enhance our 
understanding of outcomes for such carers. It does so by comparing superannuation outcomes 
for them with the lump sums required in retirement, and also by employing some different 
assumptions in the construction of the employment and earnings profiles, as specified below.  
Life-course employment and earnings scenarios are constructed for each of these profiles 
drawing mainly on information from the 2012 Australian Bureau of Statistics Survey of 
Disability, Ageing and Carers (SDAC) (ABS 201a), the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
profile of carers in Australia (ABS 2008a), Waves 1-11 of the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics In Australia Survey (Wilkins 2014), and the 2007 Families Caring for a Person 
with a Disability Study (FCPDS)  (Edwards et al 2008). Unless it is otherwise indicated, this 
information has been discussed and referenced in Chapters 4 and 5. Where possible 
information from these sources has been cross-referenced with other Australian data 
188 
 
including the 2007 ABS Survey of Employment Arrangements, Retirement and 
Superannuation as referred to in this thesis (ABS 2007a),  and the Australian Institute of 
Family Studies and FaCSIA (2008). 
 
Applicable to all scenarios is data indicating that the majority of primary care provided by 
females takes place when these carers are of working age (mostly between 35 and 65 years).  
 
 
8.3 Life-course scenarios for the carer profiles 
In what follows, consideration is given to the parameters which will govern the construction 
of the five life-course profiles with respect to duration and timing of employment, income 
strata, and the duration and timing of caring. For each profile that is developed, 
superannuation balances on retirement are calculated assuming the policy regime, 
administrative practice, and rates of return outlined and explained in Chapter 5. Thus, the 
following parameters remain the same as for those cohorts already examined in Chapter 7.  
 
First, timing of the changes to the mandatory rate of contributions from income remains as it 
has historically evolved: starting at 3 per cent in 1992 and gradually increasing to 9 per cent 
in 2002 and then 9.5 per cent in 2014. It is again assumed that the mandatory rate of 9.5 per 
cent will continue into the foreseeable future. Second, it is assumed that these contributions 
will continue to be taxed at the historical flat rate of 15 per cent per annum. Third, again, 
relatively high and relatively conservative per annum rates of return of 7 per cent and  4.27 
per cent respectively are used in calculations. Also, the annual superfund administration fee 
of 1.36 per cent is deducted in all scenarios. Finally, as per Chapter 6, the lump sum of 
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superannuation “needed” for the retiree’s preservation period has been calculated based on 
the Age Pension, the Standard Budget Approach for both a “modest” and “comfortable” 
retirement, and the Replacement Approach.  
 
Coming now to matters of the periods of employment and caring in terms of both duration 
and timing in the life-course of each carer-profile, a number of considerations must be taken 




8.4 Entry into full-time work 
The first parameter to consider is the timing of entry into full-time employment for the first 
time. The lifetime earnings scenarios in the previous chapter were based on the 
Commonwealth Treasury’s estimate that workers are most likely to assume full-time 
employment and earning adult wages at 25 years of age. Considering that primary carers in 
every working aged cohort are less likely have a Bachelor’s degree than their non-carer 
counterparts, the age at which the carer enters the workforce work may be more realistically 
set at 20 years. On the other hand, given relatively high rates of youth unemployment and the 
increasing trend toward part-time and casual work in Australia over the past few decades 
(ABS 2010), it would not be realistic to assume these people were immediately engaged in 
full-time work. Therefore, retirement incomes for the five carer profiles are calculated 
assuming workforce entry at 20 years, but employment is on a part-time basis of 20 hours per 





8.5 Exiting the workforce for childrearing 
First we may consider the age at which carers who are mothers have withdrawn from or 
reduced their involvement in the labour force to raise children. As earlier noted, in Australia 
the median age at which women first give birth is approximately 27 years. However, as 
discussed in chapter 5, considering the positive, significant relation between women’s level 
of educational attainment and the age at which they give first give birth it is likely that female 
carers are over represented in the 13 per cent of women in Australia who first give birth 
between the ages of 20 and 24 years. Considering this, the age at which mothers leave the 
workforce to raise their children is set for carers at 25 years of age rather than at 27.   
 
 
8.6 Post-childrearing return to employment 
The second parameter to consider is the nature of employment – especially in the case of 
mothers – on returning to the workforce after having (not disabled) children. As noted by the 
ABS (2008), 15 per cent of female primary carers are employed on a full-time basis and 24 
per cent are employed part-time. Reflecting these patterns, engagement in full and part-time 
work has been varied between the five profiles. As with the scenarios for non-carer mothers 
in Chapter 7, the scenarios for carer mothers raising non-disabled children assume the parent 
withdraws from the labour force at 25 years and remains out of the workforce until their 
children begin school. This withdrawal period is assumed to be 5 years. Thereafter, the 
mother returns to part-time work throughout the children’s schooling. This assumption 
abstracts from the variety of situations in which mothers raise non-disabled children. 
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However, this chapter focuses on the financial impacts of caring on carers, and thus 
standardises the impact of raising other children for illustrative purposes. 
 
 
8.7 Timing of withdrawal from employment due to caring 
The third consideration is about the timing of female carers’ withdrawal from, and/or 
resumption of, paid employment in the face of motherhood and new caring responsibilities. 
Next we need to consider the ages at which women withdraw from the labour force because 
of new caring responsibilities. The ABS (2008a) Profile of Carers indicates that of the 
295,000 primary carers who were not employed, 31 per cent had left work just prior to taking 
on the caring role. Also, 51 per cent of primary carers in this situation had left work 
specifically to start or increase care. In the case of a disabled child, we can distinguish two 
sub-cases: one where the child is born with a disability which requires full-time care and the 
other where a child develops a disability (such as serious mental illness) at the age of 17. 
These sub-cases enable us to be precise about the age at which carers begin their caring 
responsibilities. In the case of elderly relatives, however, it is difficult to be precise about the 
likely age at which carers will assume caring duties because the elderly tend to need care due 
to some episode or accident in their lives. As such, we have provided a number of profiles 
that incorporate different periods when aged care begins in a carer’s life. The same holds for 
the severity of the difficulties faced by an elderly relative, which in turn translates into the 
question of whether the carer can take up part-time employment whilst also looking after 
their relative. Again, variations in the profiles have been made to illustrate the possible effect 
on superannuation of part-time employment (versus no employment – i.e. full-time care). The 
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only consistent parameter in this regard is the assumption that the elderly relative dies a 
natural death when the carer is 59 years old. 
 
 
8.8 Income level 
In chapter 4 we noted that 65% of primary carers resided in a household with equalised gross 
household income in the lowest two quintiles of the national income distribution. However, 
as noted, the available evidence also suggests that primary carers were receiving 
approximately similar annual incomes to comparable non-carers in the year immediately 
before caring and similar hourly wages if working while being a carer (Bittman et al 2007). 
For this reason, remuneration for carers’ paid work used in all of the carer profiles and 
scenarios have accordingly been based on the median (i.e. 75 per cent) of the Average 
Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings.  
 
 
8.9  Financial outcomes in retirement for women in caring roles 
From these above assumptions about the parameters governing superannuation 
accumulations, we may calculate superannuation balances for the five carer profiles under the 
different rates of return. As with the scenarios in Chapter 7, the scenarios in this chapter will 
be compared to the lump sums of capital “required” by a person to self-fund their retirement 
(in accordance with the three methods of determining such “required” sums). The first three 
sets of scenarios deal with cases that may be described as dealing with caring within the 
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immediate family – i.e. caring for a spouse or children or both. The scenarios following them 
all revolve around caring for an elderly relative.  
 
 
8.10 Caring for children and a disabled spouse 
In this scenario, after working part-time from 20-25 years old, a woman leaves the workforce 
for 5 years to have children. She re-enters the workforce on a part-time basis, working 15 
hours per week. We would then normally assume that after the youngest child had turned 15 
years old, she would then seek full-time employment at 44 years old until preservation age 
(optimistically). However, at the carer’s age of 40, her partner becomes somehow disabled 
(such as via physical illness or injury, or due to mental illness) and thus needs to be cared for 
part-time for the next three years. Thereafter, her partner requires full-time care as the 
partner’s problem becomes progressively worse such that they lose the capacity to perform 
“core” functions. The carer must therefore give up paid work altogether at the age of 43 to 
look after her spouse until (and into) preservation age retirement. Figure 8:1 illustrates the 
life-course outlined here. Table 8:1 shows the accumulated superannuation for this scenario. 
Table 8:2, meanwhile, shows the shortfall in the accumulated superannuation at preservation 
age compared to various measures of the amount “required” in order to be a fully self-funded 
retiree. As can be observed in this table, the gap between what would be “required” and what 





Figure 8:2  Timeline of life-course for a mother-carer with disabled spouse 
 
Table 8:1 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age (in real terms) for a 
mother-carer with disabled spouse 











Table 8:2 Differences between required and accumulated superannuation at 

















Lump sum required $371,300  $435,000 $789,000  $556,400 
     
 
Required minus accumulated funds  
7% rate of return  $319530  $383,230  $737,230  $504,630 
4.27% rate of return  $348,911  $412,611  $766,611  $534,011 
 
 
8.11 Caring for a child who is disabled from birth 
Some carer-mothers will have children who are seriously disabled from birth. These children 
will require care for the duration of their lives, which one may assume to be at least as long as 
the carer’s own lives. As such, the carer’s life-course will be the following: after working 
part-time for the first 5 years of their adult lives, they have a severely disabled child. Having 
to care for this child beyond the carer’s age of preservation entails that the carer is out of the 
workforce for almost all of her working life. Figure 8:2 illustrates this situation. Table 8:3 
shows the accumulated superannuation at preservation age. Table 8:4 records the shortfall in 
the lump sum relative to different measures of “required” superannuation in retirement. 
                                                 
15
 Note that all numbers coloured red are negative numbers. In the context of this and similar tables, the red 
coloured numbers indicate a shortfall in accumulated superannuation with respect to “required” superannuation 
for self-funding retirement from preservation age onwards. 
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Needless to say, the shortfall is massive due to the exceedingly short period over which the 
carer is contributing income to her lump sum. 
Figure 8:3 Timeline of life-course for a mother-carer with child disabled at birth 
 
 
Table 8:3 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age (in real terms) for a 
mother-carer with child disabled at birth 
7% rate of return 4.27% rate of return 
$10,572 $4,661 
 
Table 8:4 Differences between required and accumulated superannuation at 
preservation age (in real terms) for a mother-carer with child disabled at birth 
 













Lump sum required $371,300  $435,000 $789,000  $556,400 
     
 
Required minus accumulated funds 
7% rate of return $360,728 $424,428 $778,428 $545,828 




8.12 Caring for a child who is disabled from 17 years old 
In this scenario, a woman enters the workforce on a part-time basis at 20 years old, leaves the 
workforce for 5 years to look after her children and then returns to part-time work whilst 
raising her children. Ordinarily, it is assumed, the mother would commence full-time work 
again after the youngest child had turned 15 (i.e. when she is roughly 44 years old). However, 
in this scenario, her first-born becomes effectively permanently disabled either by physical 
injury or by mental illness at the age of 17 (i.e. when the mother is 42 years old). This event 
cuts short the mother’s part-time working period and indeed negates the possibility of paid 
employment at all for the duration of the rest of her working life up to preservation age. This 
life-course is pictured in the Figure 8:3 timeline. Table 8:5 records the accumulated 
superannuation at preservation age, and Table 8:6 records the shortfall in the lump sum 
relative to different measures of “required” superannuation in retirement.  
 







Table 8:5 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age (in real terms) for a 
mother-carer with child disabled at 17 years old 
7% rate of return 4.27% rate of return 
$48,082 $20,809 
Table 8:6 Differences between required and accumulated superannuation at 
preservation age (in real terms) for a mother-carer with child disabled at 17 years old 
 













Lump sum required $371,300  $435,000 $789,000  $556,400 
     
 
Required minus accumulated funds 
7% rate of return $323,218 $389,918 $740,918 $508,318 
4.27% rate of return $350,491 $414,191 $768,191 $535,591 
 
The remaining scenarios to be examined are ones that focus on care of the elderly. These 
scenarios are particularly important because, although assisted-living centres and nursing 
homes have become significant institutes devoted to elder care, it is also the case that they are 
not utilised universally by the elderly who no longer are capable of performing all their 
“core” functions required for living independently. This may be because facilities available in 
the relevant geographical area may be in relatively short supply; or because available 
facilities are too expensive; or because the elderly person simply does not wish to enter into 
such facilities; or because the family of the elderly person does not wish them to utilize such 
199 
 
facilities. As such, it is not unreasonable to surmise that the “problem” of informal elder care 
within younger peoples’ homes (predominantly the children or nieces/nephews of the 
elderly), will persist for the foreseeable future.   
 
8.13 Caring for children and an elderly relative 
The following set of scenarios we will examine is mothers who have to care for an elderly 
relative. (In fact, it could be more than one elderly relative – say, two parents – but this would 
not change the outcome in terms of time worked and thus the superannuation accumulated). 
In each of these scenarios, we assume a woman who enters the workforce at 20 years old and 
obtains part-time work for 20 hours per week, until she has a child at 25 years of age. At this 
point, she leaves the workforce for a period of 5 years, to raise the child and have another. 
From here we have two possible life-course scenarios. One involves an elderly relative who 
is relatively healthy, but progressively declines over time. The second scenario is an elderly 
relative who has serious difficulties early on.  
 
The first scenario goes as follows. At the age of 30 she returns to the workforce and obtains 
part-time employment for 15 hours per week. At the age of 42, an elderly relative comes to 
live with the woman because she is no longer able to live independently, but is not eligible, 
unable to afford, or is unwilling to enter an assisted-care facility. Since the relative is still 
able to perform some “core” functions (such as clean himself/herself), this does not disrupt 
the carer’s part-time employment. However, after 5 years, the elderly relative deteriorates to 
the point of being unable to perform “core” functions and so requires full-time care. The carer 
then switches from part-time caring duties to full-time caring duties, requiring her to leave 




The second life-course scenario is one in which the elderly relative arrives at the carer’s 
home when the carer has just finished raising her children full-time and is now ready to 
embark on part-time work. Unfortunately, the elderly relative has serious health problems and 
so requires full-time care on arrival, so that the carer must leave the workforce at 30 years 
old. 
 
In both scenarios, the woman cares for the elderly relative until the latter’s death when the 
carer is 59 years of age. Thereafter, the woman returns to full-time work until preservation 
age at 65 years old. Figure 8:4 illustrates the life-course of the two carer’s scenarios. Table 
8:7 shows the accumulated superannuation for this scenario. Table 8:8 meanwhile shows the 
shortfall in the accumulated superannuation at preservation age compared to various 













Figure 8:5 Timeline of life-course for two mother-carer scenarios of elderly relatives 
 
Table 8:7 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age (in real terms) for a 
mother-carer with elderly relatives 
 7% rate of return 4.27% rate of return 
Elder care scenario 1 $95,977 $60,189 







Table 8:8 Differences between required and accumulated superannuation at 
preservation age (in real terms) for a mother-carer with elderly relatives 
 













Lump sum required $371,300  $435,000 $789,000  $556,400 
     
 
Elder care scenario 1: Required minus accumulated funds  
7% rate of return $278,373 $339,023 $693,023 $460,423 
4.27% rate of return $310,111 $374,811 $728,811 $512,875 
 
Elder care scenario 2: Required minus accumulated funds  
7% rate of return $327,775 $391,475 $745,475 $496,211 
4.27% rate of return $336,002 $399,702 $753,702 $521,102 
 
Although in both cases, as before, the amount of superannuation accumulated up to 
preservation age is clearly inadequate to enable self-funding of retirement for carers in each 
of these scenarios, it is also worth noting the disparity in the shortfalls between the two 
scenarios. This only serves to emphasise the effect that an elderly parent (or other relative) 
can have on a carer’s future finances in retirement. In the above case, the elderly relative who 
was less “healthy”, and therefore required more care compared to the “healthier” relative, 





8.14 Caring for the elderly only 
Finally, we end with the profile of a woman who does not have children, but who, in mid-life, 
does have to care for an elderly relative. This case effectively eliminates the “effect” of 
having children from the above two elder care scenarios. In such a case, a woman can work 
full-time contributing to her superannuation in an “unencumbered” fashion until having to 
care for an elderly relative (or relatives).  
 
We assume the elderly relative needs care from the time the carer is 37 years old. We vary 
the level of care required, however, between a relatively low level of care to a relatively high 
level of care – i.e. the elderly relative needs some assistance with “core activities” on the one 
hand, and needs full-time attention on the other hand. This is reflected in the employment 
time of the carer: in the former case, the carer is employed part-time and in the latter case, the 
carer withdraws from the labour force completely to engage in full-time caring.  
 
Assuming the same income strata (75 per cent of AWOTE), we may usefully make a direct 
comparison between these above scenarios with a “base case” from the previous chapter: 
namely, a woman without children who works full-time without being “interrupted” by 
caring for an elderly relative. In all scenarios here, we assume the women obtain some kind 
of tertiary education and so only start full-time work at 25 years of age. Figure 8:5 illustrates 
the timelines of two carer profiles – a full-time and a part-time carer – and the “base case” 










Table 8:9 Accumulated superannuation at preservation age for female carers of elderly 
relatives (in real terms) 
 
7% rate of return 4.27% rate of return 
Full-time caring $110,961 $57,534 
Part-time caring $218,209 $163,150 




Now turning to the comparison of the lump sum of superannuation “required” for self-funded 
retirement with the likely accumulated lump sum for these scenarios, one will note that 
whether the elder carer is caring full-time or part-time, their accumulated superannuation for 
retirement falls well short of what would be “needed”. This is so even when defining 
financial “need” in terms of the extremely meagre, poverty-level Age Pension. (See Table 
8:10). Recall that this assumes that carers will return to full-time work at the end of their 
working lives (at preservation age). Although this entails a very small contribution to their 
overall accumulation for retirement, if this optimistic assumption were relaxed, the carer’s 
circumstances would be even worse than recorded here.  
 
Manifestly, the Australian superannuation system as it currently stands is not equipped to 
provide income security in retirement for those who, for one reason or another, are faced with 
the serious challenge of having to care for an elderly relative. As such, it fails a basic test of 
equity. Through compounding of accumulated funds based on employment income, those 
with high incomes and the wealth who can sustain continual employment can conceivably 
gain some degree of benefit from the superannuation system. Those who are burdened with 
having to look after elderly relatives themselves, thereby interrupting their employment and 
thus their contributions to superannuation, are likely to gain little from the system. Thanks to 
the compounding effects of the system, the ultimate result is a natural tendency toward 








Table 8:10 Differences between required and accumulated lump sums at preservation 
age for women with children (in real terms)   
  




















Median                           
(75 % of 
AWOTE) 
Lump sum required $371,300 $435,000 $789,300 $742,650 $556,400 
            
  Required minus accumulated funds at 7% rate of return 
Full-time caring $260,339 $324,039 $678,339 $631,689 $445,439 
Part-time caring $153,339 $216,791 $571,091 $524,441 $338,191 
No caring $54,870 $118,570 $472,870 $426,220 $239,970 
  
    
  
  Required minus accumulated funds at 4.27% rate of return 
Full-time caring $303,766 $367,466 $721,766 $685,116 $498,866 
Part-time caring $208,150 $271,850 $626,150 $579,500 $393,250 
No caring $179,077 $242,777 $297,077 $550,427 $364,177 
 
 
8.15 Summary comparisons 
Let us now make some summative comparisons about the above findings. The first, and most 
obvious point, is that no carers accumulate sufficient superannuation by preservation age to 
self-fund their retirement from 65-87 years of age. The quantitative point of interest then, is 
by how much does superannuation at preservation age fall short of what would be “required”. 
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Here, we may reasonably divide our scenarios, as before, into two categories: scenarios 
relating to immediate family members, and scenarios relating to elderly relatives. And with 
respect to each category, rather than comparing every possible measure of shortfall against 
every other, it would be convenient and yet informative to single out the smallest and the 
largest measured shortfalls for each scenario for comparison (i.e. the shortfall based on the 
least generous estimate of “required” superannuation, viz. the Age Pension measure, and the 
most generous estimate, viz. the “comfortable” standard of the Standard budget approach). 
Further, for visual clarity, let us select only accumulations based on the nominal rate of return 
of 7 per cent per annum (Even with this optimistic rate of return, the shortfalls are still 
prodigious.) 
Comparing then the shortfall in accumulated superannuation for the first category of 
scenarios, we have Figure 8:6. Clearly, the earlier the disability of the child who is cared for, 












Figure 8:7 Shortfall in superannuation (immediate family): required accumulation 
minus likely accumulation at preservation age (in real terms)  
 
 
Coming now to the second category, Figure 8:7 shows the shortfall in accumulated 
superannuation for those scenarios involving elder care (contrasted with a woman with no 
caring responsibilities). Clearly, full-time elder caring (especially with children) generates a 
massive shortfall by either the meagre or comfortable standards of “required” superannuation 
accumulation (i.e. a shortfall of ~$328,000 or ~$745,000 respectively). Furthermore, just to 
recapitulate a point from the previous chapter, depressingly, even a woman working full-time 
with no caring responsibilities whatsoever will still experience a shortfall in her 
superannuation accumulation at preservation age. Indeed, her accumulated super would not 
even be sufficient to match the poverty-level Age Pension (falling short of what would be 















Child disabled at 17yo
Child disabled at birth
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Figure 8:8 Shortfall in superannuation (elder care): required accumulation minus likely 




If further degrees of realism were added to the above scenarios, situations faced by carers in 
each case would most likely be even worse than as presented here. The two major elements 
of realism that could be added are the following. First, it is in fact unlikely that female carers, 
after looking after an elderly parent until the latter’s death would, at the age of 59 or 60, 
seriously consider re-entering the workforce, let alone actually obtain full-time work at even 
the median AWOTE level. It is more likely that such carers would simply not re-enter the 
workforce – effectively “retiring” at about 60 years old. Thus, what little boost full-time 
income would provide to superannuation for the last 5 years of a carer’s working life would 
most likely not occur anyway. Second, given the documented impacts of caring on carer’s 
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withdraw all, or part, of their balances to cover debts, to meet daily expenses, and/or to meet 
the additional costs of providing appropriate necessary equipment and specialist medical 
services for the care recipient. Indeed, the carers in all of the above scenarios are likely to be 
at risk of having higher personal costs associated with caring. Early withdrawal of 
superannuation funds in circumstances of financial hardship, is currently legally permissible 
in Australia, so it is entirely possible that some carers – especially those who have drawn 
upon their own voluntarily acquired wealth to help pay for their caring duties – will 
significantly shorten the period of time over which they will be able to self-fund their 
retirement out of superannuation. In the most extreme cases, such carers may indeed have no 
superannuation left to rely on at presentation age.  
 
The above scenarios, with their parameters orientated by cross-sectional data, while 
supplementing the existing literature, are nonetheless limited in what they can tell us about 
carers given the highly episodic nature of care and the unusual temporal and spatial 
asymmetry of its impacts (Bittman et al 2007; Schofield et al 2014; Falkiner 2011). As 
explained in Chapter 5, this asymmetry most likely arises from the complexity and intensity 
of the impacts of caring on carers. As noted, the effects on carer’s health, further education, 
social involvement and other factors may have implications for employment and earnings 
lasting well beyond the actual period of primary care itself. For this reason, estimates of 
carer’s retirement income based on cross-sectional data needs to be supplemented, insofar as 
it is possible, with information based on qualitative causal accounts or life histories. Although 
these qualitative accounts cannot be generalised to the entire population of female primary 
carers, they can nonetheless enhance our understanding of the degree and types of variations 
to be expected within certain cohorts that exhibit some rough similarities in terms of 
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parameters to the scenarios just examined. Accordingly, the next chapter provides accounts of 
carers’ own experiences and interpretations of their own life-courses. The chapter seeks to 
draw out the fundamental methodological point that there are complex clusters of mutually 
interacting causes and effects that can result in some situations having significantly more 
powerful impacts on some carer’s entire lives than others despite the fact that different carers 





















THE IMPACT OF CARING ON CARER’S RETIREMENT INCOMES:  
A QUALITATIVE ACCOUNT 
 
 
9.1 Introduction  
Drawing on carer’s own accounts and perceptions, this chapter examines the complex, mutual 
interaction of causes and effects that make the impacts more severe for some carers than others, and 
which also mean that for many, such effects endure long after the actual provision of care has ceased.  
As noted in the previous chapter, in the absence of longitudinal data, projecting life-course 
scenarios (and retirement outcomes) for female primary carers requires qualitative insights, 
given the difficulties in inferring causation from the correlation of variables in the cross-
sectional data. As discussed, these limitations arise both from the episodic nature of 
providing informal care and the likely temporal asymmetry of its effects (Schofield et al 
2014, Bittman et al 2007). We noted that such temporal asymmetries may be due to the 
interaction of the multiple dimensions of care giving. This chapter’s illustrative and specific 
observations regarding the financial outcomes for any given person or household cannot be 
generalized to all or most carers. 
The experiences considered in this chapter are drawn mostly from first-hand accounts 
collected by several state and national carers associations as well as from secondary sources. 
The data from carer associations includes Care for Caregivers 1998, Carers of People with 
Mental Illness Australia (2000), and the two editions of the Carers Victoria 2003 and 2004 
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publications Caring Matters - Snapshots from the Lives of Carers. Carer’s associations aim at 
effective advocacy, and as such, are possibly a biased source of information. Moreover there 
is the possibility that collections of carer’s accounts may be biased due to self-selection. Here 
it may be the case that carers who are members of Carer’s Associations or who have 
documented and offered their experience may be impacted differently or to a greater extent 
than other carers. Methodological issues associated with the use of these firsthand accounts 
have been discussed in Chapter 5.  Here it may sufficient to emphasise firstly, that carer’s 
accounts have been used in this chapter to illustrate the causal complexity underlying 
statistically significant correlations. Secondly, the very wide range of attitudes, experiences, 
moods, and perceived levels of competency and coping presented in collections of carer’s 
accounts, appear to refute the view that only carers with particular attitudes, or perceived 
levels of tolerance and competence have contributed to their experiences.   
This qualitative account begins by noting the difference between official definitions of 
primary care on the one hand, and the way that some carers define their role on the other. 
This difference supports the survey findings that many carers perceive their activity as a 
moral and physical necessity. As one primary carer expressed this:  
A caregiver gives of oneself to assure that the person in need receives the necessary 
care to carry on his or her life safely and with dignity. A caregiver sees to it that the 
basic needs of food, clothing, cleanliness and shelter are met by the person with need 
(Care for Caregivers 1998, p.1).  
 
As noted in chapter 4, qualitative research indicates that carer’s sense of the absolute 
necessity of their activity is often accompanied by anxiety that the care recipient will be 
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abandoned in their absence. This is particularly so for ageing mothers of children born with 
disabilities. As the aging mother of an adult daughter diagnosed soon after birth with a 
profound disability observed:  
I hope I can look after Jenny for a long while yet with the help of my wonderful 
husband. But when I’m not here anymore I’d like to think that there is a place for Jenny 
to be looked after where they will give her the love we have given her, as love is all she 




9.2  The intensity of informal care work: the impact of combined physical 
 and   emotional effort. 
While informal care work varies considerably, it may often be characterised by the 
combination of physical and emotional effort to a greater extent than these would be 
combined in other occupations, even formal care work. As Fine (2007 pp.4-5) emphasises, 
this combination in itself imposes demands that are incomparable to sheer physical or mental 
effort. As an example, the labour of informal care work is experienced by some as a 
contradiction between moral and emotional fulfillment on one the hand and physical and 
mental exhaustion on the other. Moreover the degree of fulfillment seems to vary with the 
nature of the caring relationship. For example, Savage and Bailey (2004) note that adult care 
giver’s attitudes appear to be more positive when the recipient of their care is a child or 




In this regard, it should be emphasized that the emotional and moral bonds and pressures 
experienced by many informal care givers are not readily comparable to the sense of duty and 
emotional attachment felt by those working in formal care industries. In the case of informal 
care, the sense of responsibility may be inseparable from sexual, parental and other 
relationships in a manner which uniquely impacts on the caregiver’s sense of identity and 
being in the world. The accounts of many informal care workers in this regard convey the 
experience of being trapped by love and responsibility in physically and psychologically 
untenable situations.  
As a woman, caring for a child who has a spinal cord injury expresses this: 
I cry at the drop of a hat. I can’t concentrate. I have memory loss. I fall asleep when 
driving. I feel, sometimes, like walking out and not coming back, but I love my 
daughter more than life itself. I don’t want to leave my farm or mix or talk to anyone 
(Carers Australia 2000, p. 27).  
The report reflected on many personal experiences including one woman’s experience, caring 
for her son, who has an intellectual disability: 
…twenty-four hour care of my son causes the fatigue and stress due to his many 
health problems, which I have been told has jeopardised my immune system. Constant 
lifting has caused the increase in back pain and strains (Carers Australia 2000, p.19).   
 
 
Some carers describe this as a lifelong sentence. As a 42 year old mother of a child with 
Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome observed:  
…. every mother understands that they must care for their very dependent newborn 
baby, but do you know what it is like to have a baby that remains very similar to a 
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9.3 The combined impact of physical and emotional labour on the long term 
mental and physical health of care providers themselves. 
In Chapter 4, we noted the significant correlation between primary care giving and reports of 
poor physical and mental health by carers themselves. The intensity and duration of these 
effects is indicated in the results of the (2000) Carers Association of Australia survey, 
Warning – Caring is a Health Hazard. Most of the respondents to this survey indicated that 
their long term health had deteriorated as they continued to be engaged in care work and 
indentified this development as a direct result of caring (Fisher and Briggs 2000).  
The respondent carers specified the chief negative physical impacts of informal care work as 
tiredness or exhaustion, disturbed or lost sleep, upper body problems, high blood pressure and 
other heart problems, as well as arthritis. Respondents also identified certain demanding and 
difficult tasks, for example, moving the person needing care. The report also emphasised the 
degree and frequency of physical injuries to carers. At least a third of all carers had been 
injured at least once in the course of their caring responsibilities and most of these did not 
recover from injury due to the continuing demands of their caring work. Moreover, nearly 
one third of those reporting poor health indicated they had not addressed their problems or 
had delayed seeking help due to the demands of their role as a carer.  
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The survey noted that the negative impact of caring on the carer’s health was particularly 
pronounced for those caring for children with disabilities. As an example, a women caring for 
her son who has an intellectual disability observed that:  
…twenty-four hour care of my son causes the fatigue and stress due to his many 
health problems, which I have been told has jeopardised my immune system. Constant 
lifting has caused the increase in back pain and strains (Carers Australia 2000, p.19).   
Another woman in her thirties, also caring for an intellectually disabled child,  notes that:  
I use to be a fit, motivated and energetic young mum – now I can barely drag myself 
around some days. The combination of lack of sleep, worry and anxiety drains energy 
(Carers Australia 2000 p.20).  
Carer’s “burnout” is a recent term used to describe a state of exhaustion, both physical and 
emotional, brought on by prolonged stress when caring for others. Moreover, as noted, it is 
not only carers, but also other members of their family who experience an unusually high 
level of mental and physical health problems (Schaufeli & Buunk 1996).  
 
 
9.4  Compounding causes and effects: time impacts, carer’s mental and 
physical health, and social and family engagement.   
As discussed in Chapter 4, the 2006 Families Living with People with a Disability Survey 
highlighted the significant correlation between caring, family problems and low levels of face 
to face social engagement (Edwards et al 2008). As noted, often there is little time and energy 
left for other activities and relationships. Consequently, many informal carers become 
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isolated and marginalised. Recreation and other leisure activities become luxuries, stress 
levels are high, and many informal care-givers consequently suffer from depression (Edwards 
et al 2008; Mintz 2008). 
In Chapter 4 we saw also that the impacts of caring are particularly intensified for those 
caring for multiple recipients (Edwards et al 2008). As noted, most of these are “sandwich 
generation” females caring for a parent and children, or mothers of multiple children caring 
for a child with a disability. As we saw, many of these parents reported significant adverse 
impacts on the siblings of the care recipient. These adverse effects of multiple caring on 
family cohesion are to some extent reflected in the relatively high percentage of carers who 
are lone mothers (Wilkins 2014). In some cases partners and other family members cannot 
accept or cope with changing living arrangements attendant upon caring for a newly widowed 
parent or partner’s parent. As one single mother recounts;  
My husband made it quite clear that he wanted nothing to do with looking after Mum. 
She was very frail, and suffering badly from arthritis. She tried to live by herself but she 
could not manage. After some years of abuse, my marriage ended and on 1 June 1972, I 
came to live with Mum and to look after her, bringing my son with me, as my husband 
had already met someone else. Looking back to the start of those 31 years, I wonder, 
had I known what was in store for me as a carer, would I have had the courage to take 
on the task? I don’t know, I honestly don’t know (Carers Victoria 2003, p.139).  
  
 
9.5  The compounding impact of ethnicity and migrant status on carer’s 
health, family cohesion, and social engagement  
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The complex interplay of cultural, social, physical and emotional factors impacting on female 
primary carers may include also their migrant status and country of birth. The latter is 
significant considering that in Australia, immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds 
(NESB) are disproportionately represented in the population of female primary carers 
(Wilkins 2014). In this regard firsthand accounts reveal that, for many NESB carers, the 
sense of marginalisation and isolation often attendant upon caring is exacerbated by language 
difficulties, geographic separation from extended family, and cultural isolation. As a carer 
attending an Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre (EDAC) workshop observed:  
I am Vietnamese, far from my homeland. For me now the days and circumstances are 
foreign, I alone must care for my lifelong partner. Our children earn their living the 
hard way. There are no relatives, no neighbors here for us. Many times, difficulties 
arise from language barriers (Ethnic Disability Advocacy Centre 2008, p.1). 
  
 
9.6  Interacting and compounding causes and effects; health, time, family, 
social contact, employment and financial outcomes. 
 
From the surveys and individual experiences considered, it is clear that the health and time 
impacts of informal caring responsibilities affords only intermittent participation in paid 
work. Moreover, it appears that when a person is continually worn down with caring 
responsibilities, long term future prospects of undertaking paid work are also significantly 
curtailed. Here it is pertinent to note that a Carer’s Payment in some circumstances amounts 
to a very low rate of remuneration considering the intensity and hours expended. As one carer 




My carer payment is a joke. I am on call 24/7 and my hourly rate is something like 0.2 
cents. Paid carers (agency) who sleep over are paid $30.07 an hour plus additional 
hourly costs for wake ups!... I’m paid just over $200 a fortnight. You do the maths. 
Why is one type of carer regarded as an expert and paid accordingly, and the unpaid 
carer is viewed as a loser and remunerated as such. This is why self-esteem is 
progressively ground down (Holland 2007, p.6). 
 
As noted in Chapter 4 in Australia the financial impacts of caring are reflected in carer’s 
households figuring disproportionately in the lowest two quintiles of mean equivalised 
household incomes. These statistics, somewhat warrant one carer’s observation that “sickness 
and poverty go together” (Carers Victoria 2004, p.85). 
 
The particular financial strains of caring for multiple recipients are illustrated by women’s 
account of raising four children while caring for a husband with schizophrenia. This case 
starkly illustrates such financial strains in the absence of albeit meager welfare payments. In 
this carer’s words;  
I have been a carer for 44 years, when my husband was diagnosed with 
Schizophrenia... It was a very big battle for us when he came home from hospital as 
he wasn’t well enough to return to work for 8 months. We had 4 children, ranging 
from 4 years to 14 years, and I was unable to go to work as I had Jim and the 
children to look after. With no help from the government, how lucky we were to 
survive, we had such a good family and friends, who helped us out with food and 




Also noted in chapter 4, the financial costs to financial households in terms of lost and 
forgone employment are often compounded by the costs of specialist treatment. Considering 
that carers are less likely to reside in major urban centres (Wilkins 2014), the travelling and 
accommodation costs associated with recipient’s treatment at specialist institutions should be 
included as part of the costs of medical treatment. The impact of these care specific costs on 
the budget and time of already strained families is conveyed in the following observations of 
a woman caring for a child diagnosed with a disability from birth.  
 
[“Son’s name”]….is severely affected intellectually, unable to speak, incontinent, has 
complex medical problems and is physically challenged in his everyday life. He 
recently had his twentieth operation at the Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne, 
with no doubt many more to go. Every operation occurs at RCH, without any choice, 
due to his complexities. This specialised facility is 175 kilometres from our home in 
XXXXX, Victoria (Carers Victoria 2004, p.33). 
 
Moreover in considering the cost of specialist equipment and other aids, several carers have 
highlighted the inability of financially strained supportive agencies to adequately subsidise 
the range of care recipients’ needs. Thus one mother of a child with a disability recollects 
being refused financial assistance in purchasing expensive much needed exercise equipment 
by a welfare agency (Carers Victoria 2004).    
These descriptive accounts illustrate the various ways in which emotional, physical, social, 
cultural, geographical and economic variables interact to produce compounding effects. The 
sheer complexity and intensity of this process, is itself likely to prolong the impacts. As such 
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these impacts may be experienced even in periods when care is not being directly provided. 
As a mother of an adult son with schizophrenia recollects:  
As parents, my husband and I often rode?? the roller coaster of mood swings with our 
son. His ride usually finished before ours did.  We seemed to take a longer time to 
recover from a major upset” (Carers Victoria 2004, p.23).    
As noted earlier in the thesis it is most likely complexity of causes and effects that underlies 
the temporally asymmetric impacts on carers highlighted in the longitudinal panel data for 
other nations (Bittman et al 2007).  In the context of assessing the impacts of caring on 
carer’s retirement incomes, the temporally asymmetric effects on employment and earnings 
are of particular interest. In this regard the accounts of carers offer valuable insights into the 
various ways in which the employment and income effects of caring are felt well after the 
provision of care has ceased.  
 
9.7  Temporal asymmetric effects: Long-term impacts of caring on post-
caring labour market participation. 
The temporal asymmetrical adverse effects on carer’s labour market participation may be 
firstly inferred from the significant correlation of providing care and enduring poor health (as 
discussed in Chapter 4). In some cases the prolonged health effects of caring may prevent or 
discourage individuals from training or seeking employment for some time after the provision 
of care has ceased. In other cases poor health may have lead to early retirement either during, 
or after the provision of care. The latter is illustrated by the case of a woman who cared for a 
year for her child with a disability and her mother with Alzheimers disease. As she relates, 
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the health effects of this relatively contained episode of “sandwich caring” had culminated in 
a desire to retire prematurely from paid work. In her words:  
What has been very significant for me is that over the last year or two I have aged like 
ten years and I feel exhausted and shattered and work is positive and is something 
that keeps me going but I think, you know, if I can retire at fifty five I will (Arskey et al 
2005, p.76). 
 
The temporally asymmetric effects of caring on carer’s labour market participation and 
earnings may alternatively, or additionally be explained by the fact that carers may find it 
difficult to regain their previously secure and well paid positions after a period outside the 
labour force. This is illustrated by the case of a woman who was denied leave without pay to 
care for her dying father and consequentially resigned from her position as a full time teacher. 
After her father's death later that year she found it difficult to regain full employment and 
consequently accepted an insecure and lower paid position as a relief teacher. (Here it might 
be noted that the employer’s treatment of this women would be regarded as discriminatory 
under the family obligations section of the Equal Opportunity Act (Women's Electoral Lobby 
(WA) 2004, p.16). 
A third explanation relates to forgone opportunities to undergo adult education or further 
training. As noted in chapter 4, working age carers are less likely than their non-carer 
counterparts to hold a Bachelors degree. However the time and effort expended in providing 
care are likely to discourage carers from taking up the opportunities for adult education 
available to many in the population. This type of asymmetric effect is illustrated in the open 
letter of a mother to her own (by then) deceased parent. She recollects: 
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The time came for you to sell your home and move into mine. I quit university forgot 
my career plans and became your carer. We both had yet to learn love’s lessons…. I 
selfishly wanted your life to match the pace of mine (Carers Victoria 2004, p.1).  
The temporally asymmetric effects of caring on carer’s labour market participation may 
additionally be explained in terms of the actual and perceived differences between what one 
carer calls “normal” and a “new kind of normal” (Carers Victoria 2004). In this regard, the 
relatively prolonged effects of caring on employment may also be connected to the social and 
cultural isolation that many carers experience during extended periods of care. As the lifelong 
carer of a partner with schizophrenia observed (after his death) ‘After twenty years of caring 
ends it leaves a large gap in your life –giving 180% after so many years makes it difficult to 
understand what a normal life is’ (Carers Victoria 2004, p.47). However perhaps a positive 
effect of this prolonged focus is that a noticeable proportion of carers seem to seek or find 
employment in the formal care sector after their informal caring has ceased. Others become 
actively involved in voluntary work in the community (as variously reported in Carers 
Victoria 2004).   
Notwithstanding this, the death of their child, partner, or parent may rob the carer of purpose 
towards which he or she has expended tremendous energy, discipline, and spirit. Thus, some 
carers note the complexity of the grief associated with the death of their child, partner, or 
parent.  As a parent of a child with a disability related after her daughter’s death: ‘The loss of 
a child is not something that you get over, you just learn to live with it. When a child with a 
disability dies the grieving process is even more complex’ (Carers Victoria 2004, p.132). The 
complexity of effects may here include the many recorded instances of inordinate grief, and 
prolonged grief and guilt related to being out of the room at the moment that a parent or 
225 
 
partner has died (Carers Victoria 2004). These effects may to some extent explain some 
carer’s inability or reluctance to resume full time work upon the death of the care recipient. 
 
Finally, the asymmetric effects of caring on carers labour market participation, may be 
related to the need to “live from day to day” in order to cope with what are often intense 
caring situations.  As one carer expresses this necessity:  
We learn to appreciate the little things in life and survival strategies become a way of 
life. Coping mechanisms come into play, for example, to live only one day at a time 
and then, if you can’t do that, then half a day (Carers Victoria 2004, p.131).  
In such circumstances, it may be difficult to even imagine planning for future employment 
and training. It would therefore take some time to adjust once the provision of care has 
ceased.  
The firsthand accounts to some extent explain and illustrate the pronounced temporally 
asymmetric effects of caring on carer’s labour market participation, as recorded in 
international longitudinal panel data. As we’ve noted, such temporal asymmetry is also likely 
to experienced by carers in Australia given the compounding impacts of caring and the 
consequent intensity and complexity of its effects.  
 
 
9.8 Conclusions: Compounding effects and temporal asymmetries:  
implications for estimating carer’s life-course earnings and financial 




In the context of this thesis, the likely temporally asymmetric effects of caring on carer’s 
labour market participation, suggests that life course earnings and lump sum superannuation 
estimates based on cross sectional data may tend to understate the extent to which carers and 
their families are disadvantaged under employment and income-based retirement income 
schemes. This is likely since earnings and superannuation balance scenarios must for rely on 
estimated “average” durations of care required for typical caring situations. With the absence 
of relevant longitudinal data the “average aftermath” of even one type of care provision could 
not be conceivably estimated with any certainty. 
Given the absence of relevant longitudinal data for Australia, more secure conclusions would 
require surveys specifically related to establishing the pattern of carers life course activities. 
The results of such surveys should themselves be treated cautiously relying, as they would, 
on recollections of many decades. Such research could itself be cross-referenced with 
conclusions from cross-sectional data and by in depth interviews. However given the focus of 
this thesis on drawing general conclusions for policy, this qualitative research would be a 








CHAPTER 10   CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter provides summative conclusions about the problematic nature of the present 
Australian superannuation scheme as a mechanism for effectively delivering accumulations 
of capital for self-funding retirement by Australian carers. It then tentatively reflects on the 
policy implications flowing from the findings of the thesis. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
addressing the limitations of the present study and suggesting some paths forward for future 
research in the area of self-funded retirement. 
 
10:1 Summative conclusions  
From the scenarios developed in this study we may conclude that, as it stands, Australia’s 
current superannuation system is unlikely to meet the financial needs in retirement of most of 
the population, regardless of whether these needs are defined in terms of a “comfortable” 
lifestyle, a “modest” lifestyle, or the amount of the Age Pension. In Chapter 7, we saw that 
70% of males and females in continuous full-time work – which is the proportion of workers 
earning below the AWOTE – are unlikely to accumulate sufficient balances on retirement, 
even granted a relatively favourable rate of return. We saw that the current system is adequate 
only for those earning well above the average wage and also full-time male AWOTE earners 
assuming a favourable rate of return. Here it must be noted that the full-time worker scenarios 
assumed a continuous full-time working life of 45 years, so taking the Commonwealth 
Treasury’s estimated average full-time working life of 35 years would engender still starker 
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conclusions. Thus, it appears that the current system is unlikely to support what may be 
regarded as the “typical” retiree.  
The scenarios developed in Chapter 7 also showed that, given the gender gap in wages and 
the greater tendency of women to work intermittently and part-time, women are particularly 
disadvantaged under the current system. In this chapter, we saw that at all income levels, 
women are unlikely to accumulate sufficient balances, and that mothers who leave the 
workforce to bear and raise children are particularly at risk. The results for these part-time 
and intermittent worker scenarios highlight the significance of the timing of contributions for 
superannuation balances on retirement. As such, these results are not only concerning 
because they suggest a systemic gender bias. They are also of concern given the increasing 
trend towards part-time and casual employment in Australia over the past three decades.  
While the full-time and part-time worker scenarios in Chapter 7 were presented merely as 
points of reference, they nonetheless support the conclusions of many earlier studies 
indicating that Australia’s SGC system is unlikely to result in adequate superannuation 
balances, particularly for women. As noted in Chapters 2 and 3, an assessment of the current 
system must consider that females are likely to have greater financial needs in retirement than 
males. Supporting a range of previous findings, the conclusions of Chapter 7 (and 8) enhance 
this literature by examining a range of scenarios that incorporated modifications to crucial 
parameters: a range of likely superannuation balances were generated by varying the 
estimates of financial “needs” in retirement; by varying the income levels (total earning, 
AWOTE, and median and mean of AWOTE); by varying the employment regimes (full-time 
and part-time); and by using both favourable and more modest rates of return (7 and 4.27 per 
cent per annum). 
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While the scenarios developed in Chapter 7 indicated the likely inadequacy of Australia’s 
current system with regards to the financial needs in retirement of most individuals, the 
results in Chapter 8 highlighted the likely adverse impacts on primary carers. The thesis has 
focused on female primary carers in particular because they constitute approximately 70 per 
cent of working aged primary carers. As noted, male primary carers are predominantly 
represented in the age cohort of seventy years and above and those in the working age cohort 
are more likely than females to fit caring around their paid working lives. This suggests that 
the provision of primary care by males is likely to have fewer impacts on these individuals’ 
retirement incomes, relative to their female counterparts. 
The estimates of female carers’ retirement incomes suggest massive financial disadvantages 
to those providing care in the relatively early years of their adult life, and that those needing 
to withdraw from the paid labour force to care for recipients with long term and chronic 
conditions or disabilities are most at risk of being marginalised under the current SGC. As 
noted, the adequacy of superannuation balances should also here be assessed in the light of 
the likely additional expenses incurred by carers’ households and the increased chances that 
carers themselves may require additional care in retirement.  
  
In focusing on carers of elders, including women simultaneously, or sequentially caring for 
children without disabilities and parents, the results in Chapter 8 enhance conclusions in the 
existing literature regarding likely financial outcomes for mothers caring for a child with a 
disability from birth, and mid-age women caring for their partners. As noted, although most 
mothers are financially disadvantaged by virtue of working intermittently, mothers caring for 
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a child with a disability are more likely to be absent from the paid labour force for extended 
periods – in some cases, for the remainder of their lives.  
In Chapter 8, we were afforded the additional insight that women of the “sandwich 
generation” who simultaneously or sequentially raise children and care for elders are 
similarly “punished” under the current regime. As we saw, the individuals represented by 
these scenarios are likely to have little more retirement income than mothers caring for a 
child with a disability from birth. In assessing the sustainability of Australia’s current SGC 
and the associated prediction that it will address the financial impacts of an ageing 
population, we should not overlook the functional significance of the “sandwich generation”. 
In this regard, it would seem that claims about the viability of the present system overlook the 
effective subsidisation of the social costs of elder care by unpaid “sandwich” carers. Given 
the substantial health, employment and financial impacts to providing informal care, the 
continuity of this subsidisation by carers cannot be assumed. To express this colloquially, if 
Australia’s current SGC is to meet the future needs of an ageing population, it would seem 
that “something has to give”.  
Functional analysis aside, the ethical implications of extreme elder poverty and ill-health 
arising from the provision of unpaid care for a generation of elderly people deserves some 
consideration. In this respect, the retirement income estimates for the range of female primary 
carers in Chapter 8 are particularly poignant instances of the consequence of gender 
stereotyping and the presupposed (but not acknowledged) exploitation of women’s “hidden” 
labour in contemporary industrial societies. As noted in Chapter 3, women’s domestic labour 
is crucial for the reproduction of market societies and economies. The fact that this labour is 
unpaid amounts to expropriation – a notion going back to Dalla Costa and James (1975). In 
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the context of a civilised society that constitutively cares for its members with a disability, for 
its elders and for the ill, the provision of informal primary care is equally an expropriation of 
women’s labour, with particularly dire consequences for such carers when they “retire”.  
Finally, in estimating financial outcomes for female carers in retirement under Australia’s 
current SGC, we must take account of the likely pronounced temporal asymmetry of effects. 
As discussed in Chapter 9, international longitudinal panel data suggests that the impacts of 
caring are likely to endure well beyond the period in which care is being provided. Drawing 
on case histories and qualitative accounts, we saw that this temporal asymmetry most likely 
arises from the complex interplay of multiple variables, giving rise to a complexity of effects. 
In the context of this thesis, the significant conclusion is that scenarios based on cross-
sectional data are likely to have underestimated the financial impacts of caring on carers, 
given the need to estimate labour force engagement in terms of discrete periods of care 
provision. (This will be discussed when considering the limitations of the thesis and in 
making suggestions for further research.)  
10:2 Policy implications 
Researchers and policy makers have responded to the perceived and predicted inadequacy of 
Australia’s current retirement income system with a range of policy reform suggestions. In 
this section we shall briefly assess the likely capacity of such reforms to address the 
retirement income problems faced by female primary carers. Here we may distinguish 
between three categories of suggestions. The first group largely accepts the status quo. This 
group sees no problem with the current system itself, or at least assumes that it is unlikely to 
be modified in any way. As we shall see, this group tends to advocate adjustments in 
individuals’ behaviour or public education campaigns as a way of alleviating problems rather 
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than changes to the system itself. A second group are reformists who accept the framework of 
the three-pillared system, in principle, but advocate certain adjustments be made to its 
operation, or some of its regulatory features in order to meet to the needs of groups currently 
or likely to be disadvantaged. And third, there are what may be regarded as radicals who 
believe that the entire superannuation system is inherently inefficient and inequitable. This 
final group tend to advocate replacement of the system altogether, rather than merely 
“tinkering” with it. Here it is interesting to note that policy suggestions by all of these groups 
tend to make tacit assumptions about the viability and equity of Australia’s socio-economic 
structure generally. In this regard, it would seem that an assessment of the SGC cannot be 
extricated from more far-reaching questions regarding patriarchy, inequality and exploitation 
in contemporary industrial societies.  
 
10:2.1 Policy suggestions focused on altering behaviour rather than modifying the 
system itself.  
Financial literacy and financial planning skills 
Some of those advocating improved financial literacy (particularly for women) acknowledge 
that there are problems with Australia’s current system but nonetheless believe that effective 
remedial action would require long term and far reaching changes in the structure of 
Australian society itself. Since such socio-political changes are usually deemed to be beyond 
the ken of these advocates, they tend to see the current SGC, including its current regulations 
as “given”. As an example, several researchers accept that in the context of patriarchal 
societies, employment and income based systems of funding retirement are inherently gender 
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biased. However, these authors believe that, given the time needed to address these 
underlying social issues, it would be expedient for women at present to (variously) improve 
their financial literacy (Clitheroe 2008), become more attuned to financial planning, 
strengthen family ties (Ross 1994) and increase their representation on the boards of 
superannuation institutions (Olsberg 2004). 
Although it is seemingly reasonable for those unwilling or unable to engage in broader 
political action, there is a body of literature which undermines the above modest suggestions 
by arguing that women are not financially less literate and less willing to plan their finances 
per se (Schubert et al 1999; Hamacher 2001; Jefferson’s (2003) qualitative research of 
Australian women’s attitudes and behaviours to finance instead suggests that they are 
intimately connected to patriarchal household divisions of labour and associated gender 
conceptions of “work” and retirement. The upshot of such a finding is that ostensibly 
expedient measures to remedy superannuation problems for women, such as more education 
about financial and accounting matters, are themselves dependant on changes in underlying 
social, cultural and economic trends.  
In fact, even if such behaviour modification measures (such as improved financial literacy) 
were separable from the problems of patriarchy, such changes would not substantially 
address the retirement income concerns of carers given Australia’s current system. This is 
because the system does not facilitate mandatory contributions for a range of low paid and 
intermittent workers and for those not engaged in the paid labour force, as discussed in 
Chapters 1 and 2. Considering the widely documented significant negative correlation 
between labour force participation and being a female primary carer, it would seem that no 
234 
 
amount of financial literacy and financial planning seminars will address this entirely 
different labour market problem.  
 
10:2.2 Encouraging mothers and female carers to gain employment 
This kind of policy basically seeks to tackle the shortfall in women’s superannuation 
accumulations by encouraging continual contributions to the SGC scheme – i.e. life-long 
employment with as few “gaps” in paid work as possible. This approach has been 
recommended (among others) by various state and federal Carer Advocacy groups and has in 
some instances been associated with facilitative government programs. The Carers 
Victoria/Victorian Government “Ways to Work” initiative is one example (Carers Victoria 
2010). Advocates such as Carers Victoria (2014) are particularly responsive to the many 
surveyed working age carers indicating that they would like to engage in paid work – if only 
to “take a break” from their perceived caring duties (Edwards et al 2008; ABS 2008; 2012). 
In this regard, surveyed carers and advocacy groups have focused on increasing government 
funding for respite care and other support services (Salin, S., Kaunonen, M., & Astedt-Kurki, 
P. 2009). These suggestions are both evidence-based and targeted. Moreover, they are 
designed to address the needs of carers across a whole range of dimensions including 
employment, income, social contact and mental health. This range of suggestions could 
plausibly be expanded to include extending paid maternity leave, subsidising childcare, and 
raising parenting and carer allowances to the level of the minimum wage (Olsberg 2002; 
Charlesworth 2007; Boyd W 2012).   
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However, in the context of assessing the capacity of Australia’s SGC to meet carer’s needs in 
retirement, the assumptions underlying these suggestions do not substantially differ from 
those underlying calls for enhanced financial literacy and planning skills. That is to say, 
focusing on increasing the labour force participation of carers effectively takes the inequities 
inherent in the SGC as given, especially as it relates to the gender wage gap which, as the 
estimations in Chapter 7 showed, ensured that women who did work continuously full-time 
for their entire working lives would still not necessarily accumulate sufficient capital to self-
fund their retirement. Further, such policy suggestions tacitly assume that it is realistic to 
expect timely, broad-sweeping increases in the public funding of institutionalised (respite) 
care, childcare, parenting payments and other welfare programs. In general terms, this is 
problematic, given that the progressive deinstitutionalisation of care has been associated with 
reduced welfare spending under neo-liberal regimes (as noted in Chapter 1). Indeed, there is 
some element of circular reasoning in advocating what is effectively increased public 
spending on elder care while implicitly accepting the architecture of a system designed to 
relieve fiscal pressures to meet the challenges of an ageing population.  
10:2.3 Policy suggestions focused on modifications to Australia’s three-pillared 
system  
Increasing the rate of mandatory contributions 
As discussed in Chapter 2, architects of the present system and other key supporters of the 
scheme have advocated an increase in the rate of mandatory employer contributions variously 
from 12% up to 18%. To some extent, this is being implemented in recent government policy, 
although the fate of these reforms under the present political regime is uncertain. Although 
this policy may go some way towards addressing likely shortfalls for average income earners, 
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it does not in itself address the inherent inequities of the present system. Rather, it perpetuates 
an arrangement where higher income earners are likely to have greater balances on 
retirement, while arguably, the greater value of their assets and other investments would 
suggest relatively less “need” for such balances. More significantly, raising the rate of 
mandatory contributions does nothing do address the inherent gender bias in the system 
arising from the gender wage gap and the gender division of carer labour. In this respect, such 
policy “tinkering” will do little to address the retirement income needs of female carers and 
other groups of women.  
A variation on the above policy suggestion is the recommendation that women in particular 
should be subject to higher mandatory contributions, especially in the early stages of their 
working lives. This measure has been advocated by researchers including Basu and Drew 
(2009). It ostensibly focuses on the significant impact that the life-course timing of payments 
can have on final preservation age accumulations, as the central mechanism via which to 
close the gender gap in superannuation. By virtue of women facing earlier, higher rates of 
mandatory contribution, this will (to a degree) compensate for women making fewer 
contributions later in their lives due to their intermittent labour force engagement arising out 
of motherhood and informal caring activities. Considering the existing gender wage gap, it 
does not seem tenable on equity grounds to treat this as a case of compulsory salary-
sacrificing for women only given that it would prima facie increase the gender gap in terms 
of immediate disposable income. As such, this recommendation would have to amount to a 
default increase in women’s gross income (disposable income could, say, remain unchanged). 
In terms of efficiency and equity, this approach tacitly relies on predicting the timing of life-
course events and also being able to distinguish in any given year between those women who 
will leave the workforce to raise children or provide primary care, and those who will remain 
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in full-time continuous paid work. Applied in a blanket fashion this policy would effectively 
subsidise those women who remain in full-time continuous work. Although many in this 
cohort are not likely to achieve superannuation balances adequate to their needs in retirement 
anyway (unless the increase in women’s gross income from which mandatory super would be 
drawn is particularly large). But setting women’s mandatory contributions to the same level 
as those who do eventually leave the workforce has significant equity and efficiency 
implications. Most pertinently, it would be difficult to predict in advance which women are 
destined to become primary carers. Given that the nature of caring is highly episodic, basing 
policy on this level of prediction is at best precarious. 
 
10:3 State funded co-contributions for low income and part-time workers, 
including a carer-specific superannuation scheme 
In 2008, then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd,  advocated the implementation of a publicly 
funded superannuation scheme specifically for carers (Karvelas P 2008). 
The latter is more likely to address the episodic nature of carers’ withdrawal from the 
workforce, even if it does not address the temporally asymmetric effects of providing care. 
Moreover, such a scheme can effectively address the retirement income needs of one carer 
group significantly disadvantaged under the current system. These are mothers who leave the 
workforce to provide care over their life-course to a child born with a disability. However in 
itself a carer-specific superannuation scheme will not effectively address the retirement 
income needs of the sequentially caring “sandwich generation”. This is because the 
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retirement income of this group is also likely to be affected by their earlier child-raising 
activities.  
In this regard, a carer-specific superannuation scheme should be considered in the context of 
a scheme addressing the range of groups particularly marginalised and disadvantaged by the 
current system. Taking the body of research on the impacts of Australia’s current SGC, the 
groups requiring subsidised contributions would include, among others, young people in 
economically depressed regions, mothers, part-time workers, the diverse body of Australia’s 
volunteers and paid charity sector workers, women from non-English speaking backgrounds, 
adult immigrants (whose country of origin has no superannuation scheme), unemployed 
people providing unpaid social labour in “work-for-the dole” schemes and, of course, primary 
carers and care recipients. Once the range and extent of those marginalised under the present 
system is considered, the claimed fiscal benefits of replacing public pensions in general with 
private contributions are somewhat obscured.  
10:4 Supplementing superannuation balances with an increased means-tested 
Age Pension 
Considering its own research indicating a likely shortfall in superannuation for many 
workers, the Commonwealth Treasury’s Retirement Income Modelling Unit has suggested 
continued supplementing of superannuation balances with the Age Pension, as noted in 
Chapter 2. Moreover in this regard Jefferson (2012), Sharp and Austen (2007) and others 
have suggested significantly raising the amount of the Age Pension itself. This suggestion 
goes some way towards addressing the inherent inequities in Australia’s SGC as it currently 
stands. If carried out, this policy suggestion would ensure that those able to afford private 
retirement income schemes are encouraged or required to contribute to these whilst those 
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who are marginalised and disadvantaged under the current system will at least be assured of a 
decent standard of living in retirement.  
However, the sheer number and range of cohorts that will most likely be requiring (some 
degree of) the Age Pension entails that discussion of this issue must be carried out in the 
context of a wider debate about whether Australia does, or is likely to, “overspend” on the 
Age Pension and whether the federal government is likely to face a fiscal crisis as the 
population ages. Here we may note that that Australia’s current public pension spending is 
approximately 3.3 per cent of GDP compared with the OECD average of 7 per cent (OECD 
2013).  
Additionally, the focus in this thesis on the adverse impacts of providing unpaid elder care 
places the official rhetoric about the fiscal efficiency of Australia’s current SGC in their true 
context. A system which achieves cost savings in elder care by indirectly physically, 
emotionally, culturally and financially exhausting the informal carers of elders cannot be 
regarded as either efficient or sustainable. The externalisation of elder care costs on the part 
of government, no more constitutes an economically efficient outcome for society, than a 
factory polluting a downstream water supply, no matter what the “cost savings” to the 
externalising agency. 
10:4.1 Reflection on inequitable retirement outcomes 
Assessing the range of suggested policy reforms indicates that questions of equity and 
adequacy in retirement are inextricably linked to questions of social justice generally. This is 
partly because the highest income earners appear to benefit most from employment and 
income-based schemes. These groups benefit by having higher rates of mandatory 
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contributions, by being able to afford additional voluntary contributions, and by effectively 
receiving public subsidies for making these voluntary contributions. Here the more 
inequitable the social distribution of income, the more inequitable are the financial outcomes 
in retirement.  
In this regard, we may conclude that the neo-liberal framing of the coming fiscal “crisis” of 
the ageing population has largely abstracted from policy dialogue on the relative merits of 
funding public pensions by reducing superannuation related tax subsidies to high income 
earners and by taxing monopoly rents, land and resource rents, and substantial holdings of 
economically unproductive assets (wealth taxes). The neo-liberal argument that progressive 
taxes act as a disincentive for national production and employment apply, if at all, only to the 
motives of those investing in largely unsubsidised labour intensive production. Progressive 
income taxes and wealth taxes can be finely tuned to target unproductive wealth holders as a 
way of funding decent standards of living in retirement. Here we may conclude that both the 
“crisis” of the ageing population and the claims of Australia’s SGC to effectively address this 
crisis are ultimately creations of a neo-liberal regime of policy makers who seem to be unable 
or unwilling to consider the possibility of arresting the increasing inequality of income and 
asset distribution in Australia.  
Moreover, considering the particularly unfavourable outcomes that informal female carers 
and other groups of women may expect under the current retirement income system, we may 
agree with Jefferson (2009) that effective and long term policy solutions should be based on 




10:5 Limitations to this study and suggestions for future research  
One will be aware of the extent and the range of the assumptions made in this thesis in order 
to calculate estimates of the retirement incomes of female primary carers and those of the 
other worker cohorts with which they have been compared. In constructing the scenarios of 
Chapters 7 and 8, many assumptions have been made about individuals both across the 
population and within cohorts. Some of these assumptions relate to the life-course 
employment and earnings patterns of individuals and include variables such as individuals’ 
workforce entry age, their lifelong salaries and wages, and the extent and patterns of their 
employment during and after raising children and caring for other family members. As 
discussed, many of these assumptions cohere with or match those made in much of the 
existing literature on estimates of superannuation accumulation for selected cohorts. For this 
thesis, as for that literature, it must be noted that the inferences drawn from cross-sectional 
data do not in themselves established causation. In Chapter 9 we saw that a qualitative 
approach revealed that caring what highly episodic and could easily give rise to pronounced 
asymmetry (and complexity) of its effects over carers’ lives. As such, the data-based 
limitations of the quantitative estimations approach can be particularly significant from the 
perspective of carers “at the coalface”.  
Assumptions have also been made about the key parameters of the superannuation system 
itself. These include the assumed stability of each of the rates of return used, the constancy of 
the mandatory contributions rate, the tax rate on contributions and the administration fee rate 
charged by the superfunds. These assumptions in turn assume continuity and stability in 
political administrations, the regulatory structure of key institutions such as the stock 
exchange and legislation and statutory bodies overseeing superfunds, as well as 
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macroeconomic variables. Indeed these continuity and stability assumptions extend over the 
many decades encompassing generations of people. These latter types of assumptions would 
be particularly concerning for critics who would question whether employment and market 
based superannuation regimes are in fact inherently stable (cf. Keen 2013).  
That said, given that this research focused on the impacts of Australia’s retirement income 
regime on a particularly marginalised group in the population, assuming the continuity of 
political and macroeconomic variables should not severely compromise the conclusions about 
the (lack of) equity of the system and the likely (dire) outcomes for female primary carers 
relative to the rest of the population. On the other hand, assumptions about political and 
macroeconomic continuity and stability do affect conclusions relating to the sufficiency of 
retirement income across the population as a whole. In this regard, assuming stability and 
continuity over many decades must be identified as another limitation of this research.  
In considering directions for future inquiry, here it must be noted that the methodological 
problems encountered in this research can be traced to two main sources. Firstly, as discussed 
in Chapters 4 and 5, any attempt to predict very long term trends for Australia is precarious, 
given the absence of relevant longitudinal data. In this regard, the problems presented by the 
relative immaturity of Australia’s SGC are compounded by the fact that longitudinal data 
bases, such as HILDA and those operated by NATSEM, are still relatively new. As noted, it 
is here particularly problematic that questions directly relating to primary carers have been 
included in HILDA only since WAVE 5. Moreover, although NATSEM’s DYNAMOD 
database does reach back to 1985, its application to modelling retirement incomes is at 
present limited by the narrow temporal range of the present SGC regime itself. As a number 
of DYNAMOD technical papers indicate, in the absence of longitudinal data, projections for 
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individuals must ultimately rely on cross-sectional, and other data, to estimate the life-course 
timing and duration of events (Kelly, et al 2001). These problems arising from the absence of 
relevant longitudinal data may, to some extent, diminish in importance as the both the SGC 
and longitudinal data bases for Australia mature. However, here the catch is that timely 
changes to policy are often required well before the full impacts are experienced. Here we 
must recall that Australia’s current system is estimated not to mature (according to the most 
favourable estimations), before approximately 2032.  
In the meantime, valuable insights have been derived from examining the case histories of 
carers and cross-referencing their recollections with what longitudinal data is available on 
carers in other nations. It is in this way that Bittman et al (2007), and Edwards et al (2008), 
were able to contribute valuable insights on the unusual asymmetry and complexity of the 
effects of caring on carers. Given this information, we are to some extent entitled to assume 
that estimates from cross-sectional data most likely understate the financial and retirement 
income impacts of caring on carers, as discussed in Chapter 9.  
Given the absence of relevant longitudinal data, research on this topic in the immediate future 
could fruitfully articulate the (asymmetrical) life-course impacts of caring through surveys 
and interviews establishing the timing of particular sequences in the lives of carers in 
Australia. However, such research is likely to encounter data problems arising from self-
selection and inaccuracies of recollection. These problems could be alleviated, to some 
extent, by cross-references to statistical data on both carers and care recipients. The ethical 































Chapter 1   Age Pension  
Appendix A1:1 
 
a)Age Pension eligibility 
 
The following information in respect to the Age Pension eligibility is from the Department of 
Human Services website.  
 
Males may be eligible for Age Pension if: 
 income and assets are below a certain amount, and  
 the recipient is aged 65 or over.  
Females may be eligible for Age Pension if: 
 income and assets are below a certain amount, and  
 recipients meet the qualifying ages below.  
 
Table A1:1 Qualifying ages for women to receive the age pension  
 
If you were born You qualify for Age Pension at 
before 30 June 1944 63    years 
between 1 July 1944 and 31 December 
1945 
63.5 years 
between 1 January 1946 and 30 June 1947 64    years 
between 1 July 1947 and 31 December 
1948 
64.5 years 
after 1 January 1949 65    years 




b) Age Pension - increased age criteria  
From 1 July 2017, the qualifying age for Age Pension will increase from 65 years to 65 and a 
half years. The qualifying age will then rise by six months every two years, reaching 67 years 




The table below shows the gradual increase in women's qualifying age for Age Pension over 
the period leading up to 1 July 2013, and then the increase in qualifying age for both men and 
women from 1 July 2017. 
 
 
Table A1:2 Age Pension – increased age criteria  - 67 Years 
 
Born 
Women eligible for Age Pension at 
age 
Men eligible for Age Pension 
at age 
Before 1 July 1935 60 65 
Between 1 July 1935 
and 31 December 1936 
60 and a half 65 
Between 1 January 1937 
and 30 June 1938 
61 65 
Between 1 July 1938 
and 31 December 1939 
61 and a half 65 
Between 1 January 1940 
and 30 June 1941 
62 65 
Between 1 July 1941 
and 31 December 1942 
62 and a half 65 
Between 1 January 1943 
and 30 June 1944 
63 65 
Between 1 July 1944 
and 31 December 1945 
63 and a half 65 
Between 1 January 1946 
and 30 June 1947 
64 65 
Between 1 July 1947 
and 31 December 1948 
64 and a half 65 
Between 1 January 1949 
and 30 June 1952 
65 65 
Between 1 July 1952 
and 31 December 1953 
65 and a half 65 and a half 
Between 1 January 1954 
and 30 June 1955 
66 66 
Between 1 July 1955 
and 31 December 1956 
66 and a half 66 and a half 
After 1 January 1957 67 67 
   








c) Residence requirements 
To lodge an Age Pension claim, you must be an Australian resident and in Australia 
on the day that you lodge your claim. 
To qualify as an Australian resident, you must be living in Australia as: 
 an Australian citizen 
 the holder of a permanent resident visa, or 
 a New Zealand citizen who was in Australia on 26 February 2001 or for 12 
months in the two years immediately before that date, or who was assessed 
before 26 February 2004 as 'protected'. 
To be paid the Age Pension, you also need to meet the 10-year qualifying Australian 
residence requirements, unless you: 
 are claiming under an international social-security agreement 
 are a refugee or former refugee 
 were getting Partner Allowance, Widow Allowance or Widow B Pension 
immediately before turning Age Pension age, or 
 are a woman whose partner died while you were both Australian residents and 
you had two years residency immediately before claiming Age Pension. 
Note: The 10-year Australian resident requirement is that you have been an 
Australian resident for a continuous period of at least 10 years, or for a number of 
periods that total more than 10 years, with one of the periods being at least five years  
Source: Department of Human Services 2012  
 
d) Age Pension entitlements - As at March 2014 
Table A1:3  Maximum payment rate for the Age Pension 
 
Single 
$766.00 per fortnight   
 
$19,916.00 per annum 
 
Couple 
$1,154.80 per fortnight   
 
$30,024.80 per annum 
 




Note: The rate of pension and the means test are adjusted every 6 months in line with the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) increases. 
 
 
e) Income and Asset test for pensioners - Effective March 2014 
 
f) Deeming rates 
 if you are single and getting either a pension or allowance, the first $46,600 of your 
financial investments is deemed to earn income at 2% per annum and any amount over 
that is deemed to earn income at 3.5% per annum 
 if you are a member of a couple: 
 if at least 1 of you is getting a pension, the first $77,400  of your and your partner's 
financial investments is deemed to earn income at 2% per annum and any amount over 
that is deemed to earn income at 3.5% per annum, or 
 if neither of you is getting a pension, the first $38,700 for each of your and your share of 
jointly owned financial investments is deemed to earn income at 2% per annum and any 
amount over that is deemed to earn income at 3.5% per annum 
 
 
g) Income Test rate – Age Pensioner 
Table A1:4  Rates under the income test  
Single person   
Fortnightly income up to $156 over $156 
Reduction in payment none – full payment 50 cents for each 
dollar over $156 
Couple combined   
Fortnightly income up to $276 over $276 
Reduction in payment none – full payment 50 cents for each 
dollar over $276 
(combined) 




h)Asset Test Assets test limits for allowances and full pensions 
Table A1:5  Rates under the income test  
Single person   
Family situation 
For homeowners 





assets must be 
less than 
Single $196,750 $339,250 




*Income above the lower threshold reduces your rate of pension by 50 cents in the dollar. 



















Life expectancy comparison  
  Table A1:6  Life expectancy estimates (years) for selected countries - sex  
Top 15 
Country Male Country Female 
Iceland 80 Japan 86 
Japan 79 Hong Kong SAR 85 
Hong Kong SAR 79 Australia 84 
Australia 79 Switzerland 84 
Switzerland 79 Spain 84 
Sweden 79 France 84 
Israel 79 San Marino 84 
Macao SAR 79 Iceland 83 
Spain 78 Israel 83 
Canada 78 Macao SAR 83 
Norway 78 Sweden 83 
Italy 78 Canada 83 
New Zealand 78 Italy 83 
Singapore 78 Norway 83 
Netherlands 78 Austria 83 
   Source: Australian Institute of Health and Welfare 2010  
 
 
Table A1:7  Life Expectancy defined by gender   
 





















           
 Years Years Years Years Years Years Years Years Years Years 
           
Males 77.4 77.8 78.1 78.5 78.7 79.0 79.2 79.3 79.5 79.7 
           
Females 82.6 82.8 83.0 83.3 83.5 83.7 83.7 83.9 84.0 84.2 
           







Superannuation Contributions    
 
Table A1:8  Proposed Increase of Mandatory Contribution under a Labor Government  
 
Date Contribution 
Rate    % 
Date Contribution 
Rate    % 
Previous 9.00 July  2016 10.5 
July 2013 9.25 July  2017 11.00 
July 2014 9.50 July  2018 11.50 
July 2015 10.00 July 2019 12.00 
    
  Source: Australian Unions Fact Sheet 
 
 
Table A1:9 Proposed Increase of Mandatory Contribution under a Liberal Government  
Date Contribution 
Rate    % 
Date Contribution 
Rate    % 
Previous 9.00 July  2018 9.50 
July 2013 9.00 July 2019 10.00 
July 2014 9.25 July 2020 10.50 
July 2015 9.50 July 2021 11.00 
July  2016 9.50 July 2022 11.50 
July  2017 9.50 July 2023 12.00 
    
Super Guide, Trish Power June 2014  
 
Table A1:10 Summary of Mandatory Contribution since 1992  
Date Contribution 
Rate    % 
Date Contribution 
Rate    % 
1992-1994 3.00 2000-2002 8.00 
1994-1995  4.00 2002-2013 9.25 
1995-1996 5.00 2013-2014 9.50 
1996-1998 6.00 2014-Present  9.50 
1998-2000 7.00   






Chapter 2  Divorce  
Appendix A2:1     Divorce rates  
Table A2:1 Rates of Divorce in 2012, there were 49,917 divorces granted in Australia 
                  (increase of 982 (2.0%) compared to 2011)  
 
A2:1 Total divorces granted, Australia, 1992–2012 
 







Table A2:2  Age-gender specific divorce rates – Australia   





















1.0 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
25–29 8.6 5.5 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 3.9 
30–34 12.7 11.5 7.9 7.9 7.7 7.3 7.4 
35–39 13.1 13.1 9.9 10.1 10.2 9.3 9.4 
40–44 11.8 13.2 10.3 10.5 10.7 10.3 10.4 
45–49 10.2 12.1 9.7 10.2 10.5 9.8 10.0 
50–54 7.6 9.5 8.6 9.0 8.9 8.8 8.9 
55–59 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.6 
60–64 3.0 4.2 4.4 4.6 4.6 4.4 4.7 
65 and 
over 
1.1 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.7 
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Females         
24 and 
under 
2.4 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 
25–29 12.5 8.9 6.2 6.1 6.1 6.0 6.1 
30–34 13.3 13.7 9.5 9.5 9.2 8.7 8.8 
30–34 13.3 13.7 9.5 9.5 9.2 8.7 8.8 
35–39 12.5 13.6 10.6 10.8 11 10.1 10.3 
40–44 10.8 12.7 10.4 10.7 10.9 10.5 10.7 
45–49 8.6 10.4 9.1 9.8 9.8 9.5 9.5 
50–54 5.5 7.3 7.2 7.3 7.3 7.2 7.5 
55–59 2.9 4.6 4.6 4.9 4.8 4.6 4.9 
60–64 1.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 
65 and 
over 
0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 
(a) Number of divorces per 1,000 estimated resident population at 30 June for each reference 
year respectively. 
 






































Table A3:1 Gender Pay Gap 
 
 






Table A3:2   Industry workforce composition  
 
 







Table A3:3 Risk of poverty by age 
 
 
Source: Australian Council of Social Services 2012  Poverty in Australia: ACOSS  



























Table A3:4   Gender pay gap by industry November 2012-November 2013  
 
 










Table A4:1  Carers by Age Group – 2005-2011 
 
 


















Table A4:2 Whom carers provide care for, by age and sex of carers  
(percentage of carers) 
 
 Source: Productive Ageing Centre 2013 
 
Table A4:3  Hours spent per week providing care, by age and sex of carers 
 
     Source: Productive Ageing Centre 2013 
 
Table A4:4  How often carer’s social activity with friends or family is  
                      limited by their caring responsibilities  
 




A4:5 Carers - Reasons For Taking On A Carer Role 
 
 























Chapter  5  Method and methodology  
 
Appendix A5:1   
AWOTE – Calculation  
The following is a descriptive account of the Average Weekly Ordinary Times Earnings 
(AWOTE) calculation from the ABS website. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 
provides the Average Weekly Ordinary Times Earnings (AWOTE) indicating the amount of 
remuneration received by Australians. They arrive at these statistics by first, surveying 
businesses selected from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS)  Business Register. This 
register is primarily based on registrations to the Australian Taxation Office's (ATO) Pay As 
You Go Withholding (PAYGW) scheme. The survey is conducted quarterly to allow for any 
changes.  The survey assesses the Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) for Australian 
employees broadly this encompasses current and regular payments in cash to employees for 
work done. The survey considers full-time employees who normally work the agreed or 
award hours for a full-time employee in their occupation. If agreed or award hours do not 
apply, employees are regarded as full-time if they ordinarily work 35 hours or more per 
week. The quarterly Survey of Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) produces estimates of 
average gross weekly earnings associated with employee’s who are employed in Australia, at 
a point in time. Although wage and salary earners who received pay for the reference period 
are represented in the Survey of Average Weekly Earnings (AWE), there are a number of 
exceptions:  
 members of the Australian permanent defence forces  
 employees of enterprises primarily engaged in agriculture, forestry  
 and fishing  
 employees of private households  
 employees of overseas embassies, consulates, etc.  
 employees based outside Australia and  
 employees on workers' compensation who are not paid through 
 the payroll. 
 
Also excluded are the following persons who are not regarded as employees for the purposes 




 casual employees who did not receive pay during the reference period;  
 employees on leave without pay who did not receive pay during the 
 reference  period;  
 employees on strike, or stood down, who did not receive pay during  
 the reference period;  
 directors who are not paid a salary;  
 proprietors/partners of unincorporated businesses;  
 self-employed persons such as subcontractors, owner/drivers, 
consultants; and  
 persons paid solely by commission without a retainer (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics  2008j). 
The ABS, further classifies remuneration as to;    
 full-time adult ordinary time earnings referring to one week’s earnings 
of employees for the reference period attributed to award, standard or 
agreed hours of work (commonly referred to as AWOTE) 
 Full-time adult total earnings (which includes both ordinary time and  
                                     overtime pay) 
 All employees total earnings, commonly referred to as TE (including  
                                     full-time and part-time, adult and junior)  
 
There can be a significant difference between the calculations. For 
example, the ABS survey for the period May to August 2010 indicates 
that;  
 Full-time adult ordinary time earnings (AWOTE) $1,259.40  
 Full-time adult total earnings   $1,312.00 




A5:2 Mandatory Contributions  
The introduction of mandatory contributions under compulsory work place superannuation 
began in 1992. The Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 defined the amount 
of contribution employers are required to make on behalf of employees. A mandatory 
contribution for most employees began at a rate of 3 per cent in 1992 and this has increased 




Mandatory contributions are paid by the employer on behalf of the employee. The following 
sets out the dates when changes occurred: 
 3 per cent from 1st July 1992 
 6 per cent from 1 July 1996  
 8 per cent from 1 July 2000  
 9 per cent from 1 July 2002 
 9.25 per cent from 1 July 2013 
Unfortunately, there are some inequities in the SGC policy framework when it comes to 
Sections 22 and 23 of the Act, as set out in the tables below.  
 
Superannuation (Administration) Act 1992  
Defined Mandatory Contributions for Employers who’s Payroll Obligations do not Exceed 
$1,000,000 
 
   Table A5:1 Mandatory Contributions – Payroll under $1,000,000 





























Superannuation (Administration) Act 1992   
Defined Mandatory Contributions for Employers who’s Payroll Obligations Exceed 
$1,000,000 
                        Table A5:2 Mandatory Contributions - Payroll over $1,000,000 















It is interesting to note that if an employer’s annual national payroll for the base year (1991-
1992) exceeded $1,000,000 the defined percentage amount paid to a superannuation provider 
on behalf of an employee was significantly higher than if the payroll was under $1,000,000 as 
shown in above tables. This means that larger organizations or organizations that paid above 
average remuneration and therefore exceeded $1,000,000 in annual payroll provided a 







A5:3  Investment: Return 
More reliable long term research from Dimson et al, (2002) suggests 7 per cent may be too 
high. Dimson et al, (2002) have collected and complied data from all three areas of 
investment, that being, cash, equities and bills across fifteen (15) countries from 1901 to 2001 
indicate a much more modest outcome of approximately 4 per cent. Their results failed to 
include the World Wide, Global Financial Crisis (GFC) which has had a significant negative 





A5:4  Investment: Risk/Return  
The rate of return on superannuation investments is not only dependent on market and 
economic conditions but on the amount of risk an individual superannuation contributor is 
prepared to take. Individuals are required to make decisions about the amount of risk they 
will take. This means individuals can choose the investment strategy or the amount of risk 
they want the superannuation fund to take on their behalf when investing their money. This 
choice means individuals can choose from, a conservative strategy meaning less risk is taken 
to an aggressive strategy where a high level of risk is taken to achieve a higher return or 
something in between. The most popular choice by employees and the employer default 
option is a balanced strategy.  
A balanced option is a medium risk strategy designed to achieve a combination of 
reasonable income and sound capital growth over the medium to long term. This is a 
mix of strategies approximately 50/50 over time between ‘growth’ and ‘defensive’ 
assets. The portfolio is well diversified and soundly managed. Although returns will 
be subject to market variations and there is moderate risk that the value of the 
portfolio may fall (Public Trustee 2009 p.1).   
There appears to be little research on long term returns for superannuation investments. 
However, some research has been undertaken on the short term. The Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 
(APRA) have undertaken limited research in this area. Both ASIC and APRA have conducted 
research to estimate the return on superannuation funds within a balanced option. The ASIC 
research indicates that the average return from 1994 to 2008 was approximately 7.848 per 
cent (Australian Securities and Investment Commission 2008a). The APRA research 
indicates the mean benchmark return over a five year period from July 2001 to June 2006 was 
7.8 per cent (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2007c. It should be noted the returns 
measured by both ASIC and APRA covered time periods that were globally, relatively 
prosperous economic times. The only minor down turn was the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
which impacted more in Asia rather than the developed western countries. World Wide, the 
GFC has had the most significant impact on markets however, this was not included in the 
above figures. The Commonwealth Treasuries, in their Retirement and Income Modelling 
(RIM) Unit estimated an annual growth rate of 7 per cent for long-term fund earnings 
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although there appears no explanation as to why this amount was used. Similar, the Rim 
research was undertaken in 2002, relatively stable economic times and before the GFC. It is 
interesting to note that when the Treasure, Wayne Swan and Minister for Superannuation, 
Bill Shorten announced changes to the superannuation system, in April 2013 they estimated 
returns on superannuation funds of 5 per cent (Shorten 2013).  
 
A superannuation investment can vary from twenty to thirty or forty years, it is therefore 
appropriate that the returns used in any income modelling be reflective of returns over an 
extended period of time, with consideration to both good and bad economic conditions. This 
research failed to find research providing long term superannuation returns. However, 
Dimson et al, (2002) collected and complied data from all three areas of investment, that 
being, cash, equities and bills across fifteen (15) countries. The following from Princton 
University press, provides a summary of the book  Triumph of the Optimists:101 Years of 
Global Investment Returns by Elroy Dimson, Paul Marsh, & Mike Staunton; 
 
They present a comprehensive and consistent analysis of investment returns for 
equities, bonds, bills, currencies and inflation, spanning sixteen countries, from the 
end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twenty-first…… Crucially, the 
authors analyze total returns, including reinvested income. They show that some 
historical indexes overstate long-term performance because they are contaminated by 
survivorship bias and that long-term stock returns are in most countries seriously 
overestimated, due to a focus on periods that with hindsight are known to have been 
successful (Dimsen et al 2002   p.1). 
Crucially, the authors analyze total returns, including reinvested income. They show that 
some historical indexes overstate long-term performance because they are contaminated by 
survivorship bias and that long-term stock returns are in most countries seriously 
overestimated, due to a focus on periods that with hindsight are known to have been 
successful. The Dimson et al (2002) research suggest the average real return from all 15 
countries around the world has been calculated at 5.8 per cent for shares, 1.2 per cent for 
bonds and 0.9 per cent for bills. In Australia, the returns have been calculated at 7.5 per cent 
for shares, 1.1 per cent for bonds and .04 bills (Dimson et al 2002 pp. 220-222).  
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This research will use a balanced option. Therefore the investment strategy would be 
approximately 15 per cent of funds invested in Australian bills, 25 per cent invested in 
Australian bonds and 60 per cent in shares (domestic 30 per cent and international 30 per 
cent). A return based on a balanced investment strategy, at the stated investment percentages 
and long term returns using the Dimson et al (2002) research provides an overall return
16
 of 
4.27 per cent. This research has therefore modelled the superannuation rate of return in each 
scenario using the realistic return of 4.27 per cent and the more generous return of 7 per cent 
used by the Commonwealth Treasury in their Retirement Income Modelling.  
Table A5:5  
Reserve Bank of Australia 
Retail deposit and investment rates; Including Savings accounts; 
Banks' bonus savings accounts; $10000 





























































Source   25-8-2014  
 
  
 Retail Deposit and Investment Rates  
www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/xls/f04hist.xls  
 
                                                 
16
 Rate of return: Balanced investment 15 per cent x .04(Australian bills) + 25per cent x 1.1 (Australian Bonds) + 30 per cent x 7.5 
(Australian shares) + 30 per cent x 5.8 (International Shares) = 4.27per cent 
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A5:6  Commonwealth Treasury (2002) Retirement Income Modelling Unit   
 
A Submission by the Retirement Income Modelling (RIM) Unit part of the  
Commonwealth Treasury  
 
The Commonwealth Treasury submitted a submission to the Australian Government in 
respect to retirement incomes. 
 
The submission ‘Inquiry into Superannuation and standards of Living in Retirement’ 
provided a number of insights into the current expectations of future retirement income  
and formed the basis of a number of calculations with in this research project.  
 





































Chapter 6   
Appendix A6:1 
 
Retirement Income Needs  
 
 
Table A6:1      Age Pension entitlements - As at March 2014 
Maximum payment rate for the Age Pension 
 Single  
$766.00 per fortnight $19,916.00 per annum 
  
Couple  
$1,154.80 per fortnight $30,024.80 per annum 
            Source: Department of Human Services 2014 
 
 
Table A6:2  Lump sum required based on replacement rate for a male 
 
 










Table A6:3 Lump sum required based on replacement rate for a female 
  Income Per Annum  Retirement  Lump Sum Needed 












Modest Life Style 
Single (male or female) 
 
Comfortable lifestyle 
Single (male or female) 
 
Total per year  
 
 
         $23,283  
 
          $42,254 





See following table A6:5  (Budgets for various households and living standards) 













Housing - ongoing 
only 
$63.75 $61.19 $73.88 $85.65 
Energy $43.58 $57.87 $44.22 $59.97 
Food $75.86 $157.15 $108.38 $195.08 
Clothing $17.58 $28.54 $38.05 $57.08 
Household goods 
and services 
$26.18 $35.50 $73.65 $86.28 
Health $39.58 $76.39 $78.52 $138.59 
Transport $96.80 $99.54 $144.25 $146.99 
Leisure $73.57 $109.60 $222.94 $305.51 
Communications $9.63 $16.85 $26.46 $33.67 
Total per week $446.52 $642.64 $810.36 $1,108.83 
Total per year $23,283 $33,509 $42,254 $57,817 




Table A6:6 Bank returns 
Table A6:6  Bank rate returns as at August 2014  
Institution  Product 90 Days 180 Days 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr  4 Yr 5 Yr 
   % % % % % % % 
         
Bank of Melbourne Term Deposit  2.70 3.15 3.35 3.40 3.75 3.90 4.15 
St George Term Deposit 2.70 3.15 3.35 3.40 3.75 3.90 4.15 
Bendigo Bank Term Deposit 3.15 3.25 3.35 3.50 3.70 3.90 4.15 
NAB Term Deposit 3.15 3.15 3.35 3.60 3.75 3.90 4.25 
ANZ Term Deposit 3.00 3.05 3.30 3.40 3.60 3.90 4.10 
Westpac Term Deposit 2.50 3.05 3.30 3.40 3.70 3.90 4.15 
Suncorp Bank Term Deposit 3.40 3.40 3.55 3.60 3.65 3.65 3.80 
AMP  Term Deposit 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.10 3.20 3.20 3.20 










A6:7 Lump sum savings required  
 
For women reaching their 70
th
 birthday life it is expected they will live until  87.5 years.  
For men who reach they 70
th
 birthday, it is expected they are lily to live until 82.3 years  
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2010).   
 
Note: The following tables indicates the amount of funds needed to provide funds, equivalent 
to the age pension for 87 years for females and 82 for men. Excel spreadsheet was used 
varying the amount of lump sum savings to calculate an appropriate amount of lump sum 














Table A6:8 Summary of calculations for lump sum needed at retirement for both 
male and female  






Retirement  Lump Sum 
Needed 
Age Pension  $ 19,900 pa Male  $304,300 
    Female  $371,300 
        
Budget  






Modest Life Style $23,300 pa Female  $435,000 
        
Budget   Male  $646,700 
Comfortable Life 
Style $42,300 pa  Female  
$789,300 






  $39,800 Female  $781,450 
Male and female calculations based on life expectancy of 82 years Female 87 Years 
*    Age Pension July 2014  
**    Based on Westpac/ASFA March Quarter  2014 
***  Based on  Males; Full Time; Adult; Ordinary time earnings ; July 2014 Male 1560.50 





























Retirement Income  Replacement Method  
Based on Life Expectancy for Women 
Years  Age Retirement  Drawdown Balance Investment Return  
  
 
Savings Replacement  after drawdown after inflation  
      Method    0.02 
1 65 $742,650 $39,800 $702,850 $14,057 
2 66 $716,907 $39,800 $677,107 $13,542 
3 67 $690,649 $39,800 $650,849 $13,017 
4 68 $663,866 $39,800 $624,066 $12,481 
5 69 $636,547 $39,800 $596,747 $11,935 
6 70 $608,682 $39,800 $568,882 $11,378 
7 71 $580,260 $39,800 $540,460 $10,809 
8 72 $551,269 $39,800 $511,469 $10,229 
9 73 $521,699 $39,800 $481,899 $9,638 
10 74 $491,537 $39,800 $451,737 $9,035 
11 75 $460,771 $39,800 $420,971 $8,419 
12 76 $429,391 $39,800 $389,591 $7,792 
13 77 $397,383 $39,800 $357,583 $7,152 
14 78 $364,734 $39,800 $324,934 $6,499 
15 79 $331,433 $39,800 $291,633 $5,833 
16 80 $297,466 $39,800 $257,666 $5,153 
17 81 $262,819 $39,800 $223,019 $4,460 
18 82 $227,479 $39,800 $187,679 $3,754 
19 83 $191,433 $39,800 $151,633 $3,033 
20 84 $154,665 $39,800 $114,865 $2,297 
21 85 $117,163 $39,800 $77,363 $1,547 
22 86 $78,910 $39,800 $39,110 $782 





















Retirement Income  Replacement Method  
Based on Life Expectancy for Men  
Years  Age Retirement  Drawdown Balance Investment Return  
  
 
Savings Replacement  after drawdown after inflation  
      Method    0.02 
1 65 $744,650 $48,700 $695,950 $13,919 
2 66 $709,869 $48,700 $661,169 $13,223.38 
3 67 $674,392 $48,700 $625,692 $12,513.85 
4 68 $638,206 $48,700 $589,506 $11,790.12 
5 69 $601,296 $48,700 $552,596 $11,051.93 
6 70 $563,648 $48,700 $514,948 $10,298.97 
7 71 $525,247 $48,700 $476,547 $9,530.94 
8 72 $486,078 $48,700 $437,378 $8,747.56 
9 73 $446,126 $48,700 $397,426 $7,948.52 
10 74 $405,374 $48,700 $356,674 $7,133.49 
11 75 $363,808 $48,700 $315,108 $6,302.16 
12 76 $321,410 $48,700 $272,710 $5,454.20 
13 77 $278,164 $48,700 $229,464 $4,589.28 
14 78 $234,053 $48,700 $185,353 $3,707.07 
15 79 $189,060 $48,700 $140,360 $2,807.21 
16 80 $143,168 $48,700 $94,468 $1,889.35 
17 81 $96,357 $48,700 $47,657 $953.14 



















Retirement savings equivalent to Age Pension 
Based on Life Expectancy for Women 
Years  Age Retirement  Drawdown Balance Investment Return  
    Savings Standard Budget  after drawdown After Inflation  
      
 
  02 
1 65 $371,300 $19,900 $351,400 7028 
2 66 $358,428 $19,900 $338,528 6771 
3 67 $345,299 $19,900 $325,399 6508 
4 68 $331,907 $19,900 $312,007 6240 
5 69 $318,247 $19,900 $298,347 5967 
6 70 $304,314 $19,900 $284,414 5688 
7 71 $290,102 $19,900 $270,202 5404 
8 72 $275,606 $19,900 $255,706 5114 
9 73 $260,820 $19,900 $240,920 4818 
10 74 $245,738 $19,900 $225,838 4517 
11 75 $230,355 $19,900 $210,455 4209 
12 76 $214,664 $19,900 $194,764 3895 
13 77 $198,660 $19,900 $178,760 3575 
14 78 $182,335 $19,900 $162,435 3249 
15 79 $165,683 $19,900 $145,783 2916 
16 80 $148,699 $19,900 $128,799 2576 
17 81 $131,375 $19,900 $111,475 2230 
18 82 $113,705 $19,900 $93,805 1876 
19 83 $95,681 $19,900 $75,781 1516 
20 84 $77,296 $19,900 $57,396 1148 
21 85 $58,544 $19,900 $38,644 773 
22 86 $39,417 $19,900 $19,517 390 



















Retirement savings equivalent to Standard Budget Approach - Modest Life Style   
Based on Life Expectancy for Women 






after drawdown after inflation  
      
 
  0.02 
1 65 $434,800 $23,300 $411,500 $8,230 
2 66 $419,730 $23,300 $396,430 $7,929 
3 67 $404,359 $23,300 $381,059 $7,621 
4 68 $388,680 $23,300 $365,380 $7,308 
5 69 $372,687 $23,300 $349,387 $6,988 
6 70 $356,375 $23,300 $333,075 $6,662 
7 71 $339,737 $23,300 $316,437 $6,329 
8 72 $322,765 $23,300 $299,465 $5,989 
9 73 $305,455 $23,300 $282,155 $5,643 
10 74 $287,798 $23,300 $264,498 $5,290 
11 75 $269,788 $23,300 $246,488 $4,930 
12 76 $251,417 $23,300 $228,117 $4,562 
13 77 $232,680 $23,300 $209,380 $4,188 
14 78 $213,567 $23,300 $190,267 $3,805 
15 79 $194,073 $23,300 $170,773 $3,415 
16 80 $174,188 $23,300 $150,888 $3,018 
17 81 $153,906 $23,300 $130,606 $2,612 
18 82 $133,218 $23,300 $109,918 $2,198 
19 83 $112,116 $23,300 $88,816 $1,776 
20 84 $90,593 $23,300 $67,293 $1,346 
21 85 $68,639 $23,300 $45,339 $907 
22 86 $46,245 $23,300 $22,945 $459 




















Retirement savings equivalent to Standard Budget Approach -Comfortable Life 
Style   
Based on Life Expectancy for Women 
Years  Age Retirement  Drawdown Balance Investment Return  
    Savings Standard Budget  
after 
drawdown 
after inflation  
          0.02 
1 65 $789,300 $42,300 $747,000 $14,940 
2 66 $761,940 $42,300 $719,640 $14,393 
3 67 $734,033 $42,300 $691,733 $13,835 
4 68 $705,567 $42,300 $663,267 $13,265 
5 69 $676,533 $42,300 $634,233 $12,685 
6 70 $646,917 $42,300 $604,617 $12,092 
7 71 $616,710 $42,300 $574,410 $11,488 
8 72 $585,898 $42,300 $543,598 $10,872 
9 73 $554,470 $42,300 $512,170 $10,243 
10 74 $522,413 $42,300 $480,113 $9,602 
11 75 $489,716 $42,300 $447,416 $8,948 
12 76 $456,364 $42,300 $414,064 $8,281 
13 77 $422,345 $42,300 $380,045 $7,601 
14 78 $387,646 $42,300 $345,346 $6,907 
15 79 $352,253 $42,300 $309,953 $6,199 
16 80 $316,152 $42,300 $273,852 $5,477 
17 81 $279,329 $42,300 $237,029 $4,741 
18 82 $241,770 $42,300 $199,470 $3,989 
19 83 $203,459 $42,300 $161,159 $3,223 
20 84 $164,382 $42,300 $122,082 $2,442 
21 85 $124,524 $42,300 $82,224 $1,644 
22 86 $83,868 $42,300 $41,568 $831 














Table A6:14M  
 
Retirement Savings Equivalent to Age Pension Single 
Based on Life Expectancy of Male 
Years Age Retirement  Drawdown Balance Investment Return  
  
 
Savings Equivalent to  after Drawdown after inflation  
      Age Pension   0.02 
1 65 $304,300 $19,900 $284,400 $5,688 
2 66 $290,088 $19,900 $270,188 $5,404 
3 67 $275,592 $19,900 $255,692 $5,114 
4 68 $260,806 $19,900 $240,906 $4,818 
5 69 $245,724 $19,900 $225,824 $4,516 
6 70 $230,340 $19,900 $210,440 $4,209 
7 71 $214,649 $19,900 $194,749 $3,895 
8 72 $198,644 $19,900 $178,744 $3,575 
9 73 $182,319 $19,900 $162,419 $3,248 
10 74 $165,667 $19,900 $145,767 $2,915 
11 75 $148,683 $19,900 $128,783 $2,576 
12 76 $131,358 $19,900 $111,458 $2,229 
13 77 $113,687 $19,900 $93,787 $1,876 
14 78 $95,663 $19,900 $75,763 $1,515 
15 79 $77,278 $19,900 $57,378 $1,148 
16 80 $58,526 $19,900 $38,626 $773 
17 81 $39,398 $19,900 $19,498 $390 
























Retirement Income Standard Method -Modest 
Based on Life Expectancy of Male  





Method after drawdown 
after inflation  
      Modest   0.02 
1 65 $356,350 $23,300 $333,050 $6,661 
2 66 $339,711 $23,300 $316,411 $6,328 
3 67 $322,739 $23,300 $299,439 $5,989 
4 68 $305,428 $23,300 $282,128 $5,643 
5 69 $287,771 $23,300 $264,471 $5,289 
6 70 $269,760 $23,300 $246,460 $4,929 
7 71 $251,389 $23,300 $228,089 $4,562 
8 72 $232,651 $23,300 $209,351 $4,187 
9 73 $213,538 $23,300 $190,238 $3,805 
10 74 $194,043 $23,300 $170,743 $3,415 
11 75 $174,158 $23,300 $150,858 $3,017 
12 76 $153,875 $23,300 $130,575 $2,611 
13 77 $133,186 $23,300 $109,886 $2,198 
14 78 $112,084 $23,300 $88,784 $1,776 
15 79 $90,560 $23,300 $67,260 $1,345 
16 80 $68,605 $23,300 $45,305 $906 
17 81 $46,211 $23,300 $22,911 $458 

























Retirement Income Standard Method - Comfortable 
Based on Life Expectancy of Male  
Years  Age Retirement Drawdown Balance Investment Return  
  
 
 Savings Standard Method after drawdown after inflation  
      Comfortable   0.02 
1 65 $646,770 $42,300 $604,470 $12,089 
2 66 $616,559 $42,300 $574,259 $11,485 
3 67 $585,745 $42,300 $543,445 $10,869 
4 68 $554,313 $42,300 $512,013 $10,240 
5 69 $522,254 $42,300 $479,954 $9,599 
6 70 $489,553 $42,300 $447,253 $8,945 
7 71 $456,198 $42,300 $413,898 $8,278 
8 72 $422,176 $42,300 $379,876 $7,598 
9 73 $387,473 $42,300 $345,173 $6,903 
10 74 $352,077 $42,300 $309,777 $6,196 
11 75 $315,972 $42,300 $273,672 $5,473 
12 76 $279,146 $42,300 $236,846 $4,737 
13 77 $241,583 $42,300 $199,283 $3,986 
14 78 $203,268 $42,300 $160,968 $3,219 
15 79 $164,188 $42,300 $121,888 $2,438 
16 80 $124,325 $42,300 $82,025 $1,641 
17 81 $83,666 $42,300 $41,366 $827 























Table A6:17W Lump sum required based at retirement based on replacement method for 
                         median income  
 
      Median    Income     
Retirement Income  Replacement Method  
Based on Life Expectancy for Women 
Years  Age Retirement  Drawdown Balance Investment  
  
 
Savings Replacement  
after 
drawdown 
Return  .02 per cent 
      Method    0.02 
1 65 $556,400 $29,820 $526,580 $10,532 
2 66 $537,112 $29,820 $507,292 $10,146 
3 67 $517,437 $29,820 $487,617 $9,752 
4 68 $497,370 $29,820 $467,550 $9,351 
5 69 $476,901 $29,820 $447,081 $8,942 
6 70 $456,022 $29,820 $426,202 $8,524 
7 71 $434,726 $29,820 $404,906 $8,098 
8 72 $413,005 $29,820 $383,185 $7,664 
9 73 $390,848 $29,820 $361,028 $7,221 
10 74 $368,249 $29,820 $338,429 $6,769 
11 75 $345,197 $29,820 $315,377 $6,308 
12 76 $321,685 $29,820 $291,865 $5,837 
13 77 $297,702 $29,820 $267,882 $5,358 
14 78 $273,240 $29,820 $243,420 $4,868 
15 79 $248,288 $29,820 $218,468 $4,369 
16 80 $222,838 $29,820 $193,018 $3,860 
17 81 $196,878 $29,820 $167,058 $3,341 
18 82 $170,399 $29,820 $140,579 $2,812 
19 83 $143,391 $29,820 $113,571 $2,271 
20 84 $115,842 $29,820 $86,022 $1,720 
21 85 $87,743 $29,820 $57,923 $1,158 
22 86 $59,081 $29,820 $29,261 $585 














Discount Table used to Provide Retirement Savings Equivalent to 2014 Figurers.  
 
Source: The Global Body for Professional Accounts 






Chapter 7      
 
Appendix A7:1   Details of Remuneration 
 
Earnings or remuneration of working Australians is necessary for the development of both case 
studies and scenarios. Earnings post 1994, are readily available from the ABS, however pre 1994 
are only available by archival hard copy records.  
 
a)Earnings/Remuneration – Before  1994 
Earnings prior to 1994, were not available electronically. Earnings sourced from archival 
records at UWS library. Pre-electronic earnings were limited in calculations. Earnings 
were detailed for Australia and individual states.  
Female earnings: Summary of findings cat. no. 6302 
Male earnings: Summary of findings cat. no. 6302 
 
 
b)Earnings/Remuneration – After  1994  
 
The Average Weekly Ordinary Times Earnings (AWOTE) has been sourced from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat no. 6302.  
 
Female Earrings Average Weekly Earnings, cat. no. 6302.0  table 1,  clm . 
A592308J  - Females, Full Time Adult Ordinary Time Earnings TREND      
Male Earrings Average Weekly Earnings, cat. no. 6302.0  table 1,  clm . 
A592308X  - Males, Full Time Adult Ordinary Time Earnings TREND 
The ABS has developed numerous categories detailing level of earnings for different 
industries. However, the calculation for the ‘TREND’ of the AWOTE  has incorporated 
the average across all industries.   Using the average for all categories seemed a logical 
approach, in assessing the average Australian.  
The scenarios in chapter 7 have been developed using the AWOTE, the median, mean 
and total earnings. The mean and median has been calculated using the description used 
by the Commonwealth Treasury Retirement Income Modelling (RIM) modelling; 
Mean    -   83 per cent of AWOTE 
Median -  75 per cent of AWOTE 
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Total earnings have been sourced from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, cat no. 6302.0 
 Female Earnings:  Females; Full Time; Adult; Total Earnings table 
A2810225X  
Male Earnings: Males; Full Time; Adult; Total Earnings table 1  clm. 
A2810224W  
 
Similar to the calculations for AWOTE, the calculation for the ‘TREND’ of the Total 
Earnings has incorporated the average across all industries.   Using the average for all 





Retirement Income Methods of Calculation  
 
Appendix A7:2 Replacement Method 
The replacement method is based on the concept that a percentage of pre-retirement salary is 
required to provide an adequate post-retirement income.  There are many discussions and debates 
about a suitable figure of pre income as a replacement for future retirement income. The 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia Limited (AFSA) (2012) has published 
research suggesting that a rule of thumb target of 60 per cent of gross pre-retirement income is 
consistent with most of the other benchmarks surveyed. The following table indicates the amount 
of retirement income that could be expected using the replacement method.  
 
For this research a replacement income is based on a replacement figure of 60 per cent of pre-
retirement earnings. To provide some context, table 6:1 using ABS earnings for 2013 has 










Table A7:3  Retirement Income: Replacement Method – Male Earnings 
REMUNERATION 
Based on Male Earnings 
(2013) 
 
Per Annum Earnings  
Replacement Method   
60% of Pre-Retirement 
Income 
Average Weekly Ordinary 
Times Earnings (AWOTE) 
$1487* pw                = $77,324 pa $46,394 
Mean  83% of AWOTE  $77,324 pa 83%         =  $64,178 pa     $38,507 
Median 75% of AWOTE  $77,324 pa. 75%         = $59,139 pa  $34,958 
Total Earnings $1,603.10 pw               = 
$83,361.20 pa 
$50,016 
*Based on original wages April 2014 cat. 6302.0  ABS  2014 - all industries 
 
The replacement method above has been based on male earnings. Table 6:2 is similar, but based 
on female earnings. Undertaking a similar table for female earnings highlights the wage gap 
between males and females. However, the cost of living in retirement will be the same for both 






Table A7:4  Retirement Income: Replacement Method - Female Earnings 
 
REMUNERATION 
Based on Male Earnings (2013) 
 
Per Annum Earnings  
Replacement Method   
60% of Pre-Retirement 
Income 
Average Weekly Ordinary Times 
Earnings (AWOTE) 
$1248 pw            =    $64,896 pa $38,937 
Mean  83% of AWOTE  $64,896pa*.83%   =  $53,863 pa $32,318 
 
Median 75% of AWOTE  $64,896pa*.75%    = $47,172 pa $28,303 
Total Earnings $1447 pw               = $75,244 pa $45,146 
*Based on original wages April 2014 cat. 6302.0  ABS  2014 – all industries  










Standard Budget Approach  
















$63.75 $61.19 $73.88 $85.65 
Energy $43.58 $57.87 $44.22 $59.97 
Food $75.86 $157.15 $108.38 $195.08 
Clothing $17.58 $28.54 $38.05 $57.08 
Household goods 
and services 
$26.18 $35.50 $73.65 $86.28 
Health $39.58 $76.39 $78.52 $138.59 
Transport $96.80 $99.54 $144.25 $146.99 
Leisure $73.57 $109.60 $222.94 $305.51 
Communications $9.63 $16.85 $26.46 $33.67 
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Total per week $446.52 $642.64 $810.36 $1,108.83 
Total per year $23,283 $33,509 $42,254 $57,817 





Appendix A7:6  Standard Budget Approach 
The standard budget approach measures a person’s post-retirement income by calculating what 
funds might be needed to cover all costs in retirement. The standard budget approach provides a 
comprehensive, but basic needs budget, of the amount of funds most retirees need in their 
retirement. Using this approach, the Westpac Banking Corporation, in conjunction with the 
Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), have developed a budget for both a 
modest and more comfortable lifestyle related to expenditure by a household (Westpac 2010).   
 
 




Modest Life Style 
Single (male or female) 
 
Comfortable lifestyle 
Single (male or female) 
 
Total per year  
 
 
         $ 33,509 
 
          $57,817 















Appendix A7:8 Definitions of Income Levels 
 
Average Weekly Ordinary Time Earnings (AWOTE) 
Payments for award, standard or agreed hours of work, including allowances, penalty payments, 
payments by measured result and regular bonuses. Salary sacrifice amounts are included. 
Excluded are non-cash components of salary packages, overtime payments, and payments not 
related to the survey reference period, such as retrospective pay, pay in advance, leave loadings, 
and severance pay and termination and redundancy payments             (Department of Families, 
Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs 2014). 
 
Median Earnings 
 The amount of earnings which divides employees into two groups containing equal numbers of 
employees, one half with earnings below the median and the other half with earnings above the 
median (Australian Bureau of Statistics  2012d). The Commonwealth Treasury, Retirement 
Income Modelling Unit (2002) provides a defined formula for a median level of income, the 
median level of income is 75 per cent of the AWOTE. This formula has been used in this 
research (Commonwealth Treasury 2002).  
 
Average Earnings (mean) 
The amount obtained by dividing the total earnings of a group (e.g. full-time employees) by the 
number of employees in that group (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012d). As with the median 
level of income, the Commonwealth Treasury, Retirement Income Modelling Unit (2002) 
provides a defined formula for a mean level of income, the mean level of income is 83 per cent 
of the AWOTE. This formula has been used in this research (Commonwealth Treasury 2002). 
 
Total Cash Earnings 
 Total cash earnings of employees is equal to ordinary time earnings plus overtime earnings  
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